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Abstract
In December 1944, Hitler’s Germany was besieged on every front. Germany was
working on super weapons and needed to buy some time to fight off the Red Army and the
Allies. Until his super weapons could turn the tide, Hitler opted for a major counteroffensive in
the west to split the Allies. Hitler would launch his last military reserves in a desperate gamble
aimed at driving to the port of Antwerp through Luxembourg and Belgium. Such a blow, Hitler
believed, would wreck the Allied Coalition. One of the divisions facing the main German
offensive was the American 28th Infantry Division, occupying a twenty five mile front that
extended along the Belgium and Luxembourg borders with Germany. The actions by the soldiers
of that division combined to slow and finally stall the German offensive, robbing it of its
momentum and, most of all, the precious time upon which the operation relied for success.
This dissertation examines the reasons why the soldiers of the 28th Infantry Division
fought so fiercely, in some cases to the last man, to delay the German advance. This research
explores first-hand accounts left by the men who fought, the efforts of the U.S. government to
inspire men to fight for the American way of life, and the chaplains who attended to their
religious needs. It identifies how significant the delaying actions of the 28th Division were to the
Allied success in the Battle of the Bulge, how faith factored into the nexus of ideas that inspired
the perseverance of the soldiers and identifies the forces beyond camaraderie and cohesion that
influenced soldiers to resist the German offensive in the Ardennes. For the men of the 28th
Division, fighting for the American way of life meant that they were fighting to preserve
freedom to worship, freedom from oppression, and freedom of movement.
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Chapter One
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to determine what motivated the soldiers of the 28th Infantry
Division, in the face of overwhelming odds, to take actions during the first few days of the Battle
of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive) to delay the German plan of attack. Challenging the
conventional ideas about the contribution of the 28th Infantry Division and the motivations that
cause men to fight, this study concluded that the soldiers fought for the American way of life.
The aim of this study was to answer three research questions:
1. What forces beyond camaraderie and cohesion influenced soldiers to resist the
German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge?
2. How did faith factor into the nexus of ideas that inspired the perseverance of the
soldiers?
3. How significant was the delaying action of the 28th Division to the Allied success in
the Battle of the Bulge?
The Allies thought the end was near for the German Army by mid-September 1944. The success
by the Russians in the east added to their optimism. In an attempt to secure the Roer River and a
complex of dams on the same river near Schmidt, Germany, the U.S. command transferred a
number of units to include the 1st, 8th, 9th, and the 28th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Armored
Division, into the Hürtgen Forest. The 28th Division moved into position on the 26th of October,
replacing the weakened 9th Infantry Division. While the 28th Division was promised lavish air
and artillery support, the weather virtually negated close air support and the terrain prohibited
observed artillery fire. After bitter fighting from November 2-14, the Division was withdrawn
from the Hürtgen Forest and was moved to Luxembourg. The division battle losses were 248
1

officers and 5,452 enlisted men. The division needed a rest and a chance to refit. The Ardennes
Forest in Belgium and Luxembourg was thick, and the Allied Command believed it to be
impenetrable. 1
The 28th Division was stretched over a twenty-five-mile front facing the German lines.
Since the entire front could not be occupied, the three regiments of the division established
strongpoints at various villages and at key road intersections. By mid-December 1944, the
division had been recuperating in Luxembourg for several weeks. A little after 5:00 a.m. on the
morning of December 16, 1944, their recuperation ended as the German attack began. The 28th
Infantry Division was the only major fighting force that stood between the German onslaught
and Bastogne, Belgium and a key road network that lead to the deep-water port of Antwerp.
Taking the brunt of the German assault were three regiments of the division – the 109th, 110th
and 112th. The actions taken in the first days by the soldiers of the division combined to slow
and finally stall the German offensive, robbing it of its momentum and, most of all, the precious
time upon which the operation relied for success.
The acts of the soldiers represents an element often overlooked by historians and
exemplified in the fighting spirit exhibited by the soldiers in delaying the German armies and
buying time for the Allies to send reinforcements to Bastogne. Despite overwhelming odds, the
soldiers managed to hold out as German assault forces began to work their way into and around
the soldier’s positions. Many of the defenders recognized that they were surrounded and that no
relief or escape, save as prisoners, was possible. Yet despite this realistic assessment, they
continued to resist until there was simply no other means to resist. In two days of heavy fighting,
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the men of the 28th Infantry Division had inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking German
forces and upset the German timetable.2
History is full of desperate historic battles that are idolized and provide lessons for future
soldiers and military leaders. Once such battle was the Ardennes Offensive, or Battle of the
Bulge. It took place from December 16, 1944, to January 25, 1945, and stands as a testament to
resolve against a determined enemy. Movies have been made and books written about the stand
of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, and their relief by General Patton’s 4th
Armored Division. The Second World War would probably have produced more casualties and
lasted longer had it not been for the strong resolve of Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe and
the men of the 101st Airborne and other units around Bastogne. While the achievements of the
101st Airborne have been championed, the actions of the 109th, 110th and 112th Regiments of
the 28th Infantry Division during the first few days of the Offensive get little attention from
historians.
By December 1944, the war in Europe seemed to be drawing to a conclusion. Beginning
in the fall of 1943 the Soviet Army had launched a relentless advance which, by the fall of 1944,
had permitted their armies to occupy East Prussian soil and to be poised for a final advance to
Vienna, Prague, and Berlin. The western allies, after landing in Normandy, France on June 6,
1944, had broken through German defenses, and pushed the German border for a final thrust into
the heartland of Hitler’s Germany. By this time, the question was not so much could the allies
win the war, but how much longer could the battered German armies hold out. Hitler’s Germany
was besieged on every front. Germany was working on super weapons and needed to buy some
time to defend against the Russian Army. Until his super weapons could turn the tide, Hitler
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opted for a major counteroffensive in the west to split the Allied Coalition. Hitler believed the
allied alliance to be weak.3
Throughout his political and military career, Adolf Hitler had shown an uncanny knack
for surprising his opponents, confounding them by launching an unexpected offensive at the
most unlikely place or moment.4 For example, one of Adolf Hitler's first major foreign policy
initiatives after coming to power in 1933 was to sign a non-aggression pact with Poland in
January 1934. On September 1, 1939, Germany conducted a surprise invasion of Poland. 5 In
another example, on August 23, 1939, Hitler signed the German-Soviet nonaggression pact. Nazi
Germany conducted a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.6
Hitler launched his last military reserves in a frantic gamble aimed at driving to the port
of Antwerp through Luxembourg and Belgium. If successful, the Allies could lose over thirty
divisions. Such a blow, Hitler believed, would destroy the Allied Coalition and cause them to
negotiate an agreement with Germany to end the war. The area chosen by Hitler for the offensive
was the Ardennes, that area of Belgium and Luxembourg which in late 1944 was considered to
be a quiet sector by the Allied Command.7 This was an area where the troops were sent for rest
and refitting. Standing in the way were four U.S. divisions – two green units placed in a quiet
sector to gain experience, and two badly shot–up units that were resting and training
replacements, occupying a front that extended along the Belgium and Luxembourg borders.
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One of the badly shot–up divisions facing the main German offensive was the American
28th Infantry Division. This veteran division, originally a Pennsylvania National Guard unit, had
been engaged in combat since arriving in France on July 22, 1944. It had participated in the
breakout at St. Lo, fought through northern France, liberated sections of Belgium and
Luxembourg, and then moved into Germany in early September, attacking the famous Siegfried
Line, or West Wall.8
It was exceptionally cold, foggy, damp, and snow covered when the Germans attacked on
the morning of December 16, 1944. Without any sleep, often without food, the soldiers of the
28th Division fought nonstop, frequently until the last bullet and last man, to stop the German
drive. Overall, the 28th Division would identify elements of nine German divisions in its sector
before the battle was over.9 The men fought like they were defending their own homes. The
achievements of the 28th Infantry Division soldiers, while facing overwhelming forces in the
early days of the Battle of the Bulge, provide lessons for future soldiers and military leaders.
The questions of why men fight, and what factors motivate them to fight even when death
seems certain, are ancient, and complex. Despite the lack of a single unifying theory of combat
motivation, military leaders strive to study, understand motivational factors, and cultivate them
in their people to achieve the greatest chance for victory. Understanding combat motivation
provides probable benefits to those who understand these factors and can instill them in soldiers.
Both military historians and social scientists have studied how soldiers behave on the battlefield,
including how they handle the stress of combat and what motivates them.
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These studies have helped in understanding how war affects soldiers. One such
motivating factor is camaraderie. Camaraderie is most socially expressed within military culture.
It is a deep and abiding bond amongst soldiers within a small, interdependent unit. Other than
being in the general vicinity of one another as in an aggregate social group, soldiers need to be
organized toward a concrete, common goal. The military organization, with its bureaucratic
objectives, lends itself to forming such concrete goals for the units. 10 “The goal is the survival
and close teamwork with others in the outfit. The life of each depends as much on the feeling of
close mutual dependence which has been seen to be so important as a basis for other aspects of
combat motivation,” 11 argues Samuel and Edward Stouffer.
The literature about combat motivation also supports the general belief that soldiers
exclusively fight because of cohesion. For example, William D. Henderson, retired U.S. Army
Colonel, believes cohesion is the primary motivational factor. 12 A similar finding was found in
Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, by Edward A. Shils and Morris
Janowitz. They studied the motivation of German soldiers during World War II and also
concluded that cohesion, as a combination of organizational integrity, fighting effectiveness, and
tenacity is what motivated the German soldier. 13
In a contrasting view, Omer Bartov maintained that the German soldier was motivated by
ideology. 14 Bartov maintains that ideology and indoctrination were really soldier’s prime
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motivating factors. The key point, according to Bartov, is that unit cohesion was not maintained
throughout the war, especially on the Eastern Front, and therefore could not have been the main
reason the Germans fought desperately until the end of the war. The story of the German
Einsatzgruppen offers insight into a fundamental Holocaust question of what made it possible for
men, some of them ordinary men, to kill so many people so ruthlessly. The members of the
Einsatzgruppen had developed a special motivation to kill. The Einsatzgruppen grew out of a
Germany that was economically crippled by World War I reparations, global depression, and a
national sense that the Jew was significantly to blame for their problems. Fostered by the ideals
of National Socialism, the naivety of youth, the sense of pride and accomplishment that military
service gave them, the members of the Einsatzgruppen became fully indoctrinated into the
beliefs of Adolph Hitler.15
Unit cohesion and camaraderie undoubtedly were strong motivators when soldiers are
together and have a chance to get to know each other and how they can count of each other. As
the 28th Division confronted the Germans from one battle to the next, the number of casualties
grew. The men who left the training in Wales were not the ones who fought the next major
battle. The attrition of war since the division landed in Normandy steadily thinned out the ranks.
Lone replacements found themselves among groups of strangers with little chance to get
acquainted before being flung into battle, so there had to be other factors that motivated the men
to fight as they did.
Understanding what inspired the men of the 28th Infantry Division to fight and how they
delayed the Germans is the purpose of this research. This research is significant as it can address
the reasons soldiers, faced with overwhelming odds, chose to stand their ground to delay the
15
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advance of the enemy. The answers can provide military leaders with a better understanding of
what motivates soldiers and can fill the gaps in the historiography of the Battle of the Bulge.
To address these issues, research focused on what specific delaying actions the soldiers
took, what were the spectrum of religious beliefs and practices soldiers brought with them and
experienced during war, and what were other motivating factors that contributed to the actions
by the soldiers in the Ardennes. For example, how much did their belief that they were fighting
for the American way of life affect the decisions of the men of the 28th Infantry Division to fight
so fiercely? For most soldiers, the American way of life meant freedom. That freedom often
emphasized the freedom to worship. In Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American
Religious Sociology, Sociologist Will Herberg describes the American way of life as, “an organic
structure of ideas, values, and beliefs that constitutes a faith common to Americans.” 16
In his book On War, Carl von Clausewitz states, “It is the interaction between physical
and moral forces that determines the victor in warfare.” 17 Clausewitz goes on to say, “they
[moral forces] are the spirits which permeate the whole element of war.” 18 Contained within
moral force, most certainly, is the courage, morale, and the religious faith of the soldiers. The
literature presented by historians writing about the Battle of the Bulge largely focuses on
presenting the physical components of the battle, neglecting the moral aspects.
According to Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, “the only thing rated more
helpful than prayer was not wanting to let the other men down.”19 Their book brings together
historical material with detailed organizational charts and tabular data. Coates and Pellegrin
16
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describe the relationship between military institutions and the American value system. The
concept of bureaucracy is used to analyze management theory, leadership, and informal social
systems in military organizations.20 In the case of the military, men the soldier sees daily and
associate with, tend to fuse together into one force. If the men of a small unit properly blend
together and function as a team, the smaller unit's cohesion can become the primary factor
influencing a soldier's fighting spirit.21
In the years immediately after World War II, historians argued that social cohesion within
the soldier’s primary group is essential to military effectiveness. William Darryl Henderson
considers cohesion a vital aspect of combat motivation.22 Unit cohesion, mutual self-sacrifice,
teamwork, and covering for each other contribute to individual bonding, and ultimately creates
camaraderie. Camaraderie may have contributed to the fighting spirit of the 28th Division
soldiers when they first landed in France. In a November-December 2000 article for Military
Review, Major Robert J. Rielly, U.S. Army, argues that “The strongest motivation for enduring
combat, especially for U.S. soldiers, is the bond formed among members of a squad or
platoon.”23 Rielly claims “This cohesion is the single most important sustaining and motivating
force for combat soldiers.” 24
Although in some ways linked to vindictiveness, the soldier’s feeling about the enemy as
human beings that are evil or subhuman has been offered as motivating factors. There are
examples of hatred of the enemy as a motivating factor among some soldiers in combat during

20
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World War II. One such example is contained in the book Road to Huertgen: Forest in Hell by
Paul Boesch, who was a lieutenant in the U.S. Army. He had a deep hatred for the Germans. On
one occasion he watches a man he shot slowly die. “I could stand there and watch him die and
feel absolutely no qualms of any kind.”25 Boesch compares his killing the German to a carpenter
hammering in a nail. They both have jobs to do, and Boesch has no feelings for the dying man.
Boesch said killing him provoked no more emotion than hammering a nail.26
Another example of vindictiveness can be found in Charles B. MacDonald’s book
Company Commander. MacDonald was an Army captain who served in Belgium and Germany.
While he does not specifically mention any factor as being a primary motivator, his hatred for
the Germans is mentioned often in the book. He has no sympathy for the Germans, military or
civilian. He blames them for starting the war and does not care when German civilians are
kicked out of their homes or stolen from. “These people had asked for it,” 27 is his typical
response. When a German farmer and his wife cry as their farm is burned down, MacDonald
laughs and says, “Thank Adolf.” 28 While evidence has been found in the interviews of 28th
Division soldiers that were conducted shortly after the war and in 1988 by the 28th Division
Historical Section that would indicate many soldiers hated the Germans, this was not found to be
a significant motivating factor.
Some men actually enjoyed combat. According to psychiatrist Eli Ginzberg, “many of the
outstanding combat soldiers were hostile, emotionally insecure, extremely unstable personalities
who might well be termed clinically psychopaths, who fully enjoyed the opportunity of taking

25
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out hostilities directly in a socially acceptable setting of warfare and who in the absence of such
an outlet not infrequently end up in penitentiaries.” 29 After reports of an SS atrocity, it was not
uncommon for American troops to refuse to take prisoners for several days. They had an excuse
to take out hostilities. Some would kill any German soldier they could, even those attempting to
surrender. 30 No evidence in interviews, after action reports, or official documents of 28th
Division soldiers indicate that this was a significant motivating factor.
Inherent to war is the apparent contradiction of sacrifice. The impulse to self-sacrifice
goes against both what our culture has engrained within us and oftentimes too, the directives of
our own human nature. Cultural standards impel us to think of our own well-being primarily, and
our natural human instinct for self-preservation tells us to avoid death at all costs. 31 Yet
somehow sacrifice on the battlefield is just as much a reality as are the bonds of camaraderie
which form between soldiers. 32 Sacrifice did contribute to the fighting spirit of the 28th Division
soldiers as they knew it was necessary to defeat their enemy.
Another factor that has been studied is honor. Camaraderie and sacrifice are battle
dependent experiences, while honor, according to Martin L. Cook is a virtue which is teachable.
Cook proposes that honor, “is most often transmitted through the natural process of
socialization.”33 Children are taught the difference between right and wrong, good, and evil, and
learn what is socially acceptable behavior. Furthermore, the standards of right conduct in war are
transmitted to soldiers through their training and the leadership of their superiors. 34 In The
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Greatest Generation, Tom Brokaw argues that “the World War II generation developed values of
personal responsibility, duty, honor, and faith. These characteristics helped them to defeat
Hitler.”35 Honor certainly contributed to the fighting spirit of the 28th Division soldiers.
American soldiers found comfort and motivation through prayer on the front lines of
World War II. Despite witnessing horrific acts, most soldiers remained steadfast in their
religious beliefs. In his book Serving God and Country, Lyle W. Dorsett relates a story by
Chaplain William R. Thierfelder. The chaplain wrote, “today I’m crawling from foxhole to
foxhole, and the men gobble up every word of encouragement. Some were reading their Bibles,
others their prayer books.”36
Originally administered in the immediate aftermath of World War II, The ‘American
Soldier’ studies were conducted by the Army's Information and Education Division. They
included 163 surveys and records of the attitudes and behaviors of American soldiers during
World War II. In 2013, Brian Wansink and Craig S. Wansink, using data collected during the
American Soldier surveys and records, published their findings in the Journal of Religion and
Health. They concluded that as combat became more frightening, the percentage of soldiers who
reported praying rose from forty-two to seventy-two percent. The results suggest that near the
time of combat, the more fear infantry men felt, the more they were likely to rely on prayer as a
motivation to continue to fight. 37 Religious behavior was generally high among the veterans of
World War II and the men of the 28th Division were no different.
The value and importance of religion was promoted at the highest level of the U.S.
government. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated in his Labor Day Address on September 1,
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1941 that the “…preservation of these rights [rights of free laboring men and women] is vitally
important now, not only to us who enjoy them, but to the whole future of Christian
civilization.”38 Religion played a part in helping individual soldiers survive terrifying combat
situations. Chaplain William R. Thierfelder recalled being called to a soldier lying on a litter
shaking so violently he could not stand up. He had received no physical wounds. The chaplain
helped the man up, took him by the lapels of his jacket and asked him if he was a Christian and
did he believe in God’s help for those who believe in him. After a few minutes, “I told him to
repeat my words. And we recited the 23rd Psalm together. The man learned the Psalm and
eventually returned to duty.”39 Belief in God did help to prepare young men for battle and helped
them during the stress of combat. Henderson points out that religion can promote cohesion.
Regarding Christianity in America, Henderson writes, “The broad umbrella of
Christianity that covers most religions in the United States and followed the 28th Infantry
Division soldiers to war offers some basis for common religious values, which in turn promote
basic values.” 40 Many American soldiers said that prayer helped them in combat. However, no
specific religion or belief was identified as being helpful. According to Anthony Kellett, “Prayer
is not of itself a sufficient indicator of religious faith; it may have been adopted as an instrument
of psychological self-defense in much the same way as belief in talismans (e.g., a rabbit's foot) or
in fatalism.”41 However, interviews of 28th Infantry Division soldiers suggest otherwise and
insist that religious faith may have contributed to the fighting spirit of the men of the 28th
Division.
38
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Ideology includes nationalism, racism, and or political convictions. According to
Henderson, “ideology is effective for getting men to join the military or enter battle, but during
the battle, ideology appears to have significantly less influence in controlling a soldier's
behavior.”42 “The American soldier was typically, without deep personal commitment to a war
which he nevertheless accepted as unavoidable. He gave little concern to the conflicting values
underlying the struggle,” 43 submits Samuel A. Stouffer. In several books, Stephen Ambrose has
always presented the theme that the American soldier fought for their comrades due to the strong
cohesion that developed between them.44 Sociologist Charles Moskos has proposed that latent
ideology plays a role in soldier motivation, albeit a secondary one.45
There are many examples of 28th Division soldiers performing heroic actions and
displaying courage in demanding situations or in the face of imminent death and receiving the
Silver Star, Bronze Star, or Distinguished Service Cross. Some soldiers even received battlefield
promotions for their bravery and leadership. While displaying eagerness to participate in a
worthy cause “at any cost” can inspire peers, it might also be inspired by peers.46 Marshall
argued that “for some, heroism may not involve risk-taking for the sake of excitement as much
as it involves the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of the cause.” 47 That cause was
fighting for the American way of life. This cause reflected the values of the society from which
the soldiers came from. To understand what compelled the soldiers to fight, it is important to

42

Henderson, 110.
Samuel A. Stouffer, A.A. Lumsdaine, M.H. Lumsdaine, RM. Williams, Jr., M.B. Smith, I.L. Janis, S.A. Star, and
L.S. Cottrell Jr. The American Soldier: Volume II: Combat and its Aftermath. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1949), 149.
44
Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldier: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Battlefields to the Bulge to the Surrender
of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945. (New York: Touchstone, Simon, and Schuster, 1997), 14.
45
Charles A. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military. (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1970), 147.
46
Samuel L.A Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1947), 33.
47
Ibid.
43

14

look at their involvement with the American national socio-political system, national identity,
and acceptance of the national ideology. Each contributed to the action of a military unit on the
battlefield, and also to the enlisting and sustaining of the force. 48
Many Americans viewed the issues at stake during World War II in terms of clearcut
right and wrong, democracy against fascism, defense against aggression, good against evil. The
soldiers who left the shores of America to fight did not define what the American way of life
meant, but their understandings of it reflected the overall views of American society. They knew
they were fighting for, what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called in his Address to Congress in
1941, four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship
God in his own way, freedom from want, which meant economic understandings which will
secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants, and freedom from fear,
meaning a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion
that no nation would be able to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor.
While the soldiers may not have repeated Roosevelt’s words, or invented the ideas, they did, by
their comments and actions, demonstrated that they knew what the American way of life meant.
Stephen Ambrose captured these feelings:
Although the GIs were and are embarrassed to talk or write about the cause they
fought for…they were the children of democracy and they did more to help spread
democracy around the world than any other generation in history. At the core, the
American citizen soldiers knew the difference between right and wrong, and they
didn’t want to live in a world in which wrong prevailed. 49
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The overarching beliefs and values that unified Americans during World War II revolved around
the ideology of the American way of life. This encompassed political, economic, and social
elements. Politically, freedom and democracy were the guiding principles that appeared on
virtually every war poster. These catchwords served as easy phrases for the public to rally around
and an ideology for the soldiers to commit to. Stephen Wesbrook argued that the great majority
of individuals exhibited a commitment to the national socio-political system. He wrote:
Although the person with such a commitment is not an ideologue, ideology still
plays a major role in his motivations. From the individual’s point of view, the
significance of the national ideology is not that it directly causes him to do what is
demanded, as in the case of the ideologue, but that it gives him a cause for doing. 50
To fully understand what the American way of life meant to the American soldier, we have to
examine the historical context of the society from which he came. Americans of the World War
II generation experienced the full brunt of the Great Depression, and many harbored cynical
memories of the unfulfilled idealism of World War I. Roosevelt’s freedom from want resonated
with many who had struggled during the Great Depression and were just beginning to work and
recover when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Roosevelt’s freedom of
every person to worship God in his own way resonated with many Americans as children born in
the 1930s were raised during a time in which Americans were more rooted and less mobile.
Tradition and institutional loyalty were important. People tended to go to church, they tended to
continue going to church as the years wore on. By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor
over seventy percent of Americans identified themselves as Christians or Jews. 51 Roosevelt’s
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freedom from fear resonated with many Americans as they had seen and read what the Nazis and
done in Germany and in the countries they conquered. Roosevelt’s freedom of speech and
expression reverberated with many Americans as they witnessed the burning of books and the
censorship of Jews in Germany.
The examination of the historiography about the Battle of the Bulge yields significant
gaps in the scholarship. Historians have generally focused their attention on the events in or
around Bastogne, Belgium. While many briefly mention the holding actions of the 28th Infantry
Division, accounts typically shift to the Bastogne area forces. The specific details of actions
taken by the 28th Division soldiers are limited, and the reasons the soldiers took those actions are
not identified. For example, little is written about the placement of gun positions, roadblocks,
barricades, etc., that delayed the German soldiers. There are little or no references in these
writings to soldiers’ religious beliefs, camaraderie, honor, sacrifice, or other reasons that may
have affected their performance and motivation.
This research fills the gaps in the historiography by illustrating the comments made by
soldiers while they were fighting and after. Those comments reflect their understanding and
commitment to fight for the American way of life cause. This research follows the combat
narratives of the 28th Infantry Division units which demonstrate the soldier’s commitment to the
cause by acts of heroism and stubborn resistance to the German attacks. The soldier’s experience
fighting across France, at the Siegfried Line, and in the Hürtgen Forest is a testament to their
willingness to endure against demanding circumstances. This research fills additional gaps in the
historiography by recording the determined effort of the 28th Division to delay the Germans
from achieving their goals during the Battle of the Bulge and buying time for the Allies to reposition forces to eventually halt the German advances.
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There are several books that assist this research in determining what the overall situation
was prior to the German attack, the disposition of forces, and the specific actions taken by the
men of the 28th Infantry Division. Some examples include Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight
Days (1946). In it Samuel Marshall describes the beginning of the German attack, briefly
mentioning the 28th Division. This book provides a combat history of the critical battle during
the Allied liberation of Europe in World War II. After a brief discussion of the events of 16-18
December, he jumps to the encirclement of Bastogne and the deployment of the 101st Airborne
Division to Bastogne.52
At the time John Toland was researching The Story of the Bulge (1959), the official afteraction reports and documents of the battle were just becoming available to scholars. As a result,
his book was based largely on interviews rather than official documents. His book describes the
events that occurred at Clervaux, Luxembourg with the 28th Division’s 110th Regiment. 53
First published as CMH Pub 7-8-1, The Ardennes: Battle of Bulge (1965) by Hugh M.
Cole was written for the U. S. Army Center of Military History. His publication tells the story of
how the Germans planned and executed their offensive, how the Allies planned to defeat them,
and some stories of the soldiers involved with the battle. Cole’s work provides significant details
about the 28th Infantry Division’s maneuvering, artillery support, and movement of equipment to
delay the German advance. This volume represents an exhaustive collection of personal memoirs
by leading participants of the campaign. The memoirs contain interviews with American
participants and written accounts prepared immediately after the end of the war by the German
officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. 54 In determining the German plan for the
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Battle of the Bulge, the study looked at works from the U.S. War Department collection, U.S.
Army Center of Military History, Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives) and the Imperial
War Museum.
Napier Crookenden’s Battle of the Bulge 1944 (1980) presents some enlightening
photographic and documentary information. The book provides more details about the German
Fifth Panzer Army attack of the 28th Infantry Division, including counterattacks and door-todoor fighting. Napier’s work looks at the German strategy, Allied positions, and tactical
maneuvering that took place during the battle, with an explanation of the weapons used. 55
Charles B. MacDonald’s A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the
Bulge (1985) presented the most definitive account of the Ardennes Offensive. His book
incorporates personal accounts, and official documents to examine the plans and preparations for
the attack, the first days, the American resistance, the German penetrations, the American stand
at Bastogne and American counter attacks. Regarding the 28th Infantry Division sector,
MacDonald offers more details about the stationing of troops, the movement of armor,
emplacement of mortars and the maneuvering of squads then previous writing. 56 MacDonald’s
work is a traditional military history of the battalion level. The author attempts to demonstrate
the valor of American troops and rebut the contention that some fled in disarray.
Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Battle of the Bulge to
the Surrender of Germany (1997) by Stephen E. Ambrose is about the junior officers, and
enlisted men of the European Theater of Operations. Ambrose covers the period from D-Day
through the German surrender. Citizen Soldiers includes maps and many accounts of the soldiers
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involved. Ambrose incorporates the most information to date of specific actions taken by soldiers
to delay the Germans, but what he includes is limited. 57 Promoted as a story from the perspective
of the men and women who fought it, Ambrose talks about the courage of the defenders but does
not include any information about religious beliefs or why the soldiers were courageous.
Sir Antony James Beevor does not offer a new interpretation of the Battle of the Bulge.
He provides a look at the ordinary soldiers on both sides of the battle in his book Ardennes 1944:
The Battle of the Bulge (2015). The book includes maps of the German and American position
throughout the battle and offers a detailed account of the German advance and the maneuvering
of American units. 58 In Beevor’s book, we get to see the big picture of grand strategy as generals
on both sides devise plans to outwit and outfight their opponents. He does not offer much
specific detail about the 28th Infantry Division. What he does offer is more from a macro
perspective. The book does not offer any insight into what motivated the soldiers who resisted
the German advance or anything about their religious beliefs.
Robert E. Merriam’s Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge (2017)
was first published in 1947 and then in an abridged edition in 2017. It is an account of the Battle
of the Bulge, presented from both the Allied and the German viewpoints. Merriam writes a great
deal about the advance of the German units and the Allied Command efforts to stop their
advance.59 The book contains unique and critical information, including details gleaned from
interviews conducted by the author with commanding officers on both sides, some of which are
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the only reports gathered from these sources. However, the 28th Division is barely mentioned,
and no mention of the religious beliefs or other motivating factors are offered.
If You Survive (1987) by George Wilson provides little information about motivation in
combat. Wilson did not participate in the D-Day invasion of France. While not as popular or
well-known as many other WWII memoirs, Wilson’s work covers nearly the entire campaign
from Normandy to VE-Day through the eyes of an infantry officer. Wilson’s story describes his
experiences through the Normandy Campaign, Siegfried Line, Hürtgen Forest, and the Battle of
the Bulge. His memoir tells of ambushes and close calls, with a tone of detachment that showed
how many officers had to separate their feelings from many of the events in order to command
effectively. 60
In The 110th Holds in the Ardennes: The Blunting of Hitler’s Last Gamble and the
Invasion of the Reich (2017) by me, contains many of the after-action reports and personal
accounts of soldiers and civilians who lived through the Ardennes Offensive. The book also
contains excerpts from the publications from the U.S. Army Centre of Military History and
research conducted by Cercle d’études sur la Bataille des Ardennes or Study Group on the Battle
of the Bulge in Luxembourg. Incorporated are previously unpublished accounts of the last stand
of the 28th Division’s 110th Infantry Regiment, and many previously unpublished personal
accounts and stories. 61
Most of the above mentioned writers and historians end up with attributing the stopping
of the German advance to the heroic stand of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and other
attached units and the relief of Bastogne by General George S. Patton’s 3rd Army punch behind
the German lines to relieve the Bastogne fighters. As time went on and more reports, interviews
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and accounts became available, scholars and authors still have not given credit to the soldiers of
the 28th Infantry Division for delaying the Germans long enough to influence the outcome.
Research for this dissertation in the 28th Division archives, located at the Fort Indiantown
Gap Military Museum, uncovered interviews of soldiers who fought in the Battle of the Bulge
with references to their religious faith and in many cases, how their faith sustained them. The
interviews were conducted by the 28th Division Historical Section in December 1988. Other
interviews, located at the National Archives, were conducted at Moosburg, Germany and
Buzancy, Hachinette, Lapoutroie, and Montfaucon, France between January and June 1945 by
the 3rd Information and Historical Services, Headquarters III U.S. Corps. These beliefs and
experiences have been excluded from the writings about the Battle of the Bulge and are
historically significant as scholars examine the reasons why soldiers fought so courageously. An
examination of soldier interviews and memoirs offers an intriguing look at why soldiers fought.
During an interview in 1996, George Durham, Company A, 109th Infantry said, “We all
knew we had to fight. We were all part of the same generation. When we grew up, everybody’s
father had been in the war [World War I], I mean, having veterans around was about like having
trees in a forest, there wasn’t anything unusual.” 62 In his memoir Charles Haug, Company B,
112th Infantry writes, “Six small German tanks headed out of Lutzkampen in our direction.
Behind the tanks came hundreds of Germans on foot. We bit our lips and prayed. We were
scared and shaking, but we knew God would protect us.” 63 In a 1988 interview when asked why
he fought Private First Class Robert Pocklington, Special Troops, 28th Division, stated, “Well,
you know in the military we were always to fight and to hold. We were never to retreat. My dad
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said if you come home and you get beat up, I’m going to beat the hell out of you. So that was
always on my mind.” 64
Norman Forde carried a copy of the New Testament in a pocket of his uniform and wore
a cross with his dog tags as he fought the Battle of the Bulge as an 18-year-old Army private. “I
was never afraid for my soul,” the World War II veteran said. “My body could’ve been blown up
at any time, but my faith didn’t waver.” 65 William Smith always wrote in his letters to his
Grandma a prayer. He asked that she share the prayer with others. He recalled, “We certainly
didn't have an altar in the Ardennes. The Padre served communion from the hood of his jeep.”
Another veteran said, “There wasn't usually a priest around, so I prayed and confessed directly to
God.” Yet another veteran commented that a chaplain had once used a tree stump and wasn't
even Catholic, but it didn't stop them from praying along with him. The priest wasn't there. “It
was just me and God in that foxhole. I prayed for God to spare me, and he did. I had a direct
hotline to 'the Man’ and believe me; I used it. We were scared!” 66 More detailed analysis of eyewitness accounts are included in subsequent chapters.
The following sources were examined for statements about what motivated the soldiers:
Official records of the 109th, 110th and 112th Regiments of the 28th Infantry Division and
German military units involved in the Ardennes Offensive, letters and personal diaries of
soldiers, historical studies, oral histories, biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs, literary
writing, newspapers and other periodicals, archives, eye-witness accounts, official records of the
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military units involved, and other peer-reviewed articles, unit histories, personal accounts and
stories, and unit reports.
Additionally, secondary sources that assist in explaining the spectrum of religious beliefs
and practices soldiers brought with them to war and the factors that motivated them to fight
include Thomas W. Bohn’s Why We Fight film essay explaining the assumption that servicemen
would be more willing and able fighters if they knew the events that led up to, and the reasons
for our participation in the war. Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation that tells the stories of
individual men and women the story of a generation, America's citizen heroes and heroines who
came of age during the Great Depression and the Second World War and went on to build
modern America.
The religious beliefs of the soldiers are examined by looking at several publications.
Chappie: World War II Diary of a Combat Chaplain by Alton E. Carpenter and A. Anne Eiland
paints a vivid picture of the daily reality Chaplain Carpenter and his fellow chaplains
experienced during their three years of serving along the front line. It provides a first-hand
account of an army chaplain who kept a diary, making entries before battles, in the midst of
battles, and afterwards, recording the joys, the humor, and the tragedies unfolding around him
and his fellow soldiers. Written at the time the events occurred, the author shared his
observations, and expressed his opinions.
Lyle W. Dorsett’s Serving God, and Country: U.S. Military Chaplains in World War II
tells the story of chaplains armed only with Bibles, Torahs, and the tools of their holy trade,
these men of God went wherever the troops went. They prayed over men about to march into
combat and they guided fallen fighting men of every faith as they breathed their last and gave up
their lives in the fight against tyranny.
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Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II (1994) by Donald F. Crosby
offers a look at soldiers from the chaplain’s perspective. Father Donald Crosby chronicles the
little-known but crucial wartime role of Catholic chaplains and celebrates their compassion,
courage, good humor, and humility. Their wartime efforts saved lives, provided comfort and
hope, and renewed lost faith in a dark time.
Glenn J. Gray’s The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (1998) is a philosophical
meditation on what warfare does to us and an examination of the reasons soldiers act as they do.
Gray explains the attractions of battle, the adrenaline rush, the esprit de corps, and analyzes the
many rationalizations made by combat troops to justify their actions.
Michael Snape’s God, and Uncle Sam: Religion and America’s Armed Forces in World
War II (2015) shows how religion played a crucial role in helping more than sixteen million
uniformed Americans through the ordeal of World War II. Snape explains how America's armed
forces were the products of one of the most diverse and dynamic religious cultures in the western
world and were the largest ever to be raised by a professedly religious society. He explains how
religion played a crucial role in helping more than sixteen million uniformed Americans through
the ordeal of World War II.
The research methods employed in this study involved locating and analyzing appropriate
sources for the reconstruction of the first few days of the Battle of the Bulge. Each source was
examined and their value to the study determined. Eyewitness testimony is problematic and
sometimes inaccurate, especially decades after an event. Therefore, the outlook of the source is
considered when using it as evidence. It is recognized that statements made by veterans long
after the event must be corroborated by comparing them to after action reports, official
documents of the period and interviews conducted shortly after the event.
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Most of the interviews used in this study were conducted by members of the historical
sections of Army organizations while the soldiers were still in Europe. The accuracy of the
interviews conducted decades after the events and other oral interviews many decades after the
war were corroborated by comparing them to the unit histories, unit journal entries and accounts
written during the Battle of the Bulge. The major types of sources used for this study can be
classified as archived, primary published and unpublished, secondary sources and scholarly
articles.
Primary sources such as memoirs, diaries and interviews are the earliest available
accounts of the Battle of the Bulge which have been used by later writers to interpret that event.
They are the raw material used by other writers to provide them with information and data. In
using primary sources, the value judgement was made by the people who wrote them and the
intent of the author in writing the original document is analyzed. Secondary sources provide
interpretations and make judgements about primary sources. When using secondary sources, this
study considers that the account they give, even when it involves lengthy quotations from
primary sources, may not be accurate. Secondary sources are used to understand primary sources
and provide supporting information.
In the early 1940s, America stood between the struggles of the Great Depression and the
storm clouds of war in Europe and in the Pacific. The American people began to understand the
magnitude of the challenge, the importance of an unparalleled national commitment, and the
certainty that only one resolution was acceptable. The nation turned to its young to carry the
heaviest burden, to fight the enemies of freedom in their own lands to keep the home front secure
and free. The overarching beliefs and values that unified Americans during World War II
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revolved around the American way of life. This encompassed political, economic, social
elements, and religious freedom.
Fighting for freedom was a popular refrain in letters and interviews of veterans. While
unit cohesion and fighting for one’s buddy certainly were a factor in why soldiers fought, it is
clear from interviews and personal accounts that the overriding reason why the men of the 28th
Infantry Division fought so fiercely do delay the Germans during the first days of the Battle of
the Bulge was to insure the American way of life.
While soldiers may not have used the exact words “fighting for the American way of
life,” their diaries, journals and interviews shortly after the Battle of the Bulge and years later
contain common threads that reflect the refrain. The veterans comments echo President
Roosevelt’s appeal to the sensitivities of Americans as defenders of freedom. They clearly
understood and stated the need to defend their own liberties, while simultaneously defending and
restoring the liberties of other victims of the Nazi onslaught in Europe. They knew there would
be sacrifices and repeatedly stated they knew what they were fighting for. The soldiers
frequently commented that they had to beat the Nazis and they knew why they were there. Many
reflected on writing home about stopping the Germans and having confidence that God was on
their side and would protect them. They stated the reasons they went to war was to defeat a
monstrous animal, a Nazi Dictator, enslaving the people of Europe, who had his eyes on
enslaving Americans. They commented that the Germans could not be allowed to strip anyone of
their freedom, and if left unchecked, they would bring their terror to American shores. Some
exhibited extreme bravery that earned them battlefield promotions and awards for valor. They
felt so strongly about their convictions to fight for the American way of life that they were

27

willing to risk all for the cause. Their bravery motivated others to continue to fight and
exemplified their commitment to fight for freedom and stopping the Germans.
This research was intended to analyze the factors that contributed to the actions of the
28th Division’s 109th, 110th and 112th regiments during the first days of the Battle of the Bulge
and add to the historiography by offering a comprehensive explanation of why they fought so
bravely in delaying the German advance. Although well-motivated troops would be expected to
perform well in battle, assuming all other factors (like weapons technology) were equal to the
enemy's, motivational factors also influenced or predicted casualty rates and can explain the
reasons for unit success. The result of this research will provide military leaders and soldiers
with the source of motivational factors and good military strategies that can be applied to a
tactical situation like defensive positions using less strength to overcome superior numbers.
Subsequent chapters analyze and explain the results of examining the research questions.
Chapter Two analyzes the American culture and the definition and promotion of the American
way of life by the U.S. government, civilian organizations and by military leaders and trainers of
recruits. It provides an understanding of the concerted effort that was taken to promote the idea
of fighting for the American way of life. Chapter Three looks at how churches, chaplains and the
military promoted and supported the religious practices of soldiers. It identifies the efforts that
were taken promote and support the religious beliefs and practices soldiers brought with them
and experienced during war and how much they influenced them to fight. Chapter Four describes
the training the soldiers received and how that training prepared the men to fight for the
American way of life. Chapter Five outlines the Allied and German strategic setting, and the
combat experience of the 28th Infantry Division and their movement across France up to and
including their attack on the German Siegfried line. It shows how the soldiers confronted the
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Germans and continued to fight for their values. Chapter Six is a description of the 28th Division
involvement in the First U.S. Army plan to launch an attack aimed initially at the crossing of the
Roer River, the capture of Duren, and then drive to Cologne and into Germany, and the 28th
Division’s fighting in the deadly Hürtgen forest. This chapter identifies the struggles the soldiers
faced in one of their deadliest battles and how their resolve was tested. Chapter Seven answers
one of the research questions describing the specific delaying actions the soldiers took to delay
the German advance between December 16 to December 18, 1944. The tactics used by each of
the elements of the three division regiments, beginning with the unit operational reports, after
action reports and eye-witness accounts to determine the specific measures that were taken to
delay the German troops are examined. Chapter Eight contains vignettes in the words of veteran
describing answering the third research question identifying the predominant reason the soldiers
fought so fiercely to delay the Germans advance. Chapter Nine concludes the dissertation by
summarizing the results of the research and answering the research questions of why the soldiers
of the 109th, 110th and 112th Regiments of the 28th Infantry Division fought as they did during
the first days of the Battle of the Bulge. It discusses the research contribution to the
historiography and provides recommendations for future military leaders and soldiers as they
consider the actions that will bring a successful outcome to defense against stronger force.
As far as can be determined, no studies have been conducted to identify motivational
factors that contributed to the soldiers of the 28th Infantry Division action during the Battle of
the Bulge. Therefore, this is original research intended to show that specific factors played a
significant role in the motivation of the soldiers. This research proceeded in several phases. In
the first exploratory phase, a literature review was conducted to produce a list of accounts of the
Battle of the Bulge. An attempt was made to determine if there was any research done on the
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factors that motivated the 28th Infantry Division soldiers in combat. The second exploratory
phase involved selection of the combat narratives to be analyzed. Autobiographical accounts,
memoirs, diaries of the soldiers involved were considered. In the third exploratory, all books and
documents were analyzed for references to factors that motivated the soldiers to fight. In the
fourth explanatory phase, the conclusions of the research were developed.
As the last major German offensive of the war, and the United States largest land battle
of World War II, the Battle of the Bulge is frequently examined in literature. Despite this,
historians continue to focus primarily on physical aspects, suggesting that physical forces were
the single influence on the final result. This research employs primary and secondary sources to
conduct the historical analysis and provide an interpretation of the motivating factors that caused
the soldiers of the U.S. Army 28th Infantry Division to delay the German advance during the
Battle of the Bulge. By analyzing the various interpretations presented in the literature and
personal accounts, this research produces a re-interpretation of the first days of the Battle of the
Bulge through the perspective of combat motivating factors.
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Chapter Two
American Culture and the American Way of Life
As war raged in Europe and the Pacific theater in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor,
many Americans suggested that what had happened politically in Germany might also happen in
the United States. Educating American citizens in the ways of democracy, many felt, was an
important response to the world crisis. In the late 1930s the National Education Association
inaugurated its Educational Policies Commission, a Washington-based group that devoted much
of its time to pondering the role of education in democracy and the actions American educators
could take to improve citizenship and save the American way of life from foreign and domestic
foes. 67 An appeal to American military history or the insistence that the United States fought
only because it had been attacked were frequently invoked in educational materials. 68
The invasion of Poland had not yet happened when, in his 1938 State of the Union
Address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined the threat posed by Germany and its allies as
an attack on religious freedoms. In the speech, he associated the defense of religion with the
defense of democracy. He explained, “There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must
prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their
churches, their governments and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of
democracy and of good faith among nations is all the same fight.”69
Soldier’s attitudes undoubtedly reflected American culture, as officials, private and
public often spoke of the need to preserve the American way of life. In Roosevelt’s annual State

67

Joy Elmer Morgan, “The Significance of Citizenship Recognition Day,” Journal of the National Education
Association, 28 (December 1939), 257.
68
Ibid.
69
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress, January 4, 1939,” Public Papers & Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The American Presidency Project. (University of California, Santa Barbara).

31

of the Union Address to Congress on January 6, 1941, he presented his reasons for American
involvement in the war, making the case for continued aid to Great Britain and greater
production of war industries at home. He told Congress:
In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world
founded upon four essential human freedoms: the first is freedom of speech and
expressing – everywhere in the world, the second is freedom of every person to
worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world, The third is freedom
from want, which translated into world terms, means economic understandings
which will secure to every nation a healthy peace time life for its inhabitants –
everywhere in the world, and the fourth is freedom from fear, which translated
into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and
in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of
physical aggression against ant neighbor – anywhere in the world. 70
President Roosevelt appealed to the sensitivities of Americans as defenders of freedom.
Roosevelt, who was an Episcopalian, believed religion was a distinct strength of America, and
emphasized faith in the nation’s war effort and especially in the armed forces. Under his
leadership, the military incorporated religion into the fabric of soldiers’ lives by assigning clergy
to the troops based on percentages of the religious affiliations of the nation’s population. The
goal of this strategy was to have soldiers’ religious needs served by ministers of their own faiths.
During the course of the war, American soldiers increasingly found motivation through prayer,
especially at times of combat engagement.71
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One fact determining soldiers attitudes was the idea that the United States was forced to
go to war as a matter of self-defense. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Adolf Hitler's
decision to declare war four days later put an abrupt end to the isolationist notion that the United
States could remain out of the global conflict. Judging from the history of Nazi aggression and
subjugation, the American public realized war was a necessity for national self-preservation. 72
Faced with a direct threat, all men contemplated the same reality: Germany and Japan were the
aggressors that had to be defeated.
Samuel Stouffer proposes that “the American public understood the need to defend their
own liberties, while simultaneously defending and restoring the liberties of the other victims of
the Nazi onslaught.”73 With all aspects of American life devoted to victory, there was a constant
personal and communal urging that all citizens play some part in the war effort. It was socially
unacceptable for men to refuse service and those very few that did were effectively ostracized. 74
The creators of comic books encouraged their readers to contribute to the American war
effort and fostered a sense of patriotism and political obligation. “Captain America” burst onto
the American comic books stands in March 1941. The cover of Issue #1 featured Captain
America mid-fight, punching Adolf Hitler squarely in the nose. In Figure 1, Hitler is shown in
his German headquarters surrounded by Nazi soldiers. Plans to destroy a United States munitions
factory are in plain sight. 75
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Figure 1 - Captain America, Issue 1, March 1941 (National Archives)

Among the initiatives to foster a sense of patriotism and obligation was the Why We Fight
film series. The films were developed to win the confidence of the citizen soldiers. Intended as a
series of orientation films for all Army troops before they went overseas, the Why We Fight
series consisted of seven separate films produced between 1942-45 by the U.S. Army Signal
Corps with the task of maintaining morale and instilling loyalty and discipline into the civilian
Army. 76 Prelude to War (1942) explains the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy as well as
Japan’s aggression in the Far East. The film examines the differences between the United States
and the fascist Axis states of Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler and Hirohito by portraying the latter
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countries working together as gangsters to conquer the world. That is done by footage from
Nazi's Triumph of the Will film but with different narration designed to support the Allied cause.
It is emphasized that after the Nazis smashed the opposing political parties and labor unions, they
turned their attention to their last remaining obstacle, the church. In one scene, a stained glass
window is shattered by several bricks to reveal a “Heil Hitler!” poster behind.77
The Nazis Strike (1943) covers appeasement, the Munich Crisis and the years leading up
to the German invasion of Poland. This second Army orientation film in the series focuses on
Adolf Hitler's early political and military achievements. After first describing Germany's inborn
“love of conquest,” manifested by such leaders as Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the
film discusses Hitler's specific scheme for reshaping the world through the spread of National
Socialism. Recalling the twelfth century invasions of Genghis Khan, the film defines Hitler's
strategy in terms of geopolitics.
Divide and Conquer (1943) focuses on the Blitzkrieg of Europe in 1939 and 1940. The
film begins immediately after the fall of Poland. Of the two major Western Allies of 1940, the
United Kingdom is first to be mentioned. The role of the Royal Navy in blockading Germany is
highlighted, in that it means that Germany must overcome British resistance in order to clear the
way for its world conquest. Hitler's treachery towards the small neutral countries of Europe is
exposed. 78
The Battle of Britain (1943) explores the lethal contest for the skies above England. This
fourth documentary in the Why We Fight propaganda series, shown in theaters across America
during World War II to inform the public and rally support for the Allied troops, focuses on the
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harrowing bombardment of England by the Nazis in 1940. Using a combination of staged and
real footage, director Frank Capra details the exploits of the heroic RAF (Royal Air Force) pilots
who fought the German Luftwaffe over the skies of London and celebrates the courage of the
British during their darkest hour. 79
The Battle of Russia (1943) covers Hitler’s 1941 attack on the U.S.S.R. The film stitches
together newsreel and archival film to explore relations between Russia and the United States.
The film also recounts Russia's military history through the use of stock footage and clips from
Sergei Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky. Particular attention is paid to the Battle of Stalingrad,
during which Soviet forces fended off Nazi troops attempting to seize control of the Russian
city. 80
The Battle of China (1944) shines the spotlight on Japan’s genocide in Manchuria. This
documentary examines the full and rich Chinese culture and history, while highlighting the
Japanese invasion of China and the reasons Japan seeks to conquer the country. Depicting
numerous atrocities inflicted upon the Chinese people, the film brings to light the need for U.S.
involvement in the war effort. Capra also captures the determined will and spirit of those already
fighting for freedom.
Produced in 1945 and not available to the soldiers during their training before the Battle
of the Bulge, War Comes to America is the climax of the series and depicts the United States’
entry into the war.81 “Why We Fight series stands among the most ambitious and successful film
projects ever undertaken by the United States government. Over the course of seven films,
released from 1942 to 1945, director Frank Capra and his team argued forcefully for American
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military people and civilians to unite in the massive labor of defeating the Axis Powers and
defending American values,” 82 wrote Ashley S. Behringer for the National Archives Blog The
Unwritten Record. The films played a positive role in mobilizing millions to fight for freedom
and tolerance against brutal enemies. The film series offers original images of Americana and the
things worth fighting for. They also draw a strong contrast between American values and those
of the Axis powers. These films highlight the reasons soldiers should fight to defeat the powers
that would change America.
The 28th Infantry Division soldiers had read news accounts and seen films about life in
Nazi Germany and military leaders reminded them of what and who they were fighting against
before they even started the first days of training. The reasons they were fighting were
emphasized by their military leaders. Eddie Pfannenstiel joined the 130th Field Artillery, Kansas
National Guard on September 25, 1939. In August of 1940 he was sent to training camp at Camp
Ripley, Minnesota. He remembered his superiors talking about what was happening in Germany.
Officers would lecture the men about how the Nazis seized Austria, the campaigns against the
Jews, the campaign to destroy all Jewish business, the Japanese war in China and the Spanish
Civil War. “They would remind us of what we would be fighting for,”83 wrote Pfannenstiel in his
Wartime Log.
The soldiers could envision what life would be like under Nazi rule. Philip K. Dick
would capture this fear years later in his 1962 novel, The Man in the High Castle. In Dick’s
novel, America lost the war and were subjugated to their Japanese and German occupiers. Their
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freedoms were greatly restricted including their freedom of movement and their freedom to
worship. 84
American’s attitude toward getting involved in war slowly began to change. In his 2007
article for Diplomatic History David Zietsma wrote, “Whereas American foreign policy before
1938 emphasized a more passive good neighbor approach rooted in the biblical parable of the
Good Samaritan, Americans increasingly interpreted international events in terms of good and
evil. Thus, Americans concluded that the United States should intervene as a righteous nation.” 85
Many propaganda posters, such as the one in Figure 2, show a soldier, a factory worker, and a
sailor. Published in 1941 by the Office of Emergency Management, it stressed the continuity
between civilian employment and the military.

Figure 2 - Men Working Together (Northwestern University Library)
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Chapter Three
Churches, Chaplains, and the Military Promoted Religious Practices of Soldiers
One of the research questions was to explore how faith factored into the nexus of ideas
that inspired the perseverance of the soldiers. In 1941, President Roosevelt argued for the
escalation of American involvement by supplying allies with munition. He maintained the aid
was necessary to defend freedom. By including worship in his definition of freedom, Roosevelt
provided an avenue by which Americans could think of the war in terms of a potential threat to
religion. By defending the nation, one could also defend one’s faith. Military leaders also
adopted such language. For example, General Douglas MacArthur described the war as a
“crusade of personal liberty” in a speech in Australia soon after leaving the Philippines in March
1942. 86 In Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted similar language. On the eve of the
D-day invasion into France, Eisenhower released a statement in which he proclaimed the start of
a “Great Crusade” and urged troops to “beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great
and noble undertaking.” 87 Religion and faith were tremendously important to American soldiers
in World War II. Religious beliefs and practices and ideas of freedom of religion were basic
elements in American culture and this ethos naturally extended to the U.S. military.
Fighting for the American way of life was an idea that was promoted by churches,
chaplains and the military. For most, the American way of life meant freedom. That freedom
often emphasized the freedom to worship. It also meant fighting so good would prevail over evil.
In Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, Sociologist Will
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Herberg describes the American way of life as, “an organic structure of ideas, values, and beliefs
that constitutes a faith common to Americans.” 88 This common faith was influenced by the
organized religions in the United States during the war. In March of 1941, Congress authorized
the expenditure of over twelve million dollars to build chapels for army personnel. 89
The challenges of helping keep morale strong and courage high required that the religious
and spiritual needs of military personnel be met. During World War II, a Jewish and Christian
world view exercised a dominant influence over American thought and behavior. Military
leaders recognized that training men to kill the enemy and sustaining them in this dreadful task
required chaplains who could help combatants maintain their humanity and religious convictions
in the worst of times. 90 It also required churches to emphasize to their congregations that fighting
for the American way of life included freedom to practice religion.
Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a strong anti-military and anti-war
sentiment among Episcopalians and Quakers. The Presbyterian Church’s General Assembly had
declared that “war was a violation of human personality and is repugnant to the Christian
conscience.”91 In the immediate wake of Japan’s attack, many of America’s young men stood in
long lines to volunteer for military service. Eighty percent of Americans before December 7,
1941 believed America should stay out of the war. Public opinion shifted nearly 180 degrees by
early 1942 and religious institutional leaders quickly, albeit cautiously, joined the American
public in changing their attitude toward war. 92
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In 1942, a partnership between civilian producers, the War Department, and the Army
Chaplain Corps resulted in Chaplain Jim - a weekly radio show that followed the adventures of a
fictional and religiously ambiguous chaplain. As Ronit Stahl has argued, “the show served to
unite Americans under an umbrella of generic monotheism.” 93 Civilian organizations such as the
National Conference of Christians and Jews and the Anti-Defamation League promoted the idea
of interfaith cooperation. For example, in early 1941, an official with the Jewish Welfare Board
proposed that the Army Chaplain Corps should cooperate with the National Conference of
Christians and Jews to sponsor a program in army camps promoting interfaith cooperation and to
support the ideas of fighting for religious freedom.94 Kevin Schultz noted, “this partnership
flourished during the war. 95 Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and Protestant ministers maintained
regular contact with the men and women in uniform and could also assure families and friends at
home that their sons and daughters were attending worship services and finding spiritual
guidance and counseling.”96
Lyle Dorsett argued, “Chaplains were absolutely essential to America's victory because
they cultivated courage and morale among U.S. troops that allowed them to make needed
sacrifices.” 97 According to Dorsett, chaplains filled a very practical role for the U.S. military.
They helped develop more effective soldiers and built support at home. For example, Dorsett
explained that during training, chaplains functioned to “help civilians become combatants, adjust
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spiritually and psychologically to a radically different way of life, and at the same time assure
families and communities back home that military life would not destroy the moral values and
souls of their loved ones in uniform.” 98
The sheer number of U.S. troops and the nature of military deployment made formal
religious leadership challenging in the U.S. Army during the course of World War II.
Consequently, “military chaplains sought to encourage lay leadership to expand religious
coverage for smaller religious traditions as well as those located in remote locations,” 99 reasoned
Karl H. Hertz. “Recognizing the challenge of providing religious coverage, the U.S. military
cautiously encouraged lay leadership as an extension of the religious work of chaplains.” 100
For lay leaders, the Army included basic worship aids for them in their official
songbooks. In 1941, the U.S. military printed a revised edition of the Hymnal, Army and Navy,
first published in 1920.101 Designed for use in chapels, this hymnbook included distinct sections
devoted to Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish worship, but it was too bulky for common use when
deployed overseas. Consequently, the U.S. military developed a second, shorter songbook in
1941 titled Song and Service for Ship and Field.102 This book contained worship services with
responsive readings divided among the three dominant traditions followed by a selection of
popular hymns.
In addition to materials produced by the military, civilian organizations provided
resources designed to equip soldiers and sailors for lay leadership. For example, four cooperating
Protestant agencies launched the Service Men’s Christian League in November 1942. Designed
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to supplement and support the work of chaplains, the Service Men’s Christian League published
the Link Magazine, a monthly periodical for soldiers and sailors that included daily devotional
Bible readings as well as plans for weekly discussion meetings intended for use by selforganized lay people.103
Chaplains distributed the Link Magazine widely with over 2.6 million copies printed
during the first year alone. Similarly, the Jewish Welfare Board distributed over one million
copies of an abridged prayer book that included dozens of services and prayers. The preface
explained that the book was “designed to be used where the exigencies of life in the army or the
navy do not permit attendance at regular synagogue services.” 104
Many soldiers during World War II practiced a private spirituality. One on the most
private, but also devoutly religious soldiers in the American military, was General Matthew B.
Ridgway, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The Corps helped stop and push back
German troops during the Battle of the Bulge. In his memoirs he wrote about what many felt. He
admitted that in the darkness, after he had gone to bed, alone with his God, his thoughts
inevitably turned inward and whatever resources of the spirit he possessed, he prepared himself
as best as he could for whatever test may lie ahead. He found great comfort in the story of the
anguish of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane. Ridgway figured that if Jesus could face anguish
with calmness of soul then surely he could endure. 105 Ridgway’s biographer George C. Mitchell,
claims that “Ridgway’s fearlessness in the front lines was founded on his solid religious base.
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Ridgway reads the Bible and firmly believes that God will not permit him to be hit before
Germany is totally defeated.” 106
In an essay for Link Magazine stating what he was fighting for, Private Henry Johnson
mentioned freedom of worship and freedom from fear. He concluded, “I am fighting for what I
consider to be the American way of life. That great ideal is high enough and fine enough to
challenge me to fight, and, if need be, to die to guarantee its realization.”107 There were many
who believed as Johnson did. In a letter to his mother, Morris B. Redmann wrote about the death
of his brother on Tarawa. “He died fighting for an ideal, the American way of living,” Redmann
reflected. “He died so that the squealing babies I saw baptized in church this afternoon may live
in peace, speak their mind, and worship God in the true religion.”108
While military chaplains and religious organizations sought to encourage and equip
chaplains and lay leaders, some soldiers took initiative to fill what they perceived as a vacuum of
religious leadership. For example, Louis Gehr reported to the editor of Wheaton Alumni that “I
actively participated in a unit of the Service Men’s Christian League that met on Wednesday
nights when I was training in England.”109
Because of the tough conditions that prevailed during the war, chaplains and others had
to compromise on some traditional worship practices. 110 Jewish chaplains concluded, for
example, that dietary laws may be violated in extenuating circumstances, but they encouraged
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troops to obey them whenever possible. 111 Similarly, “the Roman Catholic Church reduced and
eventually omitted the required time of fasting before one could participate in the Eucharist
under pressing conditions.” 112 Because of the limited number of priests and the very real
potential for death, Catholic chaplains occasionally practiced general absolution where they
would absolve entire group from their sins. 113
Aside from spiritual edification, some soldiers and sailors turned to religious readings to
remain connected to familiar aspects of home. In letters to his mother, Private Roger Houtz, a
committed Presbyterian, often mentioned reading his Bible regularly while in the army. “The act
of reading seemed to comfort me both spiritually and emotionally in that it sustained a
connection with mother.” 114 From basic training, he sent home a pocket testament exactly like
his own as a Mother’s Day gift, hoping that it would make up for his inability to get anything
else. Five months later, he reflected on the significance of he and his mother reading from
duplicate testaments commenting, “God joins us together tho we are miles apart.” 115
Soldiers participated in organized programs for religious study when the circumstances
permitted. The Service Men’s Christian League made available information for weekly Bible
lessons in the Link Magazine. While the Service Men’s Christian League was essentially a
product of the Protestant establishment, other organizations emerged. Most significantly, the
‘Navigators’ provided templates and resources to equip soldiers to study the Bible both alone and
with others. Organized by Dawson Trotman in the mid-1930s, ‘Navigators’ focused on military
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personnel, initially as an outreach to sailors. 116 Evangelistic in nature, the organization sought to
help new Christians grow through intensive Bible study.
The soldiers of the 28th Division, like most other soldiers in World War II, took with
them their religious beliefs and practices. Civilian organizations and the military provided
materials and support for soldiers to practice their faith. Some men gained revelations and
strengthening of their religious convictions. Still others believed that pleading to God provided a
sense of calm and strength in an otherwise difficult situation. Jon Butler suggests that “Many
believed that God would protect them in battle. Regardless of perceived effectiveness, some
soldiers sought supernatural intervention in order to preserve their lives and the lives of those
around them. Many made such appeals out of desperation or as something they could do when
nothing else could be done. Some solidified their commitment to a faith they had previously held
only loosely.”117 The soldiers drew from the religious beliefs and practices they brought with
them to petition God for protection as they fought for the American way of life.
As the federal government and military leaders celebrated the idea of interfaith
cooperation and religious practices, soldiers believed that the freedom to practice their religion as
they saw fit was an integral part of the American way of life and were willing to and ready to
fight for it. The spiritual mindset of the 28th Infantry Division soldiers who entered combat can
be reflected and summarized in a poem written by an anonymous World War II soldier:
No shell or bomb can on me burst,
Except my God permits it first.
Then let my heart be kept in peace,
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His watchful care will never cease.
No bomb above, nor mine below
Need cause my heart one pang of woe
The Lord of Hosts encircles me,
He is the Lord of earth and sea. 118
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Chapter Four
The Military Trained Men to Fight for the American Way of Life
Fighting for the American way of life was an idea that was promoted by military
leadership. Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the general
attitude about America getting involved in war was passive. Michael Snape suggests, “Army
Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall had a shrewd understanding of the character of
America’s non-professional soldiers. He was also acutely aware of the likelihood of political and
public relations problems arising from the idea of America becoming an army of democracy.” 119
The United States plan was to annihilate the enemy. “The prevailing view was that
victory would be accomplished through the utter destruction of evil, often going beyond moral
boundaries and evoking moral qualms,” 120 argued Thomas W. Zeiler. The was a necessary fight
against genocide and aggression. Military leaders would defend fighting a supposedly ‘good
war,’ as commentators later called it, against murderous ideologies. 121 There was no broad
national plan of using military threats to effect political ends, engage in international politics, or
base military strategy on national security, principles, values, and defense interest. Rather, for the
United States, “war was the strategy. Its objective was to eviscerate the enemy, military and
civilian alike, through industrial technology and an insistence of unconditional surrender that
amplified the killing by promising total defeat,”122 notes Russell F. Weigley. World War II
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permeated every aspect of American life, including the government, the economy, entertainment,
and society. Before the new recruits even got to basic training, the Office of War Information's
Bureau of Motion Pictures assumed responsibility for making sure that moviegoers left those
theaters only with government-approved thoughts in their mind. In Hollywood Goes to War,
Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black assert that the Office of War Information’s supervision
of Hollywood filmmaking was “the most comprehensive and sustained government attempt to
change the content of a mass medium in American history.”123 The Office of War Information
wanted movies to extol the virtues of the American way of life and to portray the Allies as
models of righteousness and the Axis as embodiments of evil.124 This was the exposure the new
recruits faced as the entered the military. The ideas of fighting for the American way of life were
continually promoted by the soldiers leaders.
In training and morale materials for American soldiers and in representations of soldiers
created for civilian audiences, depictions of the military emphasized the continuing individuality
and autonomy of each American serviceman. By describing the most regimented elements of
military life as analogous to civilian life, by emphasizing the moral autonomy of men even in a
military situation, and by attempting to train Americans to fight for empirical, rational reasons,
the military leadership attempted to construct, in word and action, an army ready to fight for the
American way of life. The military leadership realized, as Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel
argued, “In order to become an effective soldier, he must learn to adapt himself to a completely
undemocratic group, which required of him submission and fixation in a dependent position and
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ideology”125 The potential soldier and sailor was constantly reminded of what America had to do
to protect freedom.
Government representatives saw knowledge as essential to the morale of American
troops. Troop morale had to be based on a knowledge of the facts if this was to be a war against
fanatical belief systems. Thus, from very early in the forming of military strategy, key figures
stressed the importance of knowledge of the truth to the morale of the troops. Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, addressing a conference of army public relations officers held in Washington,
D.C., in March 1941, argued that “The success of the army depends upon its morale…Nothing
can undermine this morale.”126 A later memo from the War Department’s Information and
Education Division laying out the objectives of the morale program emphasized, among other
goals, fostering both a “belief in the cause for which we fight and a resentment, based on
knowledge of the facts, against our enemies who have made it necessary to fight.”127
Technical Sergeant Glenn M. Girardat, Company C, 112th Infantry Regiment wrote in
his diary that he had enlisted on November 11, 1940 after seeing the war movies. He enlisted in
the National Guard and was mobilized at the Meadville, Pennsylvania armory on February 17,
1941. He left for training the night of February 27. He said the entire time, “I was itching to get
into the fight.”128
Staff Sergeant Robert F. Sessoms wrote in his diary that “Uncle Sam interrupted my
happy-go-lucky days and inducted me into service at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, along with a
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group of sad-faced guys. We were not slackers and put our shoulders to the wheel and pushed
forward our aims for victory, just as we had seen in the movies.”129
Mrs. Mabel Smith wrote about her son Staff Sergeant Robert L. Smith, Company C,
112th Infantry Regiment. She said he was training at Camp Lee, Virginia when the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. He was sent to Company F, 112th Infantry, 28th Division. Robert was 19
years old then. He came home on furlough and that was the last time his mother saw him. He
was killed on September 19, 1944. While he was home, he told her that he wanted to fight. He
had seen the movies and read about what the Germans and Japanese were doing. He knew it was
his duty to fight.130 Staff Sergeant Smith received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions
near Percy, France.
General Marshall knew that duty/honor/country encompasses feelings of duty, both to
country and fellow soldiers, a sense of honor, patriotism, and a love for the individual's home
country and all it represents. Richard Holmes defined honor as “concerned with the obligation of
a soldier, and in part it is a reflection of the manly honor which encourages so many young men
to enlist and buoys them up before their first battle.”131 The concept of honor for soldiers is
based primarily upon moral standards of his culture and what values and virtues his society
upholds. Martin L. Cook argues that it is the value system of his culture which will form the
soldier’s concept of honor and will inform the soldier’s conduct in battle.132
General Marshall understood that the army had to motivate men who were highly
individualistic, democratic, and even anti-military. In 1942, the U.S. government established the
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Office of War Information to serve as the United States propaganda branch during World War
II. The office created thousands of posters (like the ones in Figure 3), books, pamphlets, radio
broadcasts films, and other media that were used at home and abroad. Enlistment and worker
posters were placed in public places.

Figure 3 - Recruiting Posters (U.S. Department of Defense)

“The soldier’s idea of honor is based upon the training he has received to instruct him in
the right conduct of war,” argues James Johnson. 133 In the Army, fresh recruits soon realized
physical training was focused on the survival and psychological training was focused on why
they were fighting. The purpose of the transformation from a civilian into a soldier was to teach
men what they needed to know to stay alive on the battlefield. They also needed to be reminded
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of the reasons they were fighting. Along with instilling teamwork, and learning the basics of
survival, drill sergeants stressed the importance of winning to preserve the American way of life.
The Germans and the Japanese could not be allowed to win or America would be a different
place.134 New recruits were issued FM 21-100 - War Department Basic Field Manual: Soldier’s
Handbook, July 23, 1941. It covered everything from how to assemble a field pack and address
officers to how to react in a mustard gas attack. The first paragraph of the forward reads:
You are now a member of the Army of the United States. That Army is made up
of free citizens chosen from among a free people. The American people of their
own will, and through the men they have elected to represent them in Congress,
have determined that the free institutions of this country will continue to exist.
They have declared that, if necessary, we will defend our right to live in our own
American way and continue to enjoy the benefits and privileges which are granted
to the citizens of no other nation. It is upon you, and the many thousands of your
comrades now in military service, that our country has placed its confident faith
that this defense will succeed should it ever be challenged. 135
Along with movies produced exclusively for the military, such as training and orientation films,
the Why We Fight films were shown to American soldiers during basic training. Beyond basic
training, about 160 technical bulletins were produced with combat footage. These movies played
a significant role in the lives of American soldiers from the moment they entered the military. 136
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Senior military leadership understood that if soldiers could believe that America was the
place for them to practice Judeo-Christian traditions, they would die to defend it. Military leaders
and chaplains emphasized that Communism in the Soviet Union, Fascism in Italy, National
Socialism in Germany, and the rise of the Showa in Japan represented totalitarian regimes that
limited freedom, particularly, religious freedom. 137
A speech was delivered during an I am an American Day gathering in New York's
Central Park on May 18, 1941 by Harold L. Ickes, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of
the Interior serves to define what it meant to be a free American and is indicative of the message
the government wanted to get out to its citizens. It came at a perilous moment in history, May of
1941, when Adolf Hitler and the Nazis seemed headed toward possible world domination. Ickes
said:
….what constitutes an American? Not color nor race nor religion. Not the pedigree
of his family nor the place of his birth. Not the coincidence of his citizenship. Not
his social status nor his bank account. Not his trade nor his profession. An American
is one who loves justice and believes in the dignity of man. An American is one who
will fight for his freedom and that of his neighbor. An American is one who will
sacrifice property, ease and security in order that he and his children may retain the
rights of free men. An American is one in whose heart is engraved the immortal
second sentence of the Declaration of Independence. Americans have always known
how to fight for their rights and their way of life. Americans are not afraid to fight.
They fight joyously in a just cause.138
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During his fireside chat on December 28, 1941, President Roosevelt warned, “at this moment the
forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom are being held away
from our shores. The Axis powers represented the revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In
that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope…” 139 In effect, Roosevelt framed the war as a
momentous struggle for the preservation of human liberty and the American way of life.
Roosevelt shared his “profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put
forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to meet the threat to our democratic
faith.”140
The messages from the leaders of the United States were not lost on the men who would
be part of the 28th Division. They entered the military with those messages fresh in their minds.
While the United States was still neutral at the start of World War Two, and as the war clouds
gathered over Europe, in August 1940, all U.S. National Guard regiments were called into
Federal service for 12 months to bolster the strength of the Regular Army. The 28th Infantry
Division Historical Summary provides some information about the beginning of the Division.
Before being federalized, the 28th Division was a unit of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard
and is the oldest division-sized unit in the Department of Defense. Some of the units of the
division can trace their lineage to Benjamin Franklin's battalion, the Pennsylvania Associators. 141
The Division’s storied history was not lost on many of the men who served in its ranks. When
soldiers joined the 28th Division they were given a card that outlined a brief history of the
division.
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The road to the Battle of the Bulge for the 28th Infantry Division began on February 17,
1941, when they were called into federal service at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. By June,
enough replacements were expected to bring the division strength to 12,947. The division
remained there until August 1941 when it was relocated to A.P. Hill Military Reservation,
Virginia to continue training. The soldiers of the 28th participated in maneuvers in North
Carolina from September to December 1941. In January 1942, the division was sent to Camp
Livingston, Louisiana and in March came under control of U.S. Army Ground Forces and was
placed under the IV Corps of the Third Army. 142
According to Sergeant Albert W. Burghardt, Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment, “the
basic training was very tough at Camp Livingston, especially when most of the troops came into
the army without knowing what exercise was. It didn't take long to weed out the fellows who
could not take the training.” 143 The obstacle courses and the marches were tough on most
soldiers. The calisthenics for forty-five minutes without stopping were very difficult, but most of
the trainees made it.
In January 1943, the division moved to Camp Gordon Johnson, near Apalachicola,
Florida, where the Amphibious Training Command was set up. This was a training school for all
weather, shore to shore assault training. The tempo of the training increased. They went on many
speed marches that consisted of four miles in forty-five minutes and five miles in an hour.
Almost daily, the division participated in mock landings on islands in the Gulf of Mexico and
beach landings on the coast of Florida. At that time, they did not know where they were going the Pacific area or the European Theater of Operations. They did a lot of patrolling in the
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swamps and long marches in the sand. It looked like the South Pacific for the division. Frequent
lectures remined the men that they were going to fight for the American way of life. 144
The barracks floors were sand. They slept on cots. Every morning the soldiers would hit
the heel of their boot against the side of the cot to see what would fall out. Overnight scorpions,
giant ants, etc., crept into them. The men did a lot of swimming in the Gulf as part of their
training. Everyone was expected to learn how to swim. During one of the night training
exercises, the 112th Regiment lost several men when the ramp on an LCP (Landing Craft
Personnel) was lowered on a sand bar in the Gulf, instead of on land.145
Howard J. Friedman talked about the living conditions in a 1975 interview. He said, “The
winter of 1942-1943 proved severe, and the barracks lacked adequate heating. The Army did not
build mess halls for some time, requiring troops to eat outside with mess kits for several months.
A permanent chapel was not completed until a month after the men arrived, and no recreation
center existed for several months.”146 The men of the 28th Division did not realize it at the time
but, they would experience these conditions many times as they fought their way across Europe.
At Camp Gordon Johnson the tempo of the training continued to increase. To add realism
to the training in the use of the bayonet, the instructors had the men leave the scabbard in place.
The soldiers would pair off and go at it until one of the contestants was slashed, jabbed, or was
touched with the scabbard over the bayonet. One of the more important parts of their training
was street combat that took place in an abandoned town called ‘Schicklgruber Haven.’ The men
went through the town one at a time. Cardboard dummies popped up, and they fired at them,
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learning to fire from their hips. 147 In May 1943, while at Camp Gordon Johnson, the division
went by truck to Camp Rucker, Alabama, for both qualification and familiarization of their
weapons.
The men of the division were reminded of their mission by their leaders and in their unit
newsletters. For example, in the May 30, 1943 issue of the Trumpeter, the 110th Infantry
newsletter, there was an article entitled “Memorial Day 1963?” It read:
Each year on May 30th, the nation honors the dead of the various wars. In later
years some of us may be among those honored dead. Will we have accomplished
the objectives for which another crop of carnivorous Caesars be trying to
dominate the world, subjecting minority groups and allegedly inferior peoples to
Machiavellian abuse? To observe Memorial Day 1963 peacefully we have a big
job to do. The war, which should be called a Peoples Revolution, must be won!
The war is being fought to secure for men everywhere the freedoms which
Americans have been taking for granted for many generations. 148
On June 10, 1943, the Division arrived at Camp Pickett, Virginia from Camp Gordon Johnson by
train, where the training continued. Troops were taken to an area, where there was a large
platform, which was a replica of the side of a ship, about two and a half stories high. They had
cargo nets secured to the top. The men went up one side hand over hand, with full pack and
down the other side the way they would on a regular ship.149 In August, the division moved by
rail and trucks to Norfolk, Virginia, where they participated in ship-to-shore amphibious training

147

Burghardt. Note: Alois Hitler (born Alois Schicklgruber) was an Austrian civil servant and the father of Adolf
Hitler.
148
“The Trumpeter, 110th Infantry Unit Paper,” Vol. IV, No. 7. 28th Infantry Division Archives, filing cabinet 2.
(Fort Indiantown Gap: Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum). Note: The unit paper was
distributed to every man in the regiment.
149
Division Historical Summary, 23.

58

at the Solomon Islands in Chesapeake Bay, Virginia. While at Camp Pickett, the 45th Infantry
Division was alerted for an overseas assignment. The 28th Infantry Division was assigned to
furnish 1,500 replacements to bring the 45th Division up to strength. 150
The soldiers were able to get a short break from the grind of training. At Camp Pickett,
they were able to visit the Red Cross Hospitality Center, participate in religious services, and
leave the post on a three-day pass. Many went to Washington, D.C. Some of the men whose
hometown was close, went home for a couple of days. This was the last time the soldiers would
leave the confines of their camp before leaving the United States. The men had some time to
think about why they were there. In his diary, Tom Hickman wrote, “I do believe that the war
against Hitler was a proper one, but we were subject to a great deal of propaganda. We were told
that Hitler was stamping out religion.” 151
On September 28-29, 1943, the Division moved from Camp Pickett to Camp Miles
Standish, near Taunton, Massachusetts. This was a type of security camp. No one was permitted
to leave the area. Some of the men went to the wire fence that surrounded the camp and gave
some kids money to get liquor for them. The soldiers were not at this camp very long. They had
inspections and got ready to leave for their overseas assignment to the European Theater of
Operations. On October 6 and 7, they boarded troop trains and went to the port of Boston where
they boarded the SS Cristobal. In October, the Division set sail arriving ten days later at
Newport, Wales.152
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The training continued in Wales, and none of it was easy. While they trained, they were
exposed to hedgerows, long, deep walls of hedges that reached fifteen feet in height. Little did
they realize that these tremendous obstacles awaited them in Normandy, France, where they
would cost the lives of so many men. During their stay in Wales, they were out of camp more
than in. Rumors circulated that the camps may be the targets of German air raids. The more time
spent in the field, the less likely the unit would suffer casualties from such raids before
embarking for Normandy. There were German planes overhead most nights. 153
While in Wales, the men went to the Assault Training Center near Barnstable,
Devonshire. The English had a large area set up to resemble the type of fortifications that the
soldiers would encounter when they hit the beach. The Division also used the same tactics when
they got to the Siegfried Line. They formed into assault teams. Each team consisted of sergeants,
riflemen, flame throwers, demolition teams, bazooka teams, light machine gun squads, 60mm
mortar squads, and men with Bangalore torpedoes. Each assault team was assigned a pillbox to
attack and destroy. Umpires judged their efforts. 154
On one of the amphibious exercises, they went by troop transport to the Irish Sea. They
disembarked down the cargo nets into small assault crafts, and after circling around, made for the
beach. The surf was very high, and one could look over the side of the boat and see the sand in
front. Albert W. Burghardt recalled, “the waves in the surf must have been around twenty feet
high. The surf was deep, and as usual everyone was wet. There was never a change of
clothing.” 155 The Irish Sea was very cold, but after the original shock, the woolen long johns
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gave them a measure of warmth. Later, when the Division landed on Omaha Beach after D-Day,
they saw the same type of beach that they had practiced on in the Irish Sea exercises.
In June 1944, Lieutenant General George S. Patton was given command of the Third
United States Army, a field army which had newly arrived in the United Kingdom and which
was composed largely of inexperienced troops. Patton began delivering speeches to his troops in
February 1944. The speeches were made available to other units training at the time. Patton's
Speech to the Third Army was a series of speeches given by Patton to troops prior to the Allied
invasion of France. The speeches were intended to motivate the inexperienced Third Army for its
pending combat duty. In the speeches, Patton urged his soldiers to do their duty regardless of
personal fear, and he exhorted them to aggressiveness and constant offensive action. Patton's
profanity-laced speaking was viewed as unprofessional by some other officers but the speeches
resounded well with his men. This an excerpt from one of his speeches:
…Sure, we all want to go home. We want to get this war over with. But you can't
win a war lying down. The quickest way to get it over with is to get the bastards
who started it. We want to get the hell over there and clean the goddamn thing up,
and then get at those purple-pissing Japs. The quicker they are whipped, the quicker
we go home. The shortest way home is through Berlin and Tokyo. So keep
moving… 156
When the men had a break during their training in the field, they collected watercress. There
were many streams in this mountainous area, and the watercress was fresh and crisp and a
change from what was offered in the company mess. The occasional break in training gave the
soldiers a chance to attend religious services and to write letters to loved ones at home. Although
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chaplains were not readily available everywhere in 1942, or present in all combat areas, by 1943
almost no soldier in uniform was without benefit of clergy care if he wanted it. The soldiers were
able to go to the local town and frequent the pubs, which usually had better food then the mess
halls. During the religious services, chaplains and lay personnel emphasized that the men were
fighting for the freedom of all oppressed peoples. 157
Infantry soldiers were not the only ones who experienced hardships and died for their
beliefs. Chaplain Captain Clyde E. Kimball, who would die in combat in the Battle of the Bulge,
left behind a diary that provided a glimpse of a chaplain who willingly made rounds in England
to serve as many troops as possible. Chaplain Kimbell blessed many men by tirelessly traveling,
speaking about why they were fighting, and passing out Bibles, stationery, and other useful items
he would purchase in the Post Exchange. For his later actions during the Battle of the Bulge, he
was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for displaying great personal bravery, volunteering to
pass through fierce German machine gun fire in an effort to render treatment and evacuate the
wounded. 158
On April 17, 1944, the 28th Division moved from Wales by motor transport to Chiseldon
Camp and Rackley Park in Wiltshire on Salisbury Plains. The men were back to primitive living,
assigned to pyramid tents that held between four and six men. They were not issued army cots,
so they made stakes out of tree branches, drove the stakes into the ground and laced twine
between the stakes. This gave them a sort of hammock and kept them off the damp ground. They
were issued mattress covers which were filled with straw. Training continued with marches and
firing various weapons, including the bazooka antitank rocket.159
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While at Rackley Park, the word came down that another move was imminent. On July
18, 1944, the Division left Rackley Park and moved sixty miles south to Moorhill Camp, near the
port of Southampton. Moorhill Camp resembled a security camp, because it was surrounded by
barbed wire, and security troops were on patrol everywhere. No one could leave the camp, and
the soldiers were billeted in very close quarters. Their stay in this camp was short. Equipment
was checked and some replaced. They were issued items for combat, cigarettes, candy rations,
water purification tablets, and pocket Bibles.
Chaplains accompanied the fighting soldiers throughout their training and into battle. In
his book Serving God and Country: U.S. Military Chaplains in World War II, historian Lyle W.
Dorsett describes the role of chaplains in various theaters of operation and the promotion of
religion by military commanders. For example, he cites comments by Brigadier General F. B.
Prickett who commanded regular habits of church attendance by soldiers under his command. 160
The general got specific about his expectation of chaplains:
The chaplains are more than morale builders; morale building is every officer’s
duty. The primary function of chaplains is to be ministers of religion to the
officers and men of his command. In order to do this work most effectively, the
chaplains are training with the men, going to the field, living with the troops,
getting close to them, understanding their psychology. 161
Dorsett explains that chaplains were also directed to provide sex and hygiene lectures to soldiers.
Many chaplains used the Bible to make their case.162 Chaplains also distributed steel-covered
New Testaments Bibles to soldiers as they prepared to go into battle. “Advertised in newspapers
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and magazines as protection from bullets, the small books were designed to be carried in the
pocket over one's heart as both symbol and shield.” 163 On the first page inside was a printed
message from The White House, with the printed signature of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Roosevelt’s message encouraged the new recruit to use the Bible as a source of strength:
To the Members of the Army: As Commander-in-Chief I take pleasure in
commending the reading of the Bible to all who serve in the armed forces of the
United States. Throughout the centuries men of many faiths and diverse origins
have found in the Sacred Book words of wisdom, counsel, and inspiration. It is
a foundation of strength and now, as always, an aid in attaining the highest
aspirations of the human soul. Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 164
The American Bible Society was producing 12,000 New Testament Bibles per day for soldiers
by the end of 1943.165 Chaplains were responsible for not only distributing the Bibles, but as
Lyle Dorsett pointed out, “Chaplains were absolutely essential to America's victory because they
cultivated courage and morale among U.S. troops that allowed them to make needed
sacrifices.” 166 Dorsett explained, “during training, chaplains functioned to help civilians become
combatants, adjust spiritually and psychologically to a radically different way of life.” 167
Chaplain Alton E. Carpenter’s vivid daily account of his travels with the 20th, 1340th,
and 1171st Combat Engineers from November 1942 provides a look at the lives of the soldiers
he ministered to and the emphasis and support of the military for chaplains in combat. 168 While
records are not available of the number of soldiers who attended services conducted by
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chaplains, many soldiers attended services as they could. Some soldiers practiced their faith in
private. Most men who fought in the war were fairly traditional Christians or Jews from
childhood, though they expressed their beliefs in a variety of ways. Nicholas Pellegrino
concluded that some soldiers faced enemy fire believing that God would protect them. 169 In The
Greatest Generation, Tom Brokaw argues that “the World War II generation developed values of
duty, honor, economy, courage, service, love of family and country, and, above all, responsibility
for oneself. Coupled with their faith, these characteristics helped them to defeat Hitler.” 170
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Chapter Five
Fighting across France to the Siegfried Line
After crossing the English Channel to the coast of France, everyone was apprehensive
about what they would see. The 28th Division landed at Omaha Beach on July 22, 1944, where
the first American troops landed on D-Day, June 6. The aftermath of the battle was very evident.
There was debris everywhere. As the men went from the beach up a road to high ground, they
saw to their left what looked like a cotton field in the distance. On putting the binoculars on the
area, what they saw was not a cotton field. It was row after row of white crosses. These were the
graves of the men of the U.S. invasion force that landed on Omaha Beach on D-Day. The men of
the 28th Division would leave the beaches of Normandy and embark on a journey across France
and into Germany that would harden their resolve to defeat the Nazis and insure that the
American way of life would be preserved.
Once they left the beach area, they began the march inland where there did not appear to
be too much damage from the fighting. When they stopped periodically for one reason or
another, and there were buildings nearby, they checked them out. The buildings were empty, but
the soldiers found traces of bandages and dark stains, and assumed it was from troops that had
been injured in the fighting in the beach area. 171
While they waited for the orders to replace the 35th Division, there was a delay. During
this waiting period, the 28th Division was several miles behind the front lines. They heard
hundreds of Allied planes passing overhead. This was the start of the saturation bombing near St.
Lo involving over 1,000 planes. This also was the start of the big offensive to breach the German
lines, and even though they were miles from the bombing, the ground shook. During this
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devastating bombing, some of the planes dropped their bombs short, and they caused many
casualties in the 35th Division while it awaited relief from the 28th. During the wait, the men had
time to think about their training and why they were in Europe. They thought about what
President Roosevelt had told America about fighting for freedom and the American way of life.
They thought about their families back home and were determined that the Germans would not
set foot on American shores. Private First Class Milton R. Downey, Company C, 112th Infantry,
wrote to his mom and dad on July 30, “The American flag means a whole lot to me. I am glad
that when I do come home I can say I have a share in it. That is more than some people can say. I
hope my son doesn’t ever have to go through what I have and will go through. I am going to
have a son when I come back home. That’s what I am fighting for.”172 Map 1 shows the First
Army Breakout, July 24 to August 4, 1944.
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On July 29, 1944, the men rode trucks through St. Lo. It had been heavily bombed and
shelled. There were bodies and parts of bodies visible in the debris, and there was the everpresent smell of death. Bloated bodies of draft horses and cows littered the area. After three and
a half years of training, the men of the 28th Division now faced war: stench, decay, devastation,
and death. Despite witnessing horrific acts, most soldiers remained steadfast in their religious
beliefs and committed to why they were there. 173
The Division’s first attack on July 31 was on the French town of Percy and Hill 210,
south of St. Lo. It was a morning attack. The division’s regimental assault teams consisted of
rifle, machine gun, mortar, and demolition squads, and bazooka teams. The division assault
teams took off reminiscent of Picket's charge at Gettysburg, with a lot of yelling and hollering.
They entered Percy confused and disorientated. Eventually some of their troops who were in
reserve took them back to the original lines. Displaying the usual symptoms of a unit new to
combat, the troops of the 28th Division would need several days to overcome a natural hesitancy
to advance under fire, to become accustomed to maneuvering in unfamiliar terrain, and to learn
the techniques of advancing through hedgerow country. 174
Hesitancy to advance under fire did not stop Staff Sergeant Walter R. Tauchert of
Company L, 110th Infantry Regiment from doing what he came to do. During the attack on
Percy at approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 31, Sergeant Tauchert, together with the 2nd Platoon,
were holding down the right flank of his company when they came upon a crossroad near the
town. The crossroad was heavily defended by German machine gun emplacements on either side
of the road, by a machine gun and a sniper in the attic of a house on the right front and by a half-
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track vehicle on the left-front. This crisscrossed concentration of fire was supplemented by a
heavy German artillery barrage that had succeeded in pinning down Tauchert’s company. 175
From his position at the side of the road, Sergeant Tauchert opened fire on the machine
gun emplacement menacing his right flank, knocking it out with his grenade launcher. Utilizing a
machine gun nearby, he turned his fire upon the machine gun emplacement on his left flank and
silenced it. Although an airburst from a German 88mm gun exploded with such force as to knock
Tauchert to the ground and rip the clothing and equipment from his back, he turned his machine
gun on the gun and sniper in the attic and silenced them. He then directed his fire on the German
halftrack but its fire forced him to withdraw. For his extraordinary heroism and courageous
actions Staff Sergeant Tauchert was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 176
In an interview by the 28th Infantry Division Public Relations Section on September 28,
1945, Technical Sergeant Edward F. Schroder, Company D, 112th Infantry remembered Percy. It
was Sunday, August 1, “when my battalion was initiated into combat. We suffered heavy
casualties and at the end of that day my platoon had eight of the original thirty-five men left. We
knew there would be sacrifices, but we knew what we were fighting for. Those who were left
knew what combat was and had gained some knowledge and combat experience at the expense
of their buddies.” 177
The 28th Division infantry men took their kindergarten training in hedgerow fighting at
Percy and Hill 210. Their post-graduate work was at Gathemo and Hill 288, further south.
Gathemo was a small town of a population of five hundred. When the battle smoke cleared away
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German and American bodies lay everywhere. It was hot and dusty when the attack began on
August 7. The infantry fought and sweated and clashed in hand-to-hand battle from morning
until night for four days. 178 The smell of death was all around when Private First Class Edward J.
Sharkey, 109th Infantry, saw that his rifle company was pinned down by flanking machinegun
fire. He voluntarily crawled across an open field under heavy fire, leaped into a German
emplacement, fired his automatic rifle into the gun crew, killed three Germans and knocked out
their weapon. His company advanced a couple of hedgerows. Sharkey was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross for his actions but was killed in a subsequent action.
Private First Class Sharkey was not the only man who demonstrated brave action. Private
First Class Frank Kielbasa, 112th Infantry, crawled to within forty yards of a German position on
Hill 288. Throwing his grenades, he killed six German riflemen supporting the position before he
was fatally wounded by machinegun fire. He received the Distinguished Service Cross
posthumously. 179 There were many heroes at Gathemo and Hill 288. They fought the Germans
so that America could remain free. They battled and fell and sometimes it was days before their
bodies were found, surrounded by bodies of the green-gray clad Wehrmacht (German Army). On
the afternoon of August 10, Gathemo fell to the 28th infantry men and Hill 288 was cleared of
the Germans.
A significant tactical dilemma facing the 28th Division in Normandy was the local
terrain, called Bocage in French. Bocage refers to farmland separated by thick coastal
hedgerows. These hedgerows are denser, thicker, and higher in Normandy than elsewhere along
the French coast or in the British countryside on the opposite side of the English Channel where
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the division had trained. From the German military perspective, they were ideal for defense,
since they broke up the local terrain into small fields edged by natural earthen obstacles. They
provide real defense in depth, extending dozens of miles beyond the coast. The Bocage
undermined the U.S. Army’s advantages in armor and firepower, and the hedgerows gave the
German defenders natural shelter from attack. 180 The men persisted and stubbornly fought their
way through the obstacles.
After the bitter hedgerow fighting around Percy, and a brief respite to refit and receive
replacements for the casualties suffered, the 28th Division continued their advance across France
in pursuit of the fleeing Germans. The Germans continued to fire artillery at the advancing
Americans, but they continued on, as they had a mission to accomplish – to defeat the Germans.
Martin Blumenson recalled, “for protection from German artillery shells, we would dig slit
trenches, the length of our bodies and deep enough to protect us from shells that might fall close
by.” 181
As the men of the 28th Division traveled across France they were not only constantly
reminded by their leaders and chaplains of why they were there, they were also bombarded with
German propaganda leaflets loaded in artillery shells. The propaganda were meant to test the will
of the American fighters. One in particular was entitled Do You Remember – The Olympic
Games in Berlin? On the cover was a picture of three American athletes who participated in the
games. It read, “Have you ever heard or seen in these reports [reports of the Olympic Games]
that the German people then was unhappy, oppressed and enslaved by the Nazi bosses? - NO.
You have seen a peaceful, sporting, gay people, at work and at festivals and contest. But today
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you are told to liberate the German people… 182 Most of the soldiers used the propaganda flyers
for toilet paper or to light small gasoline stoves they used to make coffee or heat cans from their
C or K-rations. They knew it was all Nazi propaganda and they were not going to be distracted
from their mission of defending freedom. 183
On August 21, the 110th and 112th Regiments captured Verteuil, Breteuil, and Damville.
The next day they liberated Nogent-le-Sec, Bonneville, Conches, Cleville, and Bacquipuis. The
frantic Nazis put up a short but stiff fight at Le Neubourg on August 24. But a task force
composed of the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, the 107th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C of
the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a small tank unit stormed and took the town. 184
Technical Sergeant Emerson W. Buckler, Company C, 112th Infantry wrote in his journal
that after they landed on Omaha Beach he joined the 1st Platoon. “The platoon looked pretty
rough at that point. As they started to push towards Germany, he experienced his first combat,
and was plenty shaken up, but knew they were there to fight for the folks back home. They were
not going to let the Germans win.”185
After weeks of slow progress through hedgerows and cities, the men of the division
found themselves in a fast advance east, liberating towns as fast as they could move forward.
They encountered the occasional German resistance nest, detaching a regimental combat team or
a battalion to deal with it, and kept the rest of the division moving. By August 25, the division’s
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110th and 112th Infantry Regiments had placed themselves on the Seine River to cut off German
forces retreating from the Falaise Pocket. The 109th Infantry Regiment captured Elbeuf on the
Seine and cut off the last of the retreat route of the German army in the area and the regiment
took five hundred prisoners of war. 186
The Falaise pocket was the decisive engagement of the Battle of Normandy. Map 2
shows the Allied forces that formed a pocket around Falaise, Calvados, in which German Army
Group B, with the 7th Army and the Fifth Panzer Army were encircled by the Western Allies. 187
The battle resulted in the destruction of most of German Army Group B west of the Seine, which
opened the way to Paris and the Franco-German border. On August 21, the Falaise Pocket was
sealed. Around 60,000 soldiers of German Army Group B were trapped inside, 50,000 of whom
were taken prisoner. 10,000 Germans were killed by artillery or air strikes inside the pocket.

Map 2 - The Falaise Pocket (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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While they spearheaded across France, every French town and village showed their
appreciation for being liberated by bringing all kinds of things to drink - wine, champagne,
brandy, calvados (apple brandy), etc. The Calvados was supposedly 180+ proof and was used by
the soldiers when there was a gas shortage. Albert Burghardt noted, “it made the jeeps backfire a
little, but it worked.”188 The Americans were proud to have guaranteed the freedom of the
French people while they fought to preserve their own.
The Germans constantly put-up roadblocks of several types. One was to put a two-man
machine gun alongside a road, usually in a ditch. They would wait until the division spearhead
was close and would then open fire. 189 The men of the division walked and fought the Germans
day after day across France. Sometime on August 27, the men were notified of a move by truck,
but were not told the destination. The soldiers were surprised when they arrived at Bois de
Boulogne (Boulogne woodland), a large public park in the outskirts of Paris, where they took
their place in formation for the triumphal march through the French capital. The Division
marched down the Champs-Elysees and around the Arc de Triomphe as the French people lined
the street, several rows deep, and cheered them as they passed, twenty-four abreast. Crowds of
French citizens lined the streets cheering the troops in appreciation for their country’s liberation.
The men had only been in combat for five weeks, and they were already being treated as
heroes. Many soldiers thought that this war was not so bad after all. There was confident talk
among the troops that the war would be over by Christmas, but they were wrong. The Germans
still posed a serious threat to be reckoned with in the days to come. It would be no easy task, but
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the men knew what they had to do. They marched out of Paris, and that night bivouacked near
the city dump. The next morning, they were up and after the Germans again. 190
As they got farther from Paris, the division went through beautiful country, and pursued
and engaged the Germans in short, sharp skirmishes as the Germans tried to slow the American
advance. After clearing the Compiegne Forest, it was dusk on September 2 when the 110th
Infantry Regiment stormed into the streets of St. Quentin in northern France. German, overrun
by the speed of the American advance, stumbled out of houses and shops and started firing at the
Americans. Within minutes the gathering darkness was filled with rifle and machine gun fire and
the shouts of officers and the cries of the wounded. While moving through the city, they were
suddenly engaged by a column of Germans of about a company size. 191
The Nazis, aided by several armored cars, attempted to break the regimental column.
Captain Archie W. Stewart’s jeep stopped and fired at the Germans coming up the street. The
Germans overran the jeep, killed the driver, and shot Stewart, leaving him for dead. The
Germans captured the jeep and drove away. 192 The 110th Regimental S-2 (Intelligence Officer),
Major Robert Gaynor earned the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions that day. He
pursued the six Germans who were fleeing in the captured jeep, killed or wounded the entire
group, and recovered the vehicle. While he was questioning one of the wounded Germans, a
German platoon advanced on foot toward his position. Despite overwhelming odds, he killed and
wounded several of the German platoon before he was seriously wounded, and the Germans
overran Gaynor’s position and continued on. Major Gaynor crawled to his vehicle and reported
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the information to headquarters. Artillery fire was brought on the German platoon and most were
killed.193
After they left Paris, the soldiers of the division had walked over 195 miles, an average of
18 miles a day. There was more walking and less leap frogging with trucks then before they
arrived in Paris. German opposition was very light. There was an occasional roadblock or booby
trap. The division continued to advance through La Fère, Saint-Quentin, Laon, Rethel, Sedan,
Charleville-Mézières, Bouillion and on September 6 crossed the Mouse River.
As they got close to the German border, the word came down the line from headquarters
that they were not to accept anything to drink from the German people. On September 10 they
arrived at Binsfield, near the Our River, the geographical border between Luxembourg and
Germany. That night a patrol from the 109th Infantry Regiment crossed the border and became
the first 28th Division troops to enter Germany. Two days later the entire division dug in on
German soil.194
The pillboxes the division soldiers faced were twenty to thirty feet in width, forty to fifty
feet deep and twenty to twenty-five feet high with roofs and walls three to eight feet thick of
reinforced concrete. About half of the pillboxes were underground. Most had two firing
portholes for machine guns or light antitank weapons sited to cover approaches and provide
mutual support to other pillboxes. Each structure provided sleeping rooms for five to seven men.
Concrete bunkers in the rear were designed to hold and protect reserves, counterattack forces and
command posts. 195 Most pillboxes were on the forward slope where they had longer fields of fire
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and observation. Map 3 illustrates the position of the West Wall and the Allied front lines on
September 11 and on December 15.

Map 3 - The Siegfried Line (Defense Mapping Agency)

In this area of the Siegfried line, good tank approaches were protected by lines of
“Dragon’s Teeth” that were pyramid shaped blocks of concrete in five rows rising in height from
two to five feet. Barbed wire was strung in front of the blocks. There were trenches running
between adjoining pillboxes to protect the troops when they moved from one box to another and
to provide outside lookout and listening posts. 196
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Available intelligence gave no reason for concern. The V Corps G-2, Col. Thomas J.
Ford, predicted that the corps would meet only battered remnants of the three divisions which
had fled before the corps across Belgium and Luxembourg. These were the 5th Parachute, Panzer
Lehr, and 2nd Panzer Divisions. It was possible, Colonel Ford added, that the corps might meet
parts of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, known to have been operating along the corps north
boundary. “There seems no doubt,” Colonel Ford concluded, “that the enemy will defend [the
Siegfried Line] with all of the forces that he can gather.” But, he intimated, what he could gather
was open to question.197
On September 11, combat patrols of the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments, moving
under the cover of darkness, pushed into the Siegfried line. Travelling down the roads leading to
the Dragon’s Teeth and the German pill boxes, the soldiers came under intense German artillery
fire. They reached the Dragon’s Teeth and found that the engineers had blown a path large
enough for tanks to go through and they proceeded very cautiously, waiting for the Germans to
attack, but they never did. They penetrated a mile or two, clearing empty pill boxes stripped of
any guns. 198
On September 12, 1944, two platoons in Company K, 109th Infantry were crossing the
Our River near Kalborn, Luxembourg, to get to higher ground on the other side. Thanks to an
early morning fog, Technical Sergeant Francis J. Clark and his platoon safely made it across. The
fog lifted by the time the second platoon reached shore, though, and they were hit by gunfire,
which killed the two men in charge and pinned the rest down.199
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Sergeant Clark saw what was happening and crawled across a field riddled with gunfire
to reach the stuck platoon. He led the survivors to safety, then turned around and went back to
rescue a wounded soldier, all while German gunfire continued to try to cut him down. Later,
Clark led his squad and the men from the rescued platoon “In dangerous sorties against strong
German positions to weaken them by lightning-like jabs,”200 the citation read. During this time,
Clark killed two German machine gunners with hand grenades. He continued to put himself in
danger, running toward the fight, killing, and wounding several enemies, scattering German
patrols, and eventually forcing a full company of heavily armed Germans to withdraw. 201
Five days later, on September 17, Clark's unit had moved northeast and across the border
into Sevenig, Germany. Clark single-handedly killed an enemy machine gunner and forced
another to flee before the Germans came at them hard, taking out a lot of the soldiers in
Company K. Seeing that they were left without leadership, Clark stepped up and took command.
He was wounded the next day, but he refused to be evacuated. By daybreak on the 19th, Clark
managed to kill three more Germans, one of whom was trying to set up a machine gun only fifty
yards away. Later that day, he braved more gunfire to deliver food and water to an isolated U.S.
platoon. Clark assumed leadership when it was desperately needed. His actions were essential to
keeping up the spirits of the hard-hit troops of Company K. For his efforts, Francis J. Clark
received the Congressional Medal of Honor. 202
As the 110th Infantry Regiment reached Germany they found the outer reaches to be illdefended. A reinforced patrol from Company I crossed the border and moved on to the town of
Harspelt, where it was ordered to return to the battalion area on September 12. The same day, the
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2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the border at Stuppach with Company F receiving slight
resistance while the remainder of the group met no opposition and occupied the ground short of
the Siegfried line. At 8:00 a.m. on September 13, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack with the
mission of driving through the Dragon’s Teeth and after breaching the fortified area, to assault
the town of Kesfeld. The attack was launched without armor support and was not successful. The
battalion was held up by automatic weapons fire from pillboxes and by artillery and mortar fire.
On the morning of September 14, the attack was resumed by the 2nd Battalion, this time
using a company of medium tanks in support. 203 Staff Sergeant Richard A. Dalton of Company L
volunteered to lead a tank through a mine field in the face of German fire. It was necessary to get
the tank into firing position against pillboxes, otherwise the pillboxes would have had to be taken
without the use of tanks, potentially resulting in many casualties. The pillboxes were taken out
by the tank allowing the company to continue its attack. Sergeant Dalton was awarded the
Bronze Star for his actions that day. 204
At the same time, the 1st Battalion attacked with no armor support. They were unable to
make any progress, as the men were slowed down by automatic weapons fire from pillboxes and
considerable artillery and mortar fire. Company F was able to get through a gap which had been
created by Company E and Company G and succeeded in seizing six pillboxes but was hit by a
counterattack supported by flame throwing tracked vehicles. Very heavy casualties were inflicted
on the Americans.
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On September 15, the 2nd Battalion was unable to advance but the 1st Battalion,
supported by a company of tanks, was able to break through and capture a key hill after
engineers had blown a second gap out of the Dragon Teeth. The Germans counterattacked on the
night of September 15 quickly destroying Company F. A small German force from the 2nd SS
Panzer Division, well-armed with automatic weapons and flame-throwers and supported by
tanks, made quick work of the company. Units met with some success but fierce German
counterattacks quickly erased the gains. 205
Staff Sergeant Philip Columbus, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry,
was a member of an antitank squad. The squad had moved into a position covering the only road
supplying the forward line companies of the battalion. During the night, a German patrol tried to
cut off the road, but small arms fire from the antitank squad drove the patrol off after the German
patrol leader had been killed. 206 The following morning three American tank destroyers moved
into the antitank gun position and began firing on German troops on a near-by hill. The tank
destroyers drew so much German mortar and 88mm gun fire that the antitank squad was pinned
down except for Gunner Corporal Paul G. Woodward, who was on outpost duty, protecting the
flank of the gun position.
At about 10:00 a.m. Corporal Woodward told Sergeant Columbus that two Germans were
setting up a machine gun about 1,000 yards from the road, apparently trying to knock out the
tank destroyer crews. Despite heavy mortar and artillery fire, Columbus led the squad in a rush
for the German gun position. Fortunately, the Germans had not had time to put the gun properly

205

Combat Interviews, 28th Division Siegfried Line, 11-16 September 1944, interviews conducted by First
Lieutenant John S. Howe. U.S. Army. European Theater, Historical Section. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army
History Institute).
206
110th Infantry Regiment, Unit History.

81

into position and the rush caught them unprepared. They fired one burst when the squad was
about twenty yards from them, then abandoned their gun and ran.207
On September 16, the 1st Battalion attacked and seized a key hill, after Company A and
Company C attacked and seized yet another key hill. The 2nd Battalion was still unable to
advance and the 3rd Battalion was committed in the gap created by the 1st Battalion and 3rd
Battalion. The 3rd Battalion, with a patrol of tank destroyers, attacked and seized eleven
pillboxes with a loss of one man killed and two men wounded. Then they silenced the opposition
which had stymied the 2nd Battalion to that point. That same day, the 3rd Battalion closed the
gap between battalions and the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to occupy defensive positions.
From September 18 to September 29, the 110th continued to occupy a defensive position in the
vicinity of Kesfeld with a tank force of medium tanks to mop up pillboxes, some of which had
been re-occupied by the Germans. 208
Private First Class Thomas J. Ciccone, Company M, 110th Infantry Regiment was
awarded the Silver Star for his action on September 25. Ciccone, ammunition bearer in a mortar
squad, and four other men were given the mission to go back three miles to secure food and
ammunition for their platoon. After successfully securing the needed rations and ammunition,
Ciccone and his party were fired upon by Germans that had infiltrated friendly lines and
established a machine gun position. During the intense fire fight that ensued, Ciccone crawled
within close range of the gun position before the enemy discovered him. Disregarding the
machine gun fire directed at him, he continued to advance and killed three of the German crew
with hand grenades, causing the remainder of the Germans to withdraw. After returning to the
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location of his companions, they secured the rations and ammunition and proceeded to their
company lines. 209
On October 1, Staff Sergeant Herman B. Leff, Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment,
was in a group attempting to re-secure three pillboxes captured by counterattacking enemy
forces. He volunteered to take dynamite charges up a rain-soaked hill under intense German
machine gun fire. Sergeant Leff ran and crawled two hundred yards to one of the fortifications,
only to find that the Germans were holding three American soldiers inside. After a small wet
charge failed to explode, he returned for additional explosives, and became seriously wounded
on the return trip to the emplacement. Despite his wounds, he continued forward over fire-swept
terrain until he placed the explosives around the door of the pillbox. Through his heroic actions,
the door of the fortification was demolished, the three Americans were freed, and the pillbox
eliminated as a threat. Sergeant Leff was awarded the Silver Star for his actions. 210
With no appreciable gains the 110th Infantry Regiment received orders that they would
be relieved by the 23rd Infantry Division and were sent back to Elsenborn, Belgium for rest and
reorganization. 211 While in the Siegfried Line, the men were able to observe the famous German
Buzz Bomb. The launchers were about 10 to 15 miles in front of their position. One’s watch
could be set by when they went over the division positions, exactly every 15 minutes. The range
of these weapons was controlled by the amount of fuel they carried. They made a funny sound
because they were rocket propelled. When the sound stopped, their nose dropped, and they came
down. The Germans employed these V-1 rockets against the division's rear areas.
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Russell M. Hark, Company B, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, remembered one instance
of a soldier’s belief that he was invincible. Hark’s unit was assigned to the 110th who had taken
several pillboxes. Hark had just moved into one when the Germans started to fire mortars at the
pillbox. Hark looked out the door and saw Private Stanley T. Masztzak making some hot
chocolate on a small gasoline stove. Hark yelled,” You dummy, get in here.” Masztzak replied,
“Don’t worry. They can’t hit me. God is on our side.” 212 Masztzak finished making the hot
chocolate and shared his drink with the group inside.
Elements of the 112th Infantry, attached to the 5th Armored Division, crossed into
Germany capturing the town of Wallendorf on September 15. In a small village near Wallendorf,
the commander of Company D, Lieutenant Frank L. Schmidt had the men rounding up all of the
German villagers, to look for German soldiers. They herded the people by an L-shaped rock wall
for their protection as the Germans were shelling the town. The villagers, not knowing the
motives of the Americans, thought they were being lined up against the rock wall to be machine
gunned. The women and children were screaming and the men were making gestures to the
Americans not to harm them. Lieutenant Schmidt, who spoke German, informed the people that
they were not going to be harmed. Sergeant Edward F. Schroder recalled that Lieutenant Schmidt
was a quiet man but would constantly remind his men why they were fighting. After the incident
with the frightened villagers, Schmidt told some of the men that they were fighting for the

villager’s freedom too. 213
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Sergeant Charley S. Jordan, Company C, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, was captured on
September 17 at Bollendorf. In an interview by the 28th Infantry Division Public Relations
Section on September 28, 1945, Jordan remembered:
Most of the men were green, including myself, in combat. I had only been with
the outfit about thirty days. Our company was put out in front that evening as
outposts and most of the men had dug in when the Germans opened fire on us.
My squad lasted all night until about 8:00 a.m. the next morning. When I was
captured, I was completely out of ammunition, but I was not going to retreat.
We had to resist the Nazis. That is why we came. 214
For the 112th and for the other units of the 28th Infantry Division, a new kind of warfare had

begun. Pressed against the border of their home country, the Germans fought desperately, not
just the usual combat divisions that had survived the great retreat but new units of former

garrison troops, overage men, and youth forced prematurely into uniform. For both sides,
including the 112th Infantry, the casualty rate was fearful and defeat bitter.215
As the 28th Division fought along the Siegfried Line, the soldiers and their commanders
were unaware that Hitler was planning a counter-offensive through the Ardennes Forest. Hitler
became convinced that after the Allies had broken out of their Normandy beachheads, he had to
regain the initiative in the war or face certain defeat. It appears that the first idea of the Ardennes
Offensive was discussed on September 16, 1944, during a second meeting after the daily Fuehrer
Conference that took place in the Wolf's Lair, Hitler's East Prussian headquarters. Present at this

214

Charley S. Jordan, Sergeant, Company C, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division. “Personal History
Of the Men Who Marched in the Paris Parade.” 28th Infantry Division Public Relations Section. APO 28,
U.S. Army Europe, September 28, 1945. 28th Infantry Division Archives, filing cabinet 2. (Fort Indiantown
Gap: Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum).
215
MacDonald, 51.

85

meeting were Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, General Heinz Guderian and General Alfred
Jodl. 216 Hitler is reported to have said, “I have made a momentous decision. I am taking the
offensive. Their [the Allies] out of the Ardennes!” And smashing his fist down on a situation
map, he shouted: “Through the Ardennes and on to Antwerp!”217
As German resistance stiffened, Major General Leonard Gerow, the American V Corps
commander, ordered all offensive operations at the Siegfried Line to end on November 13 and
for most of the corps forces to withdraw back across the Our River. 218 The 28th Division crossed
into Belgium. After dark, they dug in. In about an hour, some troops came up to them and
introduced themselves as Canadian Artillery. They were in the next field behind the 28th
Division. They told the men that if they had to fire that night, they would blow their helmets off,
so the 28th soldiers moved off to their right and out of their line of fire. After five days of
attacks, the 28th Division had run out of steam. Only limited progress was made during the
operation, and the cost was very high for the division. 219
The shock of heavy casualties and tough resistance by a determined enemy had a
demoralizing effect on the men. The chaplains had their work cut out for them. The total 28th
Division casualties during the Siegfried Line attacks was more than 3,000. Included in this figure
were 230 killed, 1,815 wounded, 141 missing, 63 captured, and 961 nonbattle injuries. 220
From the Siegfried Line, the division went to a rest area at Elsenborn, Belgium to receive
replacements and equipment and for continuous training. They bivouacked in a tree line with an
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open field in front of them. Russell M. Hark recalled, “the Red Cross and kitchen trucks were
there. They offered the soldiers doughnuts and coffee; the doughnuts were two cents apiece.”221
Rest and recreation activities were extremely limited to the soldiers. Instead, V Corps ordered
extensive training. The designated training priorities included: assault of a fortified position,
river crossing techniques, personal hygiene for winter months, patrolling, booby trap removal,
defensive positions, and weapons familiarization. 222
The strong personal bonds, comradery, and unit cohesion formed between the soldiers
during their training and early fighting had dissolved. The veterans were now surrounded by new
soldiers with no combat experience who’s motivation to fight was only to protect the American
way of life. On September 29, the division received orders to move into Aachen, Germany in
preparation for a planned First Army attack to seize the Roer River Dams. The Division’s
involvement in this campaign would take them into the Hürtgen Forest and once again test their
commitment to fight for the American way of life.

221
222

Hark, 14.
Historical and Pictorial Review of the 28th Infantry Division. (Atlanta: Love Press. 1946), 29.

87

Chapter Six
The 28th Division Mettle is Tested in the Hürtgen Forest
The commitment of the men was about to be tested as never before as they entered the
dark, damp Hürtgen forest in Germany. War correspondent Ernest Hemingway called it,
“Passchendaele with tree bursts.”223 Not even Hemingway could quite capture the true
description of this awful place. Under these conditions, morale suffered and many found the
psychological strain too much. Some soldiers broke and ran to the rear. Commanders were
relieved of their command because they refused to carry out an attack or were unable to get their
men to follow them. Men were put to the ultimate test. Yet, the majority of the men fought on,
confident that they had to fight, not only for themselves, but for the folks back home. They may
not have said the words, but they knew they were fighting for freedom, for their religious beliefs
and freedom from tyranny.
The 28th Division’s experience in the Hürtgen Forest was characterized by severity, both
with regard to the doggedness and determination of the Germans as well as the terrain and
weather conditions. After all, the Americans were on the German soil. There were many
instances of close combat. The soldiers were dependent only on themselves in this forest with
interspersed patches of underwood. The men always had to reckon with surprises. Most of the
time they could use their weapons only at short distances. The intensity of the battle exceeded
the expectations of the veterans of the 28th Infantry Division.
While the fighting in the Normandy breakout was intense, nothing prepared the men for
the Hürtgen Forest. The 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments faced the special problems of
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fighting in woods-separated formations, poor command and control, confusion, and the ability of
small pockets of determined Germans to inflict heavy casualties and disrupt American attacks.
Across the Kall River, the 112th Infantry Regiment was in Schmidt and on an otherwise open
plain. They were simultaneously exposed to German gunners on the plain and isolated from their
sister regiments. Many times, success depended decisively on a small number of audacious and
bold men who knew they were fighting to defeat Nazism and protect the American way of life.
During the month of October 1944, the 9th Infantry Division, then operating under the
VII Corps, attacked through the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Roetgen, Germany. The towns
of Rott and Zweifall were among those captured. As the division continued its attack towards
Germeter, situated west of Vossenack, and north of Simonskall in the north Rhine-Westphalia
area of Germany, it suddenly met with a severe German counterattack from the north and
northeast from Hürtgen. 224
At least one battalion was cut off from the main body of the division, which during the
entire action had suffered heavy casualties. The line was stabilized toward the end of the third
week in October just west of the main road running north and south through Germeter to
Hürtgen. As a result of its heavy casualties, plans were made to replace the 9th Division with the
28th Division, who had been resting and re-fitting at Elsenborn, Belgium.225
On October 10, Private Kensler wrote in his diary to his wife Cindy. He said he had just
received a lecture on how to handle prisoners of war. He told her how he missed the things they
had back home. He said, “That is the honor and misery of war, I guess. We are here to make sure
we keep those things.” 226
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“Unrelenting German artillery and mortar fire had twisted the trees in the 9th Infantry
Division sector into weird shapes,” 227 wrote Charles Whiting. “Graves registration personnel
were completely overwhelmed due to the number of deaths and the terrain. The bodies of 9th
Infantry Division soldiers lay throughout the sector. Trash and equipment that had been
discarded was everywhere.”228 The ragged appearance and the experiences related by the 9th
Division soldiers were sufficient to unnerve many of the 28th Division men, especially those
without combat experience.229 Private First Class Albert Drapeau, Company K, 3rd Battalion,
112th Infantry Regiment recalled, “Approaching Germeter, we were brought into the grim reality
of what may lie ahead. Dozens of vehicles were approaching us enroute to the rear. They were
loaded with dead and wounded.” 230
In the overall plan, from which the V Corps and 28th Division attack stemmed, the First
U.S. Army was to launch an attack aimed initially at the crossing of the Roer River, the capture
of Duren, and then to drive to Cologne and into Germany. Preceding it, by about a week, V
Corps was to launch a strongly supported attack with the 28th Division to seize the important
crossroad town of Schmidt. Upon its capture, the division was to drive to the south and
southwest with the aim of clearing the towns of Straunch and Steckenborn. 231 In the second
phase of the attack, elements of the 5th Armored Division were to launch a coordinated attack
from the vicinity of Lammersdorf, and drive to the northeast to meet the elements of the 28th
Division driving south. 232 The V Corp plan, called for the attack to begin on October 31. Bad
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weather prevented its launch until November 2, when under orders from First Army, the attack
was launched despite bad weather which almost completely prevented artillery observation and
grounded air support until well after the attack had begun. 233
In the V Corps sector, with a part of the lower portion of the VII Corps sector assigned to
V Corps for this attack, the 28th Division entered the deadly forest. The entire western front was
quiet when the 28th Division attacked. As a result, the Germans were unhampered in bringing in
reserves, additional infantry, artillery, and armor to confront the 28th Division’s advance.
Opposing the 28th Division was the German 275th Infantry Division, 275th Fusilier Battalion,
1412nd Infantry Battalion, 89th Fusilier Battalion and the Kampfgruppe (Combat Group)
Trier.234
Beginning about five miles southeast of Aachen, the Hürtgen Forest covered about 200
square miles, extending south to the village of Steckenborn. In its midst astride high plateaus cut
by gorges of the Kall and Roer Rivers and open farming country. Three high ridges dominated
the sector of Germany faced by the U.S. First Army. The entire eastern side of the Hürtgen
Forest was faced by a chain of German fortifications stretching in a double line through the trees.
Running parallel to one another, these defenses consisted of concrete pillboxes with interlocking
fields of fire, camouflaged log and earth bunkers, reinforced concrete command posts, hidden
machine gun nests, and tall concrete pylons to prevent armored vehicles from penetrating its
defenses. Minefields and booby traps were scattered within the defenses.
On November 1, the 28th Division was in a relatively inactive sector and was almost at
full strength, but still attempting to integrate new replacements. The division had been in combat
three plus months and had seen heavy fighting in France in August and at the Siegfried line in
233
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September. The cumulative casualties to November 1 were 8,775, including 6,130 battle
losses. 235 For the attack of Schmidt, the division had been reinforced by the 630th Tank
Destroyer Battalion and the 707th Tank Battalion. The division also received forth-seven
Weasels (M-29 Cargo Carriers) in recognition of the rugged terrain in which resupply would
have to be conducted. Eight battalions and a separate battery of V and VII Corps artillery were
available for fire support. Map 4 shows the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest, November 2-9, 1944.

Map 4 - Battle of the Hürtgen Forest, November 2-9, 1944 (U.S. Army Center of Military History)

Upon arrival of the 28th Division in the Hürtgen Forest area an estimate of the supply and
evacuation situation showed that the mission assigned to the division could not be accomplished
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with their organic transportation assets. This left two alternatives: horses with pack saddles, or
M29 Weasel cargo carriers or a combination of both. Suitable pack saddles were not available
from the Army Quartermaster Class II dump, so the plan for horses was discarded and fortyseven Weasels were requested. Map 5 show the objectives of 28th Division regiments.

Map 5 - 28th Division Objectives (U.S. Army Center of Military History)

For direct and general support, the Corps placed eight battalions and a separate battery of
artillery to support the 28th Division attack. Using five fighter-bomber groups and a night fighter
group, the IX Tactical Command was to direct its main effort toward air support of the
division. 236 Following a heavy massed artillery barrage from six battalions of VII Corps artillery
from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on November 2, in misty, cloudy weather, the attack began, with
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over 12,000 rounds of artillery fired. The 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry, with Company D, 707th
Tank Battalion attached, attacked through Germeter to Vossenack. At the same time the U.S. 1st
Division in the north half of the VII Corps sector attempted to feint the Germans into thinking
the attack might be along the entire front by firing mortars and artillery. The 2nd Battalion met
light resistance in its drive eastward, reaching the northeast section of Vossenack by early
afternoon. Two 2nd Battalion attacking companies set up defensive positions on the forward
slope of the ridge while the reserve company mopped up the stragglers and snipers that were bypassed.
The German’s well observed artillery fire took a heavy toll on the American companies,
reducing them considerably. It was already evident that American artillery was unable to
effectively neutralize the German observation posts and positions on the commanding ridges
because the shells were coming into the town from three major points of the compass. The
companies reported German armor in the town of Schmidt. 237
First Lieutenant Eldeen H. Kauffman, Company F, 112th Infantry was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross for his actions that day. While advancing through Vossenack
Lieutenant Kauffman personally directed fire of a tank in support of two platoons of infantry that
had suffered many casualties and whose advance was slowing by the strong German resistance.
Then, armed with a pistol, he stepped into the street, firing as he went and urging his men
forward. He entered several houses, assaulted the Germans with his pistol causing twelve of
them to surrender, thus clearing the German stronghold. Inspired by his actions, the company
moved ahead to accomplish the mission they came for. 238
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After several days of fighting and crawling in and out of the basements of houses in
Vossenack and Germeter, the 109th Regiment was ordered to launch an attack to the northeast of
the town of Hürtgen. The attack was through heavy forest all the way so they massed all of their
.30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns to throw interdictory fire on the roads near the town.
They even took .50 caliber guns from the kitchen trucks and had them operated by headquarters
and kitchen personnel to increase the firepower. They also laid-out a ladder type artillery barrage
as they advanced through the forest.
The attack went well for a while and they made good progress in their coordinated attack
with the 112the Infantry and succeeded in knocking out fifteen pill boxes and capturing over two
hundred prisoners. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,700 yards in a drive to the northeast toward
the town of Hürtgen but the other assault battalion attacking in the same direction could only
gain 500 yards due to the thick mine fields and wire obstacles that were covered by bands of
grazing fire from German automatic weapons. 239
The 109th Infantry partially succeeded. One battalion secured most of its objective by the
end of the day. The other battalion failed to reach its objective because of encountering
unexpected minefields and strong resistance from previously unlocated German strongpoints. An
excerpt from the diary of Thomas W. Hickman, Company I, 1st Battalion of the 109th Infantry,
offers a picture of the situation facing the soldiers:
11/5 – This place is just one big hell hole. You can’t move. Death and devastation
everywhere. By far this is the worse place we have been in. Our casualties are
terrific. These Jerries [Germans] are pure SS.
11/6 – Attacked at 0600 and took battalion objective – Germeter. Replacements
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pouring in. Casualties pouring out.
11/7 – Attacked at 0600 and took the first of our division’s objectives – a crossroad
on Cologne-Aachen highway at Vossenack. We are really beat up now. Don’t see
how we can possibly hold this ground. Replacements come in and leave within an
hour – either as litter cases or basket cases. We don’t even have a chance to assign
them to platoons or squads. The poor guys don’t even know what division they are in.
11/8 – Vossenack is leveled. Not a building standing. Wish I could get out of this
place.
11/9 – From 1000 to 1800, holding. Counted four thousand rounds coming in. Our
dead are all over the place. Can’t waste time with them – too many casualties that
need help. No possible way to get them out unless you want to join them. Everyone
has trench foot. Been snowing for more than a week now. Holes are full of ice and
mud. Can’t help but remain saturated. Have a bad case myself. Feet hurt. We only
have shoes. I even lost my leggings. 240
The 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment took its objective by 10:30 a.m. and proceeded to
dig in. Opposition had been light. The rest of the 112th Infantry Regiment ran into unexpected
opposition south of Vossenack and was unable to advance further on that day. Private First Class
Raymond Carpenter of Company M, 3rd Battalion spoke for many of his buddies, “I never saw a
wood so thick with trees as the Hürtgen. It turned out to be the worst place of any.”241 He could
only blame himself for being there. In earlier service with the 45th Infantry Division, an
Oklahoma Army National Guard outfit, Carpenter received a foot injury. After his recovery he
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received assignment to a quartermaster service battalion, a relatively safe rear-area job. “But I
still wanted to fight for our right to be free and be of service to my nation, so in Wales I
requested transfer to Company M, 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry
Division – America’s oldest division,” 242 recalled Carpenter.
That same day, the action of Technical Sergeant Jacob Welc won him a battlefield
commission. The soldiers were taking a beating at Vossenack. The roads had been converted into
rivers and mud due to all the rain and snow. German artillery pummeled all routes to the
advancing units. The use of vehicles was limited. Hampered by these conditions, the wounded
were only brought back as far as the most advanced aid station. Further evacuation to the rear
appeared impossible. Without orders, Sergeant Welc drove one of his trucks through the mudchoked roads in the dead of night. In the battered town of Vossenack, German artillery rained in
constantly. Despite the incessant shelling, he brought his vehicle into the town, helped load the
wounded, and then drove over the treacherous road to the rear medical station. 243
Staff Sergeant Conrad W. Johnson was with Company D, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry. In
an interview by the 28th Infantry Division Public Relations Section on September 28, 1945, he
recalled that after a few days rest from the fighting at the Siegfried Line, he was back in the
fighting in the Hürtgen Forest. The fighting was tough for the land was hilly and there were thick
woods. It was there that his unit was surrounded. Some of the men were able to escape but he
was one of the ones who was taken prisoner by the Germans. He helped carry some of the
wounded to a German aid station for treatment. Marching several days, the group came to Bonn,
Germany. There they were loaded into boxcars and sent to Stalag XII-A in Limburg, Germany.
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Even though he was captured, Johnson later wrote home that he did his best trying to stop the
Germans. He knew that his side would eventually win. 244
Private First Class Robert J. Esterly, Company I, 112th Infantry carried a Browning
Automatic Rifle (BAR) and was picked to provide the chief means of fire power for a five-man
reconnaissance patrol which had the mission of penetrating deep into German territory at night.
The patrol had gone well into the Nazi lines when suddenly the stillness was broken by a
German guard’s order to halt. When the Americans failed to reply to the second challenge, burp
gun and rifle slugs began to rip through the darkness. The patrol hastily deployed. Esterly lost
contact with the rest of the patrol. All he could see were German gun flashes. Instead of
retreating, he chose to stay and fight. Crouching low, he held his fire until he had spotted the
muzzle flashes from ten burp guns and rifles. He then fired killing all the Germans. When asked
later why he did not retreat, he said “he came here to fight the Germans, not to retreat.” 245 Esterly
was awarded the Silver Star for his actions that day.
The 110th Infantry Regiment attacked against deadly German positions and failed
completely to achieve much success. During the attack, the assault battalions received heavy
mortar and artillery fire from the Germans and found their advance slowed by heavily booby
trapped defensive positions, pillboxes, dug-in wooden bunkers, and other prepared defensive
positions. They were only able to advance about two hundred yards. On the morning of
November 3, the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion again launched an attack. The entire front
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received heavy American mortar and artillery fire. Even after the area had been saturated with
artillery and mortar fire, the assault battalions were unable to breach the fortified positions. 246
On November 3, the 112th Regiment resumed their attack. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of
the 112th succeeded in reaching Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. The two battalions set up
defensive positions in each town. The 109th Infantry Regiment renewed its attack, bringing into
action the previously uncommitted reserve battalion, but was still unable throughout the day to
achieve success. In the morning, a sharp counterattack against the left flank of the regiment from
the direction of Hürtgen forced a slight withdrawal.
In the November 28th Infantry Division Summary of Activity from Regiments, the G-2
Section reported “…The 2nd Battalion, 109th Regiment attack didn’t get too far but their
preliminary attack in the 109th area sucked the Germans in…” Such daily summaries from the
28th Division headquarters might have confused riflemen in the battalions of the 109th Infantry
Regiment. They did not feel they had sucked in the German counterattack or foiled their
enemies. As they stumbled blindly through the battle area following inadequate maps, they might
have marveled to know the divisional headquarters prided itself on letting every man know what
he is supposed to do. 247 Yet, without good maps or clear guidance, the men did the best they
could to fight for freedom. The 110th Infantry Regiment again attacked but suffered heavy

casualties and gained no ground.248

On November 4, German artillery fire throughout the entire division area began to
increase. A counterattack against the positions in Schmidt drove the 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry
Regiment out. At first, the counterattack split the battalion in two. One company disappeared
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into the woods south of the town. The rumble of exploding artillery shells bombarding the town
of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt sent the men of Company L into their foxholes. They dug
feverishly in an attempt to enlarge their foxholes while there was still time. They were not
planning on going anywhere. The artillery fire was especially heavy to their south. Because of a
hill and sloping terrain between them, they could not fully defect the problems Company K was
facing. In addition to the artillery fire, they were also drawing German tank fire. Company L’s
2nd Platoon was dug in on a forward slope facing east with the town of Schmidt directly to their
rear. Through the morning haze the men could see about fifty Germans coming over a rise about
six hundred yards to their front.
Private First Class Albert E. Drapeau wrote in his journal, “the 2nd platoon was dug in on
a forward slope facing east with the town of Schmidt being directly to our rear. Through an early
morning haze, I discerned what appeared to be about fifty enemy coming over a rise about six
hundred yards to our front.” 249 “A rising crescendo of yelling and cussing was enveloping our
rear,” explained Drapeau, “along with increasing enemy fire. Company K was breaking, some
units fleeing to our rear through Schmidt and toward Kommerscheidt. Orders to hold were being
refused. I personally shouted and cussed some of these men. We came here to fight and defeat
the Germans, not to run.”250
Most soldiers just wanted the war to end and many looked to God for protection. In his
November 5 diary Private Kensler wrote about a letter he sent to his wife, “I wrote to
Cindy…We are about two miles from the front and can hear the field artillery. This is it, my
darling, this is what we’ve been trained for and we are here. What is in the future for me God
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only knows…we can hope for the best and pray for the courage to carry on…and a protector
when the going gets tough.”251
During this action, Captain Linguiti, 112th Infantry Regiment Medical Officer, moved his
aid station by pack carry to a small, abandoned house overlooking Kommerscheidt to guarantee
immediate medical attention for the wounded. As the fighting grew in ferocity, American
infantry and tanks took up positions close to the house occupied by Captain Linguiti’s aid
station. On November 5, a resupply convoy for the 1st Battalion arrived in Kommerscheidt at
5:00 a.m. and dumped its load in front of the house used by medical personnel as its battalion aid
station. For the next two hours Captain Linguiti, the unit surgeon, fumed as he watched company
carrying parties arrive to receive their distribution of ammunition and rations. He was terribly
concerned that such activities would compromise his work and that German artillery batteries
would fire on the site, unaware that an aid station lay in the midst of all of the activity.
The Germans on the far slope of the surrounding hills, spotting increasing activity around
the house, laid down an artillery and mortar barrage on the aid station and surrounding
vicinity. 252 Captain Linguiti realized the aid station had to me moved if he were to ensure safety
for his people and the casualties who crowded their facilities. After dark, he evacuated his staff
and patients along the road leading out of Kommerscheidt toward the river.
On three occasions, the Germans scored direct hits on the house, killing medical officers
and two medical aidmen, as well as destroying all food and most of the medical supplies. Despite
the continuous artillery, Captain Linguiti continued receiving, treating, and evacuating the
wounded. When German artillery again hit the already shattered house, rendering it almost
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completely unusable, he withdrew to combine with the 3rd Battalion aid station in a log dugout
bunker. Linguiti left eight litter bearers in Kommerscheidt. These men would collect casualties
and carry them to the dugout. 253
As the dugout became untenable and troops were withdrawing, both battalion’s chaplains
decided to stay with in the dugout, where many of the wounded cried out for religious support.
The men had fought for their religious freedom and wanted to exercise their faith even as they
lay on the stretchers. Chaplain Alan P. Madden, of the 1st Battalion, and Chaplain Ralph E.
Maness, of the 3rd Battalion, remained there until November 9, ministering as best they could to
those who were brought to the bunker. They represented both major Christian faiths. Father
Madden cared for Roman Catholics, while Reverend Maness cared for Protestants. 254 Father
Madden was eventually captured by the Germans.
Captain Linguiti’s decision to advance his aid station into the village enabled seventyseven casualties to be given immediate medical treatment, a factor which saved the lives of many
of them. Captain Linguiti was listed as missing in subsequent action against the Germans. He
was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actions that day.255
The balance of the battalion drew back to the northern edge of Schmidt, where they were
again hit by the Germans. They could not hold their position and withdrew to Kommerscheidt.
There is some evidence that the soldiers refused to hold their positions. The 1st Battalion
defensive position at Kommerscheidt was reinforced by some of the men from the 3rd Battalion,
112th Infantry Regiment, and held until the morning of November 7.
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Technical Sergeant Emerson W. Buckler was in Company C, 1st Battalion, 112th
Infantry. In an interview by the 28th Infantry Division Public Relations Section on September
28, 1945, he recalled that on November 8 the remainder of his platoon was withdrawing from the
Kall River Valley. Besides being wet from dunking in the stream they crossed, he and the rest of
his unit was lost. They were on the forward slope of a hill facing the Germans, who tossed
mortar and artillery fire on the men all night. Fortunately, no one was hit.256 When dawn broke
Buckler gathered the eight remaining men from his platoon and found their way back to the
company kitchen set-up. They found several more men from the platoon. From there they went
to Harcheidt to a holding position. This is where the German breakthrough occurred. Buckler
said, “I never saw so many men in all my life” The enemy used search lights to find the
Americans. They held out until the enemy machine gun fire ripped the top off of their dugouts.
From then on, they fought a rear guard fight. Company C was split up and half of the men got
lost. 257
Major Howard L. Topping, Commander of the 3rd Battalion, 109th Infantry was assigned
the mission of moving his battalion from the vicinity of Germeter to a position about two miles
away. His troops were given the task of defending a road and heavily wooded draw from
German infiltration which would prevent the remnants of a 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry
Regiment from an untenable position on high ground. With a small reconnaissance party, Major
Topping moved out at the head. The nearest route to his destination led across an open field
under German artillery fire. During the trip, the party was twice fired upon by German artillery.
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Reaching the woods on the opposite side of the field near his objective, Major Topping observed
a five-man German patrol moving toward him. When they were about 100 yards away, he
opened fire on the German with his M-1 rifle, mortally wounding two of them.258
Continuing to his objective he observed another German patrol about 200 yards away.
Again, opening fire, he killed one of them and forced the others to flee. Despite a German mortar
barrage, he remained at his position until he was thoroughly familiar with the ground he was to
occupy. When he was about to leave, a German sniper from across the draw shot him through the
left wrist. He returned to his battalion but refused to be evacuated until after he had led his men
to their new positions. His action permitted the remnants of the 3rd Battalion, 112th to safely
withdraw. Major Howard Topping was awarded the Silver Star for his actions. 259
The 110th Infantry Regiment again attacked but achieved no material success. As the
daily German barrages began, men of the 110th ran for their foxholes. In the distance they could
hear mortars firing. Usually, the Germans would fire about eighteen rounds. A moment or two
later the shells would land. As debris from explosions settled, someone would lift his head out of
his hole and ask if anyone was hit. Soon the Germans found out that the Americans were
counting shell rounds, so while the eighteen expected ones were landing, they dropped three
more rounds in the mortar tubes. Private Robert C. Wells said, “those last three rounds blew the
ass off more than one of our guys because we weren’t expecting them.” 260 Wells refused to be
intimidated by the German efforts. As the noise faded from the bursting rounds, “I would always
look out of my foxhole and call out, in imitation of President Roosevelt: I hate you. Eleanor
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hates you. Even Fala hates you. You sons will never step foot on our soil. And here we were,
sitting just inside Germany. It helped to keep up the guy’s spirits.”261 Another favorite comment
was to call out to one’s buddies, “Alright, I want to take a poll. All you confirmed atheists sound
off. I want to see how many of you are left. There were never any responses.”262
Private George Nikola, a scout in the 1st Platoon, Company G, ran along a firebreak
toward a shallow dip in the ground he thought might serve as a good field of fire for use against a
pillbox. He carried a light machine gun. As he reached the hollow, he dropped to the ground and
set the gun down beside him. As it touched the earth it depressed a hidden plunger on a buried
mine that then exploded, destroying the barrel of the machine gun and wounding Nickola in the
face. Thrashing with pain, his right foot struck a booby trap, setting it off and injuring his foot.
Refusing to crawl back to safety, he remained where he was for an hour in order to shout
warnings to his buddies not to venture into the area with mines and booby traps. When asked
later why he would not withdraw Nickola said, “I came here to fight the Germans in their
country and that is what I was going to do.” 263 Private George Nikola was awarded the Silver
Star for his actions that day.
On November 4, the 1st Battalion, 110th, which had been uncommitted up to that
morning, succeeded in a flanking attack seizing its two initial objectives. But it was then faced
with the presence of the Germans in dug-in positions cutting them off from the rest of their
regiment. Attempts to clear out the area were only partially successful during the following nine
days. The regiment was finally pulled off the front line on November 13. 264 The men of the
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division were grateful to be out of combat, if even for only a few hours or days. They talked
about their fears to one another. Private Charles Hubner remembered such conversations. “At
first we were petrified, really scared. But if we were lucky enough to live through a few
skirmishes we weren’t so much scared of a fight as getting maimed. Most of us said we would
rather be dead than go home a cripple or, worse, go home to Germans running the country.” 265
On November 6, the Germans counterattacked in the town of Vossenack. The 2nd
Battalion, 112th had given up its positions, without evidence of strong attacks by infantry, in the
face of extremely heavy artillery fire, some of which was direct. At the same time, the Germans
captured the main supply route to Kommerscheidt and effectively isolated the 112th Infantry and
the newly formed Task Force Ripple that consisted of the 3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry, a
company of tank destroyers, and two tank companies.
Private Kensler made another entry in his diary on November 8, recording what he wrote
to his wife that day, “During the night it snowed. It was damp and cold. I pray God that this may
soon end and stop the killing and suffering. To me war is murder. Maybe others would not agree,
but that’s one nice thing about being an American, everyone can have his own thoughts and
ideas. Thank God for that. This is why we are here. Good night my Darling.”266
While the situation seemed hopeless, the bravery of some continued unabated. During a
barrage in which six hundred German artillery rounds fell within a thirty-minute period, Staff
Sergeant Paul Kerekes of Company M dashed out from his hiding place to repair breaks in
communication wire. As Army Air Forces planes flew in to bomb and strafe German attackers,
Staff Sergeant Arthur Johnson of Company K dragged panels marking American position into
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view so pilots would be able to differentiate between German and American troops. 267 Both men
were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their efforts.
As the German tanks worked their way towards the Americans, they drove them from
their foxholes, forcing them to retreat as best they could. Sergeant Tony Kudiak of Headquarters
Company was not one to give up easily. He knew the Germans had to be stopped at all costs.
When German tanks tried to erase his position, he picked up a Bazooka and blasted the tank.
When the Germans crawled from the wreckage, Kudiak and his men picked them off with rifles,
then chased away other German tanks which had pinned down the American infantry. As the
Germans advanced, Sergeant Kudiak remained in place, climbed into a tank destroyer and
repulsed the German grenadiers. When the gun jammed, he abandoned the tank destroyer and
climbed into another one. When that gun jammed, he fired at the German tanks with his M-1
rifle, picking off as many German infantry soldiers as he could.268 Sergeant Kudiak was awarded
the Silver Star for his actions that day.
The 109th Infantry Regiment was replaced in its sector by the 12th Infantry Regiment,
4th Division, and the 110th Regiment was then used to reoccupy positions in the Vossenack area.
A task force consisting of the 3rd Battalion, 109th Infantry Regiment was sent to extricate the
surrounded and beleaguered 112th Infantry and Task Force Ripple at Kommerscheidt. It did not
succeed. Some units became lost in the dense forest, some encountered unexpected resistance,
and the entirety of the hurriedly organized task force was thoroughly dissipated. It finally dug in
on the southern slope of a hill south of Vossenack and screened the withdrawal of the 112th
Infantry during the night of November 8.269

267

“112th Infantry Regiment, Unit Report, 1-30 November 1944.” 28th Division Archives, filing cabinet 2. (Fort
Indiantown Gap: Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum).
268
Ibid.
269
28th Division Historical Summary, 172.

107

That night, Private Elliott R. Corbett II, Company B, 109th Infantry, penned a letter to his
wife Sudie, “I might say with little or no compulsion that I miss you hellishly and I’ve had
enough of humping around Europe. I see nothing in Germany to warrant fighting for any of it
and being naturally a peaceful character, I look forward to a long life of security and freedom
from the elements which are beginning to pall.”270 On November 19, Corbett was captured after
being seriously injured. He died of his wounds two days later.
On November 10, the Germans sent a captured American into the 3rd Battalion, 109th
Regiment lines with a demand by the German commander that the unit should surrender. The 3rd
Battalion Commander, Major Howard Topping answered with American artillery batteries, in
which artillery battalions of the Corps pounded German positions. 271 1340th Combat Engineer
Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Truman Setliffe was at the site of the demolished Kall
bridge on November 10. When he told his engineers of the German ultimatum to surrender or be
slaughtered, they said they would “stick it out and fight. That is what they came for.”272
This evacuation had been difficult. Casualties had been heavy. Medical evacuation was
particularly complicated and dangerous. Vossenack was the hub of three vital roads and key to
the Schwammenauel Dam across the Roer River. The area became known as ‘artillery alley.’
German self-propelled, railroad, and field guns poured between 2,000 to 3,000 rounds of artillery
shells on units of the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment in a 24-hour period. The only road
leading into Vossenack was raked with shell fire every hour of the day.
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Despite what seemed to be a hopeless situation, soldiers continued to demonstrate their
willingness to fight. For example, during the German counterattack spearheaded by three Tiger
tanks, twenty-two-year-old Captain Clifford T. Hackard, Commander of Company C, waited for
the tanks to approach. When one came within fifty yards of his observation post, he fired his
only rocket, knocking the tank out of action. As the crew attempted to escape, Captain Hackard
killed three and wounded two. Later, while checking defensive positions of his men, a German
machine gun began firing. Armed with only a rifle, he advanced toward the weapon, leaped into
the emplacement, and killed the three crew members. For his actions that day, Captain Hackard
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 273
With such ferocity of battle, it may be hard to imagine that the two sides actually paused
for humanitarian purposes. The fighting was so intense and the casualties so great that not once,
but three times over the course of five days fighting was paused to evacuate the wounded. So
bloody was the fighting in this area that both sides momentarily tempered their enmity so the
wounded could have unencumbered transport to medical support in the rear. The first such
respite began on November 7 on the Kall Bridge in the town of Schmidt. The second was
arranged by 112th Regimental surgeon Major Albert Berndt on November 9 and the third
occurred two days later. 274
With the withdrawal of the 112th Infantry Regiment, the attack on Schmidt was
temporarily abandoned. On November 10, the 28th Division was instructed by V Corps
headquarters to secure a line along the north and west banks of the Kall River. It was in the
fighting for this ground that the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment suffered its heaviest
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casualties. On November 14, all attacks by the 28th Division had ceased. The men were
exhausted. Many of the officers stated that they felt no further attacks could have been carried
out even had they been ordered.
The men of the 28th Division faced tremendous adversity in several ways during their
time in the Hürtgen Forest. During most of the action, rain, fog, and snow in the latter days
prevailed. On the days when it did not rain, low-hanging clouds and ground haze prevented
effective employment of the considerable air support allocated to the division. The rain turned
the narrow firebreak trails inadequate for use as supply routes or armored employment and
maneuver. The trails became rutted, slippery quagmires. Even jeeps and M-24 Weasels - a
tracked vehicle designed for operation in snow - became stuck and were unable to extricate
themselves. The extreme wetness made it impossible for the under-equipped troops to protect
themselves against trench foot. 275
On an average only ten to fifteen percent of the men per company were equipped with
all-weather boots. The overwhelming majority endured the entire action without them. Foxholes
turned into veritable artesian wells during the latter part of the action. The ground became so
thoroughly soaked that it was impossible for the men to keep dry. The 28th Division Surgeon’s
Report of Casualties shows 750 cases of trench foot.276 Robert W. Meyer, B Company, 112th
Infantry Regiment remembered his first night with B Company, “Light rain had started to fall
and I thought, good grief, what a miserable existence. The Hürtgen Forest was a bloody
battlefield of survival. It was a kill-or-be-killed situation. Military trash was everywhere;
discarded C-rations, bandoliers, empty ammo crates, unexploded shells, mess gear, helmets,
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abandoned stretchers, bloody bandages, and corpses were on the ground, stuck to the bushes, and
in the trees.”277
The soldiers of the 28th Division faced daunting terrain throughout. The attack was made
into and through the dense Hürtgen pine forest. Visibility, at its optimum, was limited to 150-200
yards. In places, it was less than twenty-five feet. As the attack progressed, the constant artillery
and mortar pounding of the area, knocked off tops of trees, knocked down others, and in places
so choked the ground with debris that visibility and movement were tremendously hampered.
Warm food could not be brought up through the quagmire and woods until hours after it had
been prepared, and when it finally arrived it was cold and sour. In addition, the attack was made
into and through terrain dominated by German-held high ground on the north, east and south.
This enabled the Germans to pour observed and, in some cases, direct artillery fire into the heart
of the division attack from an arc of 180 degrees. In the opinion of the 28th Division G-3
(Operations Officer), Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Colonial Briggs, this was one of the greatest
single causes for the failure of the troops to achieve success. 278 The road network in the area was
limited. It was inadequate for employment of armor. The route from Vossenack through the draw
across the Kall River to Kommerscheidt and Schmidt was little more than a trail. As it turned
out, this trail caused the breakdown of the movement of supplies and armored support to the
Kommerscheidt area. 279
Communications, always a problem in battle, was never adequate during the 28th
Division operation. The heavy German artillery and mortar fire constantly knocked out wire
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communications from battalions to companies, and several times for prolonged periods from
regiments to battalions. The most exhausting and tireless efforts of the communications
personnel to keep communications open, to keep lines repaired, were unable to keep pace with
the rate of communications being knocked out. At night, the messengers groped their way
through the tangle of shot-down treetops along the frazzled telephone line in order to patch it up
again and again. The lack of communications effected the entire situation. Lack of situational
awareness hampered quick, effective decisions on the part of commanders, and increased the
demoralization of the men. Orders from commanders were slowed or not received at all delaying
vital redeployments and other actions. 280
Finally, the performance of the 28th’s inexperienced personnel significantly hindered the
actions of the division. Although the division had received replacements during the month of
October, bringing it up to full strength after its attempts to penetrate the Siegfried Defenses in
September, many of the men were not trained infantry soldiers. Rifle company officers and noncommissioned officers, in many cases, had been drawn from anti-tank companies, anti-aircraft
units, air force ground personnel and other non-infantry organizations. Even during the period of
comparative quiet that the division enjoyed for a brief period at Camp Elsenborn, Belgium in
October, these deficiencies had not been sufficiently remedied according to Colonel Theodore A.
Seely, 110th Infantry Regiment commander. 281
As a result of the inexperienced personnel, when the attack began, and the casualties
mounted, the loss of the few remaining trained men immediately became apparent. Some
infantry soldiers broke and ran in Schmidt, in Kommerscheidt, and in Vossenack. Author Ernest
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Hemingway spent eighteen days on the front in the Hürtgen Forest. He wrote later, “It was a
place where it was extremely difficult for a man to stay alive even if all he did was be there.” 282
As the operation continued, the rapid rate of attrition of the companies, the loss of the few
experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, and the complete lack of trained
replacements contributed to the failure of the mission. For the German’s part they conducted a
fanatical defense in terrain completely familiar to them. The German troops fought viciously,
gave up some ground, but counter-attacked frequently. Their losses were also heavy, yet they
succeeded in halting, and cutting to pieces, the attack of the 28th Infantry Division. 283 Many of
the American soldiers came to Europe with the idea that the German soldiers were beaten and
were therefore complacent. They quickly found the German soldiers to be determined and
fearless fighters.
The 28th soldiers were fatigued from exposure to the cold and rain and the heavy artillery
fire pounding for hours on end. Self-care had become all but impossible. Often the dead could
not be buried because there were not enough men available and because the ground was either
too sodden, solidly frozen, or rocky. Constantly suffering casualties, the strength of the teams
manning the positions was increasingly sapped. And yet the men held their positions, went out
on patrols, attacked, overcame their fears, and faithfully performed their duty. Some exhibited
bravery that earned them battlefield promotions and awards for valor. Their shared experience
created a spirit of fellowship among them where each man was prepared to do the utmost to
defeat the Nazis.
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The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest was characterized by particular rigor, both with regard
to the doggedness and determination of the opponents as well as the terrain and weather
conditions. There were many instances of close combat. The soldier was dependent only on
himself in this forest with interspersed patches of tangled branches and shrubs. He always had to
contend with surprise. Most of the time he could use his weapons only at short distances. He had
to be fast and positive with his weapons if he wanted to survive. Many times, success depended
decisively on a small number of audacious and bold men. They knew how to enthuse young and
inexperienced soldiers and helped them to find their way and hold their own in the uncannily
dark forest. 284
The second attack on Schmidt had developed into one of the costliest U.S. divisional
actions in the whole of World War II. After the action in the Hürtgen Forest, the 28th Infantry
Division was destroyed as an effective fighting force. Division combat casualties totaled 6,184.
Losses included 614 killed, 2,605 wounded, 855 missing, 245 captured, and 1,865 non-battle
casualties. More than 750 of the non-battle casualties were from trench-foot alone.285
Given the difficulties it faced, the 28th Infantry Division fought well against all odds. For
fourteen days its men struggled over steep hills and fought off infantry and tanks while enduring
endless artillery barrages. They crossed between the ridges of Vossenack and Schmidt using no
more than a narrow, twisting trail. They briefly captured the towns of Vossenack,
Kommerscheidt, Schmidt, and Simonskall. Private soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and
company-grade officers who fought on those ridges were brave, courageous, and resourceful.
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The men knew they were fighting for the American way of life and their chaplains and leaders
reminded them.
On November 14, 1944, Ivan (Cy) Peterman of the Philadelphia Inquirer, who was
embedded with the 28th Division, watched survivors emerge from their struggle with German
forces in the Hürtgen Forest and wrote:
They crouched in their vehicles, staring straight ahead. If there were heroics to
recount, someone else had to talk. The men of this unit (28th Infantry) would not.
Too many of their companions remained behind, too many were dead or missing.
Too many grievously wounded and shattered in nerves and spirit. If they never
saw the Hürtgen Forest again it would suit them. . . . They had enough.286
Many of the 28th Division soldiers, because of glowing wartime propaganda that portrayed them
as capable of doing no wrong, believed they could beat a determined foe fighting on his own
soil. They learned a hard lesson in the Hürtgen Forest, but never wavered from their motivation
to fight for the American way of life.
Plans were drawn up for the relief of the 28th Division by the 8th Infantry Division. From
November 16th to the 21st, the changeover occurred. The 28th Division moved south to
Luxembourg to rest and refit. But this was not to be, as their resolve would soon be tested again
against a determined enemy. Once again, any personal bonds, comradery, or unit cohesion that
formed between the soldiers prior to their fighting had dissolved. The veterans were again
surrounded by new soldiers with no combat experience who’s only motivation was to protect the
American way of life.
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The soldiers did not have an opportunity to record their thoughts when they were in the
middle of German artillery barrages. Once they got to Luxembourg, they found time to record
their thoughts. Private Doyle McDaniel, Company A, 1340th Engineer Battalion, wrote that his
platoon had advanced to the crossroads by a church and were pinned down by German sniper
fire. Private McDaniel climbed onto a shed roof to locate the German positions. As he jumped
down, he landed beside a German soldier. Before the man could react, McDaniel shot and killed
him. He wrote “I felt bad about killing the German, but knew I had to. I came to Germany to
protect my wife and new baby at home.” 287
Private Clarence Skains remembered that he and Private Nathaniel Quentin, both of
Company M, 112th Infantry were in Kommerscheidt when a general withdrawal was ordered.
No one told them of the order so they remained in town while around them other members of
their squad lay dead in their foxholes. Quentin noticed a platoon of enemy soldiers crawling
toward him, their uniforms blending with the saturated ground now covered by falling snow. He
allowed them to advance withing twenty-five yards and then opened fire with his BAR, killing
twenty and forcing the others to retreat. The Germans attacked again, in one and two man rushes,
running through a turnip patch toward Quentin and Skains. The men held their ground and fired
steadily and the Germans retreated. Skains wrote that there was no way they were going to
withdraw, even if they had received the order to. They came to defeat the Germans, and that is
what they were going to do.288
Russell Arford of Company G, 110th Infantry, wrote how concern for a job finally
brought him to the Hürtgen Forest. “I signed up in February 1941,” he said, “figuring I would get
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my year of service over with and get out. By 1942, I thought jobs would be plentiful. They were,
but I didn’t get any of them. I sure chose the wrong time to go in, for I was immediately
federalized and in the army until the end of the war.” In the Kall Valley he often wondered if he
would ever live long enough to work at any of those jobs. His job now was to fight for the people
back home to have jobs. 289
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Chapter Seven
Delaying Actions During the Battle of the Bulge
The Hürtgen Forest was a horrible nightmare, but for the men of the division, it was now
over. For some it was over because they were dead. But for the living, the Hürtgen Forest was
now just a bitter memory, albeit one that would never really fade. In just two weeks in the Forest,
the division had suffered over six thousand casualties. Now platoons were the size of squads.
Companies were the size of platoons and battalions were the size of companies. The division had
been fighting since July in Normandy and badly needed rest and replacements. Veterans needed
time to rebuild their shattered nerves, put the misery of the forest behind them, and maybe enjoy
life again. New arrivals needed a chance to ease into their new assignments, make friends, feel a
part of something, and learn how to survive in combat. The Ardennes, everyone thought, was the
ideal place for this rest. However, Adolf Hitler and the German Army had different plans.
By mid-December 1944, the 28th Infantry Division had been recuperating and replacing
their losses in Luxembourg for approximately three weeks. Although it was located in what was
believed to be a quiet sector, U.S. VIII Corps had ordered it to hold a defensive line that would
have been in more active combat situations untenable. The division was stretched out on a
twenty-five mile front facing the German lines across the Our River. Such a deployment, with
large gaps between position, was thought acceptable for a quiet sector even though by the time of
the Normandy invasion it was generally accepted that a division front should be approximately
eight miles. 290 The division’s regiments were arrayed with the 112th Infantry Regiment in the
north, linking with the 106th Infantry Division’s southern flank, the 110th Infantry Regiment in
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the center and the 109th Infantry Regiment in the south, tying in with the 9th Armored Division
northern flank.
The men used the time to make sure that everything was ready for battle again. The ranks
were filled with new soldiers to fill vacancies. The replacements were green, but the battlehardened platoon sergeants knew how to manage them. Ammunition was re-stocked, vehicles
lost in the Hürtgen Forest were replaced, and the veterans had a chance to rest. Luxembourg
resident and fifteen-year-old distillery worker Adolphe Betzen remembered that he spent his
days with preparations in the distillery. The copper boilers were scrubbed, barrels cleaned, the
water bath of the boiler filled with water, and wood laid. The Americans also did routine work,
such as cleaning weapons, writing letters, and standing guard. In the evenings, everyone went to
bed comfortable, but facing the German forces across the Our River in Germany. 291 The men
were thinking of Christmas and going home. They were counting their points to see when they
could leave.
It was imperative that the Army find a way to send soldiers home in a prompt manner
based on objective criteria. Otherwise, it risked provoking widespread protests from restless
soldiers who had no enemy to fight. Soldiers more commonly referred to it as the point system.
Under this scheme, every U.S. soldier was awarded a number of points based on how long they
had been overseas, how many decorations they had received, how many campaigns they had
taken part in, and how many children they had. The men of the division soon stopped thinking
about how many points they accumulated as the Germans interrupted their rest. They knew that
more work had to be done to secure the American way of life. Map 6 shows the disposition of
forces in the Ardennes on December 15, 1944.
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Map 6 - The disposition of forces in the Ardennes, December 15, 1944 (United States Army Center of Military
History)

As the men rested, chaplains attended to their spiritual needs. Chaplains conducted
services throughout the European Theater attended by many of the men. 292 Military chaplains
were essential to sustaining morale in the European Theater. Their jobs were a combination of
their calling as ministers of faith and keeping up the morale of the soldiers and reminding the
soldiers why they were fighting. The original function of a chaplain was clearly to minister to the
religious needs of service men, but they were relied on nearly from the start to serve as the
conscience of the army, to maintain troop morale, and to constantly remind the soldiers why they
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were fighting.293 Map 7 shows the disposition of American and German forces at the start of the
German attack and the position of the Allied front as the battle unfolded.

Map 7 - 28th Division and German Units (Defense Mapping Agency)

The positioning of the 28th Infantry Division units allowed for the rotation of soldiers
into shelters for rest, minimizing exposure to the tough weather conditions. Soldiers also
continued to rotate to divisional and corps rest centers further to the rear. Some lucky men were
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able to visit Paris for a few days. “Red Cross clubmobiles and doughnut wagons visited and there
was a full schedule of USO shows and dances to help raise morale,” 294 wrote Geoffrey Perret in
There’s a War to be Won. Despite previous casualties, most soldiers were confident that the end
of the war was near. Their leaders from their Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D.
Eisenhower on down had told them so. A thorough optimism filtered down through command
and staff channels and to the infantry soldiers that the Germans were finished.295
Private Robert W. Meyer Jr., with the 109th, was positioned in Bettendorf. Every three
weeks one battalion would rotate to Diekirch where they could buy sandwiches at the Red Cross
Club, get a haircut from a local barber, attend services at the local churches, or write letters
home. While staying in Diekirch, his company had training exercises. Meyer remembered that on
one day, they had made a mock attack up a hill. At the completion of the exercise, they were
grouped together in a little clearing within a wooded area. An officer, who was not part of their
unit, gave the group a pep talk about why they should not be afraid to die. He said as soldiers it
was their duty to die if necessary to accomplish a mission. Meyer said, “the lecture was ended
with a gung-ho type of question to us troops: What were we to do when encountering enemy
troops and what was the best way to avoid being killed by them. The correct answer shouted
back (I suspect from a coached GI) was “Kill the bastards!” Meyer thought this type of thing was
needed by some, but not for him. He knew why he was fighting. 296
Believing the assurances of their officers that the war would soon end, the soldiers looked
forward to a more relaxed Christmas holiday. But even with all the efforts to improve the morale
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of the soldiers, the weather dampened their spirits. The troops faced freezing rain, thick fog, deep
snow drifts and record-breaking low temperatures. Many people in Luxembourg remember the
winter of 1944 as one of the coldest and harshest on memory.297 Thanksgiving came on
November 23 in 1944. For the survivors and replacements alike, there was much to be thankful
for. They were secure, warm and had good food. Some of the men shared their Thanksgiving
dinner with the Luxembourgers. The soldiers had established a strong friendship with many of
the Luxembourgers. The Americans had liberated Luxembourg, ending four years of German
occupation and restoring freedom to a people who yearned for it. The men were proud they had
helped free the French people as well. They had not only fought for American freedom, but also
for the freedom of the people of Europe.298
The commander of the U.S. Third Army, General George S. Patton, was troubled by the
weather. Aircraft was grounded and the conditions on the ground were extremely difficult for the
troops. On the morning of December 8, General Patton called the Third Army Chaplain, Father
James Hugh O’Neill, “This is General Patton; do you have a good prayer for weather? We must
do something about those rains if we are to win the war.”299 Chaplain O’Neill looked through the
prayer books he had but could not find a prayer for weather, so he wrote one and went to see
General Patton with it:
Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great
goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend.
Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call
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upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory,
and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies and establish Thy justice
among men and nations. 300
Chaplain O’Neill added a Christmas greeting for the reverse side of the prayer:
To each officer and soldier in the Third United States Army, I Wish a Merry
Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill
in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God’s blessings rest
upon each of you on this Christmas Day. G.S. Patton, Jr, Lieutenant General,
Commanding, Third United States Army. 301
General Patton approved of the prayer card and instructed Chaplain O’Neill to have it printed
and distributed to all soldiers and to put out a training letter on the subject of prayer to all Third
Army Chaplains to get all the men of the Third Army to pray for the weather to improve.
Chaplain O’Neill typed Training Letter 5 and the training letter with the prayer cards reached all
486 Third Army chaplains, and every organization commander down to and including the
regimental level between December 12 and 14.
Training Letter 5 not only encouraged the men to pray for the weather to improve, but it
also asked them to pray for victory, to pray for the Army, and to pray for “the defeat of our
wicked enemy whose banner is injustice and who’s God is oppression.” 302 Private First Class
William Bull, with Company B in Marnach, remembered receiving the prayer card and his
company commander’s instructions to the men to pray for good weather and to pray they would
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be successful in beating the Nazis. He said it was a reminder of why they were there, not that he
needed any reminder. 303
If the German offensive, code named Wacht am Rhein (The Watch on the Rhine is a
German patriotic anthem), was to be successful it had to accomplish two important objectives.
First, German assault companies had to dislodge the American defenders from their positions
along the road leading from Ettelbruck/Diekirch in a northern direction towards the Belgian
border near Weiswampach. The hard-surface highway (named Skyline Drive by the Americans)
gave access to the key towns of Bastogne and St. Vith. The Germans had to reach the far side of
the Clerf River before the Americans could react and reinforce the thinly stretched units.
Secondly, engineers had to quickly install bridges strong enough to hold armor over the Our
River.
According to the German plan, all of this had to be accomplished on the first day of the
offensive, December 16, 1944. Once they reached the banks of the Clerf River, the Germans had
an open shot at the major hub of the area road network in Bastogne. The successful penetration
of the 28th Infantry Division lines would place the German elements in the American rear, were
few forces existed to counter a determined German thrust.304
The German plan of attack was well developed and had at least some chance of success.
The three German armies, the Fifth Panzer, Sixth Panzer, and Seventh Army of the XLVII
Panzer Corps were the maneuver elements for the offensive. Map 8 shows the German plan for
their Ardennes Counteroffensive, as they termed it.
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Map 8 - The German Plan (U.S. Army Center of Military History)

The German Seventh Army on the southern flank was composed of infantry divisions
with no armored support. Its mission was to protect the southern flank of the motorized and
armored formations of the other two armies from an expected Allied counterattack from the
south. 305 The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies were designed to be breakthrough and rapid forces
which would race west to the Meuse River and then swing north to capture the deep-water port
of Antwerp, Belgium.306
On the morning of December 16, 1944, shortly after 5:00 a.m., the so-called quiet sector
in Luxembourg suddenly came to life with a heavy German artillery barrage falling all along the

305
306

Ibid.
Christer Bergström, The Ardennes1944-1945: Hitler’s Winter Offensive. (Havertown: Casemate Publishers,
2016), 81.

126

28th Division front. The barrage was particularly intense in the Diekirch - Bastendorf area and in
the Marnach - Fischbach area. The men of the 28th Division did not realized it at the time but
this was the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge. The victorious optimism of late summer, when
home by Christmas seemed plausible, had given way to the realization that the Germans were
still a tenacious foe – and there was a lot of fighting left to be done.
After the initial artillery barrage, the German assault continued with a massed infantry
attack in some sectors and with strong combat patrols probing the line in others. Fighting was
particularly heavy in the sectors of the 2nd Battalion, 109th Infantry, the 1st and 3rd Battalion,
110th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry. The initial German infantry attacks were
repulsed with heavy losses inflicted on the Germans. But, during the day the German build-up
continued and pressure increased.307
On December 16, the 1st Battalion, 112th was located in the Lutzkampen-Harspelt area,
the 2nd Battalion at Leiler, and the 3rd Battalion at Sevenig. At 7:45 a.m. German infantry was
observed throughout the regimental sector. The attack came as a surprise. During the period of
December 13 to December 15, considerable German truck activity was heard and noticed behind
the German lines. This was considered to be the normal traffic necessary for the relief of German
troops within the sector. Three weeks previously, the Germans had made such a relief which
created the same sounds. 308
In the 1st Battalion sector, the Germans attacked with their 1st Battalion, 156th Grenadier
Regiment, 116th Panzer Division, and succeeded in penetrating between Company A and
Company B. In the 3rd Battalion sector, the attacked was launched by the 1st Battalion, 1130th
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Volksgrenadier Regiment and 560th Volksgrenadier Division, which penetrated the lines
between Company I and Company K, overrunning the right flank platoon of Company L, and
reaching the mortar positions, the 3rd Battalion Command Post, and a stone bridge that enabled a
line of communications between the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion.309
During the day the Germans attacked with tanks and infantry in the 1st Battalion area and
penetrated into the support positions, to the kitchens, and command post area. Positions were
held and the Germans were repulsed but pockets of Germans existed throughout the battalion
area. Frank Olsen, Company A, 1st Battalion, remembered thinking, “Oh no, you don’t, you’re
not going through here. We carried out the order they told us - stay to the end - and that is what
we did.” 310
Company C, 103rd Engineers and a composite company from the regimental training
area counterattacked to force back the German pockets and the situation was temporarily
restored. A counterattack was launched by the 2nd Battalion, less one company, in the 3rd
Battalion sector, and their situation was restored. The battalions were again attacked by the
German 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 116th Panzer Division supported by seven
tanks in the vicinity of Lutzkampen, and by one battalion of infantry in the vicinity of Sevenig.
Both attacks were repulsed with heavy German losses. 311
Late in the afternoon, the Germans employed seven tanks against the 1st Battalion area to
overwhelm their defensive positions. The assault was unsuccessful, and one tank was knocked
out by a mine. Just before dark, a few German tanks, with flame throwing devices attacked the
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112th troops in the vicinity of Lutzkampen. It was estimated that during the day more than 400
German troops were killed, and eighty-nine captured. 312
Private First Class Charles Haug wrote in 1949 about his experiences that winter. Haug
recalled that the evening of December 15 came just as all the other evenings had come. Their
usual patrol went out in front of their lines and reported back that they had heard or seen
nothing. 313 Of the 190 men defending the town of Lutzkampen on December 16, he was one of
the twenty-five who survived the Battle of the Bulge without being killed, wounded, or
captured.314
The next morning, Haug was on guard duty from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. and remembered
wishing that it would soon be 6:00 a.m. so he could go back and sleep a little bit longer. Little
did he know that the little sleep he got that night was the last real sleep he would get for the next
ten days. At 5:10 a.m. the sky was illuminated by flares attached to white parachutes with an
artillery barrage that followed. Haug was a messenger for his platoon. From 7:00 a.m. to about
7:30 a.m. there was complete silence in front of Haug’s position. It was still semi-dark, except
for the light beams coming from the German lines which were aimed into the sky. 315
A few minutes after 7:30 a.m., Haug experienced what he called perhaps the biggest hairraising scare of his Army career. Out of the still darkness, he remembered, came the awfullest
screaming and yelling one would ever want to hear. The Germans were advancing and screaming
“like a bunch of wild Indians.”316 They came to within fifty feet of Haug’s position when the
112th men started firing. The Germans took cover in the ditch of the road they were advancing
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on. As dawn started to break, Haug and his fellow soldiers could see where the Germans were
located. During the first half hour of the battle the Germans were easy to spot and many were
killed. The men of the 112th had beaten back the first wave of the German attack but the
Germans continued their pressure and the American lines began to crumble. Haug recalled that
they still had some faith in the American Army though, and they prayed that other outfits in the
rear would be able to stop the Germans and push them back.317
Early on the morning of December 17, after a heavy artillery barrage, the German 60th
Panzer Regiment of the 116th Panzer Division attacked with eighteen tanks along the
Lutzkampen-Harspelt ridge in the direction of Ouren. Bitter fighting ensued during the day and
finally after dark the Germans infiltrated into Ouren. Fifteen German tanks were disabled and
186 prisoners were taken during the fight. The Americans received orders to withdraw west of
the Our River, and during the night of December 17, assumed positions in the Beiler-LeilerLansdorn area with the Regimental Command Post in Weiswampach. During the day on
December 18, a company of German infantry supported by two tanks attacked between Leiler
and Lansdorn. The attack was repulsed with fifteen prisoners taken. The next day, the 112th
Regiment was pulled back to the vicinity of Huldange where it was attached to the 106th Infantry
Division protecting its left flank.318
As a result of action during the withdrawal, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Train,
Executive Officer of the 112th Infantry was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry. Train was in
command of a rear guard task force covering the movement of trucks, jeeps, and tank destroyers.
Suddenly, a German tank force churned over the rolling hills. The tank destroyers halted and
swung their guns to meet the on-rushing Germans. In the ensuing battle, the American convoy
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was stalled. Vehicles tried desperately to dart out of the line of fire as the tank destroyers and
Panzers hurled shells at each other. Dashing past the firing guns and exploding shells, Train
gathered up scattered elements of the convoy, reorganized the vehicles, and directed the flow of
traffic over another route. 319
The Germans threw more tanks into the fray. While the tank destroyers were engaging,
one attacking tank unit from another Panzer force attempted to outflank Train’s convoy from the
front. The convoy swung off the road and bounced over plowed fields, but a half-frozen marsh
lay ahead. The leading vehicle plunged into the axle-deep mire, helplessly trapped by the soft
mud. Realizing that the marshland would be converted into a death trap for the men and vehicles
if discovered by the roving Panzers, Train gathered together a few vehicles and led them back
over an open road in plain view of the Germans. Train’s gamble was to divert the German’s
attention long enough for the bogged down vehicles to be rescued and permit the main body of
the convoy to pick a different route of withdrawal and enable the 112th men and vehicles to
reach the safety of Huldange.320
Train’s decoy convoy raced boldly down an open road and were quickly spotted by
prowling German tanks. Believing them to be the initial convoy, they closed in for the kill. Train
stopped the smaller convoy and the men took cover. The armor-piercing shells of the German
tanks disintegrated the decoy vehicles. Train’s plan had worked. While the Germans were busy
raking the decoy convoy, the main convoy was rapidly withdrawing toward friendly lines. Train
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led the men from the decoy convoy across the German terrain on foot and reached friendly
territory without a casualty. 321
Sacrifice came from not only infantry soldiers and leaders, but also from communications
personnel. For example, Private First Class Darius E. Berkey, who was acting message chief for
the 1st Battalion, operated a SCR 300 backpack-mounted radio from a house under German fire
from 10:00 a.m. on December 16 to 10:00 a.m. on December 18. After being shelled out of one
house, he entered an adjacent one which subsequently received eighteen hits from a German tank
at point blank range. 322 Before they withdrew, the 112th Infantry Regiment inflicted estimated
casualties on the Germans of 1,600, including over two hundred prisoners taken and successfully
evacuated.323
At the beginning of the German attack, the 109th Infantry Regiment headquarters was
located at Ettelbruck. Its 2nd Battalion headquarters was located at Bastendorf, with Company E
in the vicinity of Fuhren, Company F in the vicinity of Walsdorf and Company G at
Brandenburg. The 3rd Battalion headquarters was located at Bettendorf, with Company I in the
vicinity of Reisdorf, Company K in the vicinity of Hosdorf and Company L in Bettendorf. The
1st Battalion was in reserve located in Diekirch. 324
Shortly after 5:00 a.m. on December 16, a heavy artillery barrage started, falling on the
entire 109th Regimental front, then held by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. At 8:20 a.m. both
battalions reported strong German patrols operating on the west bank of the Our River in the
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vicinity of Vianden and Bettendorf. Company E, 2nd Battalion, reported strong German
infiltrations around their right flank in the vicinity of Longsdorf. Company G was ordered to
move from its position in Brandenburg to the right flank of Company F, which held the high
ground northeast of Brandenburg. This was accomplished and several strong German attacks
were repulsed.325
During the initial stages of fighting in the 109th sector, Lieutenant Colonel James C.
Rosborough, 107th Field Artillery Battalion commander, organized and led a task force to
relieve the pressure on one of his surrounded batteries. The artillery commander personally led a
platoon of infantry and two tanks, charged the German positions firing his submachine gun and
at the same time directed the fire of the two tanks. In the counterattack, the Germans lost one
hundred fifty killed and forty captured. Lieutenant Colonel James C. Rosborough was awarded
the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions. 326
In another action, Captain Paul F. Gaynor was directing his anti-tank company into
defensive positions when the Germans struck. In the ensuing battle, 109th units became
scattered, surrounded, and disorganized. Holding a house by himself, Captain Gaynor killed
eight Germans who were supporting a tank with his carbine rifle. When the tank opened fire
blasting the house into rubble in an attempt to trap the lone American officer, Gaynor darted
across an open field while German shells tore the ground around him. Reaching the high ground
just outside of Diekirch, he discovered only a battered, disorganized force holding the ground.
Fearing that the Germans might suspect the strength of his unit, he ran along the hill side firing
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his pistol in the air to convince the Germans that a powerful force opposed them. For his
extraordinary gallantry, Captain Gaynor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 327
First Lieutenant Moe Katz won the Bronze Star for heroism. Acting as a forward artillery
observer for the 108th Field Artillery Battalion, Katz was attached to the 3rd Battalion, 109th
Infantry in the Ettelbruck sector. Moving forward to the Company L forward positions, Katz
spotted a large German column of regimental strength moving along a road. He radioed the
information back to his battalion and to the 109th Infantry’s regimental commander. A huge trap
was formed and sprung on the unsuspecting Germans, who were moving in as if in a parade
formation. At a given signal, all American artillery in the sector fired at the same time, killing an
estimated 2,000 Germans. Shortly after, Lieutenant Moe Katz had achieved enough points to be
sent home but volunteered for Pacific duty. He said, “I’d feel sort of silly going back to civilian
life before this thing blows over.”328
At 2:25 p.m. the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company E, which was isolated in Fuhren
and under attack by a battalion of German infantry. Company A from the 1st Battalion and one
platoon of medium tanks was sent north to Longsdorf in an attempt to establish contact with
Company E. They ran into a strong German position supported by three Tiger tanks south of
Longsdorf and were held up. At 7:00 p.m., Company C was moved from Diekirch to positions at
Brandenburg. During the day, the 3rd Battalion held firm and repulsed several heavy German
attacks in its sector. 329 In conjunction with Company D’s 1st and 2nd Platoons of heavy machine
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guns, the 81mm mortar platoon leaders helped to consolidate and reorganize the unit to resist the
Germans. 330
The second day of the German counteroffensive, December 17, opened with a terrific
barrage of artillery in the 109th Infantry sector that started at 5:30 a.m. and lasted until 6:30 a.m.
At that time, the 3rd Battalion reported a German attack of approximately two companies in
strength. Stiff fighting ensued and the Germans were repulsed. The 2nd Battalion was attacked at
the same time in the area of Vianden - Fuhren by a company of infantry and three Tiger tanks.
This attack was repulsed with heavy German casualties and two battalion tanks knocked out.
Company A with a platoon of tanks was still unable to contact Company E, meeting strong
formations of German tanks and infantry south of Longsdorf. The battalion Anti-Tank Company,
which had taken up positions along the road running south from Tandel at the Diekirch Bettendorf junction, became heavily engaged with approximately two companies of German
infantry and three tanks. The attack was repulsed with 150 Germans killed and twenty-five
captured.331
A large force of German infantry infiltrated into the gun position area of Battery A, 107th
Field Artillery and Battery C, 108th Field Artillery, which brought the attack under direct fire of
their howitzers. With the aid of a platoon of infantry and two tanks, the attack was repulsed with
heavy German losses. Radio communications was reestablished with Company E, still isolated in
Fuhren, between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Company B with four tanks attempted to
link up with Company E, but by 11:00 p.m. they had not accomplished their mission. The
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Germans continued heavy interdictory artillery fire on all positions during the night and
extensive patrols and infiltration continued. But as the third day dawned, the lines remained
unchanged.332
On December 18, Company K, 2nd Battalion linked up with Company A, 1st Battalion
and organized a defense on the high ground south of Longsdorf. At daylight, the Germans
heavily engaged the 3rd Battalion and one platoon of its Company K was overrun. Company C,
1st Battalion, holding positions around Brandenburg, was heavily attacked but repulsed the
Germans with no loss of ground. By 12:00 p.m., Company B, 1st Battalion, had not been
successful in reaching Company E, 2nd Battalion, meeting heavy resistance south of Fuhren.
Some members of Company B’s Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons made their way to
within 200 yards of Fuhren and reported no friendly troops alive in the town. Company E was
presumed lost. 333
The 9th Armored Division, on the 109th Infantry right flank withdrew to positions in the
vicinity of Ermsdorf at 5:00 p.m. This left both of the 109th Infantry Regiment flanks wide open,
so a withdrawal to positions on the high ground north and east of Diekirch was executed during
the evening of December 18. The withdraw placed the 109th Regiment on commanding terrain
in a defensive position. German infantry and armor remained inactive during the withdraw.
However, a heavy attack was made in the 3rd Battalion sector during the morning resulting in
300 Germans dead and eighty prisoners captured. As overwhelming German pressure mounted,
the 109th Regiment received orders during the afternoon to pull back to new positions in order to
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cover the 9th Armored Division left flank. The 109th Infantry was then attached to the 9th
Armored Division for future operations. 334
By the aggressive defense of the 109th in successive delaying positions during the
beginning of the German attacks, the left flank of the German drive at its base was exposed. The
men of the 109th Infantry almost destroyed the entire German 915th and 916th Volks Grenadier
Regiments and a major part of the 914th Volks Grenadier Regiment of the 352nd Volks
Grenadier Division. Had they not held their ground as long as they did, elements of the 352nd
Volks Grenadier Division would have more than likely reached the strategic high ground in the
vicinity of Heinerscheid - Grosbous - Merzig - Berg, from which they could have launched an
attack into the assembly areas of the 80th and 26th U.S. Divisions. By the 109th securing and
holding their positions, the U.S. III Corps was able to launch a successful counterattack against
the south flank of the German offensive at its base. 335
Of the front line positions held by the 28th Infantry Division, the 110th Infantry
Regiment occupied the longest and therefore the most tenuous line. The size of the assigned
defensive sector precluded the establishment of a cohesive defensive line. Forward elements of
the 110th Regiment consisted of only two battalions of the three, because the 2nd Battalion was
retained by the division as its only reserve. Thus, two battalions were stretched over a ten mile
front, a length normally occupied by an entire division, and were placed precisely in the middle
of the German Fifth Panzer Army’s line of march. In practice, this meant that various companies
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that were located in strong points and patrols that were regularly sent out to provide a screen in
the large gaps between the towns held by the 110th units. 336
Despite their small numbers, the 110th Regimental Combat Team was assigned a
significant task. Its main defensive line ran along Skyline Drive. The road was only a couple of
miles west of the Our River. The defensive positions were designed to cover four main east-west
roads which ran from the Our River to Skyline Drive and then proceeded west into the heart of
Belgium.337 The inability of armored units to move cross country due to the Ardennes Forest,
necessitated the Fifth Panzer Army to capture and exploit this road network in order to
advance.338
The three divisions of the German XLVII Panzer Corps, two of which were armored, had
what seemed to be a fairly easy task to dislodge the two 28th Division battalions stretched over
an area too large to hold. The 110th Infantry control of this road network and the German desire
to capture it, and to move on to Bastogne, would thrust the men of the 110th Regiment into a
major role during the first few days of the Battle of the Bulge. Orders from the Division were in
effect that every unit and installation was to hold and fight it out at all costs. With that spirit the
first day was one of fanatic resistance. 339
At the beginning of the German attack, the 110th Infantry Regiment headquarters was
located at Clervaux. Service Company was located at Weicherdange. Cannon Company was
located at Munshausen and the Antitank Company was located at Hoscheid. The 1st Battalion
Headquarters was located in Urspelt, with its Company A in Heinerscheid, Company B in

336

VIII Corps After Action Report, 6 April 1945. (Washington DC: National Archives and Record Administration),
3.
337
Bergström, 81.
338
John DeVore, “Armor Under Adverse Conditions.” Committee and Officers Advanced Course. (Fort Knox: The
Armored School, 1948-1949), 2.
339
Zapotoczny, 45.

138

Marnach, Company C in Munshausen, and Company D in Grindhausen. The 2nd Battalion
Headquarters was located in Donnange, with its Company E in Boxhorn, Company F in
Eselborn, Company G in Lullange, and Company H in Boevange. The 3rd Battalion
Headquarters was located in Consthum, with Company I in Weiler, Companies K and B and
103rd Engineers in Hosingen, and Company L in Holzthum. 340
By this time, the 110th Infantry Regiment had been upgraded to a Regimental Combat
Team, which meant that it was supplied with additional support troops, including armor. After
replacing the losses from the Hürtgen Forest Battle and adding additional personnel, the regiment
reached a strength of about five thousand men. The standard for a U.S. Army regiment at the
time was slightly more than three thousand. 341
The mission of dislodging the 28th Division defenders from Skyline Drive was given to
the German 26th Volksgrenadier Division and the 2nd Panzer Division. The 26th Volksgrenadier
Division was to quickly cross the Our River, and while engineers were bridging the river for the
Panzer Divisions to follow, the 26th Volksgrenadier was to overrun the positions held by the
110th and advance to the Cleft River. Once this ground had been secured, the Panzer Division
was to race westward and secure Bastogne. According to Generalmajor Heinz Kokott,
Commander of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division:
Success or failure of the entire operation depends on an incessant and stubborn
drive westward and northwest. The forward waves of the attack must not be
delayed or tied down by any force of resistance. Bastogne should fall on the
second day of the offensive or at least be encircled by then.342
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On the morning of December 16 at shortly after 5:00 a.m. the entire 110th Infantry Regiment
front was subjected to a heavy artillery barrage for approximately 30 minutes. From 6:00 a.m. to
6:30 a.m., it diminished slightly. From 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. it again increased in intensity. At
7:30 a.m. an attack was made by German infantry along the entire regimental front. German
armor and more infantry rapidly followed this. As the day progressed, the German build-up in
infantry, armor, and artillery was rapid. Communications gradually diminished between the
American units as most wire lines were cut early in the day and radio was depended upon for
communications. 343
In the small village of Weiler, Company I, less one platoon in Wahlhausen, was in
defensive positions when the German offensive started on December 16 early in the morning. In
the early light the patrol sighted a German force of about two hundred men stealthily
approaching Weiler through a draw running between the positions of two platoons. Carbine and
M–1 rifle fire from the patrol ripped into the German infantry column. The Germans threw
themselves behind any cover they could find and laid down such a heavy volume of return fire
that the patrol was forced to withdraw to a nearby antitank position and seek cover there. At 7:10
a.m., Company I in Weiler observed another German force of about two hundred men moving
West along the draw between Weiler and Company I’s 2nd Platoon. The Germans were riddled
with small arms and machine gun fire and plastered with 81mm mortar fire. They suffered heavy
casualties and hurriedly withdrew. As the day wore on, the attacking Germans exerted continual
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Sergeant Thomas Meller’s observation post was behind the enemy lines now. He and a
companion had captured two Germans who needed medical attention. Meller moved the group to
an abandoned farmhouse were a medic bandaged the German’s wounds. One of the Germans
thanked him for not shooting him and also for dispensing medical care. “I wish to repay your
kindness by saving your life and the lives of your men,” he said in English. “You have done a
commendable job here. There are three hundred companies of three hundred men each, coming
down this road. They will take this position. Surrender now and save your life and the lives of
your men.” Sergeant Meller politely declined, as he thought that the reason he was here was not
to surrender, but to defeat the Nazis. Meller and his men were eventually captured by the
approaching Germans. 345
The ammunition situation of the 1st Platoon at the 3rd Battalion observation post became
so critical that a call for resupply and tank support was put through to 3rd Battalion Headquarters
at about 3:00 p.m. By nightfall there was still no sign of the tank platoon which was supposed to
bring the ammunition. By then the men at the observation post and in the 1st Platoon positions
were down to their last few rounds of ammunition. Lieutenant Carl A. Fisher, platoon leader of
the 1st Platoon, took the only course left. He called for artillery fire directly on the 1st Platoon
and the observation post. Lieutenant Fisher was awarded the Bronze Star for his actions. Despite
the requested artillery fire, the 1st Platoon positions and the Battalion observation post were
overrun. A few of the men from the 1st Platoon managed to work their way back to other
American positions. Only one man from the observation post escaped. 346
Second Lieutenant Jacob P. Welc was awarded the Bronze Star for his action in Weiler.

345

“3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry After Action Report.” World War II Unit Records, Record Group 407, Box 8586.
(Washington, D.C.: National Archives).
346
Zapotoczny, 92.

141

Welc (then an anti-tank squad leader) and his gun squad were attached to Company I, which was
located in a forward position along the battalion front. Although superior German forces
encircled the town, Welc personally took control of an antitank gun and sent round after round of
high explosive ammunition into the midst of the onrushing German infantry. When the supply of
high explosive ammunition was exhausted, he started firing armor-piercing shells, and is credited
with killing or wounding four Germans. When his position was overrun, he withdrew his men
and conducted a house-to-house battle until they reached the rest of Company I, defending the
center of town. 347
At 8:00 a.m., Company B, 1st Battalion, reported they were being attacked by a German
force estimated at seventy men. All of the Company B men were in prepared positions and still
holding. At 8:50 a.m. Company B reported seeing 300 German troops northwest and southwest
of Marnach. After contact was lost with Company B, Company A was ordered to send a patrol to
Fischbach to link up with Company B. At 10:00 a.m. Company C was ordered to attack the
Germans in Company B’s area, as the patrol from Company A was pinned down by German fire
in Fischbach and had to withdraw, reporting that 150 Germans were coming up the road to their
position. Company C was not able to attack in the Company B area as they became engaged in a
considerable fight short of Marnach.348
At 11:20 a.m., the battalion ordered two platoons of tanks to proceed from Munshausen
to Marnach to link up with Company C and clear resistance. One platoon of tanks went to
Marnach and contacted Company C at 4:00 p.m. The other tank platoon returned to Munshausen.
At 4:30 p.m., Company D was ordered to move from Grindhausen to Reuler, just east of
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Clervaux. The last communication with Company B was made at 6:15 p.m. They were presumed
lost. At 6:30 p.m. Company A reported Germans to their south and north, proceeding west. 349
Private Ralph Obuchowski, 103rd Engineer Battalion, thought going to Hosingen was
like going to Heaven. The town had not yet suffered the ravages of war. It was intact, peaceful,
and quiet. There were hot baths, warm beds, and indoor plumbing. Except for pulling guard duty
occasionally, there was plenty of time to read, relax, and catch up on letter writing in comfort.
The war seemed hundreds of kilometers away. But Hosingen was on the front line.
Private Obuchowski recalled, “Out of Heaven it turned into Hell on Saturday morning,
December 16.” He and another private were assigned to guard duty. Their station was at a point
near the church. Shortly after getting off guard duty, an artillery barrage opened up. Obuchowski
and some others decided to take shelter in a cellar. Forty-five minutes later, when the barrage let
up, they returned to their quarters to find them completely destroyed. A large piece of shrapnel
had penetrated the mattress on Obuchowski’s bed. 350 Later in the morning Obuchowski’s squad
was assigned to keep the Germans from attacking across an open field. Armed with their M-1
rifles, they took cover in a barn and fired on the advancing Germans. They were able to repel the
attack but started receiving fire from German mortars. After dark, they made their way back to
the center of the town looking for others from their squad and platoon. By daylight on December
17, it was obvious that things had worsened. They could hear German small arms fire. Still left to
their own devices, they decided to stay in the building where they had slept to repel any German
attempts to take over the building. Just before dark, the Germans attacked, but Obuchowski’s
squad pinned them down. When it got dark, they retreated. 351
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Early in the next morning, they heard machine gun fire just down the street. They were
told that Captain William Jarrett, the company commander, after consulting with other officers,
decided to surrender. The water was gone, ammunition was low, and the Germans had taken up
positions around the town, with infantry and tanks. The men were ordered to destroy everything
that might be of value to the Germans, including their weapons. After being searched and
relieved of their watches, money and, in some cases shoes, the men were marched out of
Hosingen toward the Our River and Germany. While the defenders of Hosingen did surrender,
they held off the Germans for fifty-two hours. 352
Holding at all costs meant that by the end of the day the situation for many units was
costly. Some elements experienced heavy losses and could not continue to fight as a combat unit.
The order to hold at all cost had a chilling effect on the soldiers but did not dappen their resolve.
As darkness approached on December 16, many units were running low on ammunition, all were
surrounded. Still, by their staunch defense, they were stalling, creating the time necessary for
reinforcements to arrive. Furthermore, they were depriving the German mobile units of the speed
they needed and, most important, time they could not afford to lose. General Hasso von
Manteuffel, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army described the action of the first day:
The Clerf River was not reached at any point. The enemy was unquestionably
surprised by the attack: he offered, however, in many places tenacious and
brave resistance in delaying by skillfully fought combat tactics. His
counterattacks, which started at once, partly supported by small, armored groups,
resulted in many points in critical situations. The tenacious resistance of the
enemy together with the roadblocks placed were the most essential reasons for
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the slowing up of the attack whose timing was not going according to plan. 353
The continued presence of the 110th Infantry Regiment strong points on the vital road networks
completely upset the German timetable for the first day. General Kokott’s division needed to
cross the Clerf River by nightfall and its failure to do so was directly attributed to the stand of the
men of the 110th Infantry. The 2nd Panzer needed to clear Clervaux and Marnach of American
strong points to open the good hard surfaced road westward. 354 By the end of the first day, they
controlled neither.
In some respects, equally bad for the Germans, was the combative spirit of the men of the
110th. That combative spirit tempted many German units to diverge from the tactics they were
ordered to use in the Ardennes. As noted by Charles MacDonald in Time for Trumpets,
according to instructions from General Manteuffel and General Kokott, the men of the 26th
Volksgrenadier were to use the ‘Hutier’ or infiltration tactics and bypass strong points of
resistance, pressing on to their objectives. 355 However, the Germans were all too often unable to
avoid a fight. MacDonald wrote, “As they moved toward their objectives, they were like a man
who tries to sneak past a hornet’s nest, only to find the hornets swarming him so furiously that he
has to stop and try to destroy them,”356 wrote MacDonald.
Early in the afternoon of December 16, when it became apparent that the Command Post
would have to be evacuated, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Hurley T. Fuller, called for
volunteers to remain with the wounded as they could not be moved. Major L. S. Frogner,
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Regimental Surgeon, was the first to volunteer along with other medical personnel, and two
Chaplains with their assistant Corporal Carl Montgomery. 357
At 2:00 a.m. on December 17, Battery A, 109th Field Artillery, located at Hupperdange,
reported German troops overrunning their position. The 1st Battalion lost contact with them at
2:45 a.m. At 8:30 a.m. four light tanks of the 707th Tank Battalion reported to the Battalion
Headquarters, having made the run from Heinerscheid to Fischbach to Urspelt. They lost
fourteen tanks along the road. At 1:00 p.m. Company A reported being attacked by seven
German tanks at Heinerscheid. The battalion lost contact with Company A at 1:30 p.m.
Company D reported a German company between their position at Reuler and Clervaux at 1:35
p.m. At 3:30 p.m. they reported they were abandoning Reuler. Contact was lost with Company D
at 3:30 p.m. At 4:50 p.m. four German tanks supported by infantry opened fire on the Battalion
Headquarters. At 5:30 p.m. all contact was lost with the 1st Battalion and they ceased to operate
as a unit. 358
Colonel von Lauchert, commander of the 2nd Panzer Division, was concerned about the
division’s slow rate of advance. Clervaux was a main objective of the tank drive on Bastogne
because of its strategic location on the main highway leading to Bastogne. Clervaux should have
fallen before noon on the 16th according to the original German timetable. Instead, the
Americans continued to hold this key position on the morning of the 17th. A single 57mm
antitank gun guarded the bridge near the railroad station where the road coming down from the
north entered the town. It was at this antitank gun position that 1st Lieutenant Kenneth G.
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Maddox of Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 110th Infantry, directed the gun crew in a last
desperate attempt to keep the Germans out of Clervaux.359
The crew members of the antitank gun were so busy firing at the oncoming tanks that
they did not notice an infiltrating German soldier moving up on the flank of the gun position.
Lieutenant Maddox saw that the German soldier was about to fire at the gun crew and realized
after he shouted a warning to them, that his men could not hear above the noise of the battle.
There seemed only one other course of action to him. He leaped in front of his men, firing at the
German grenadier. As he did so, Lieutenant Maddox received the full burst from the German’s
machine pistol in his chest. Maddox’s sacrifice was in vain as a tank-infantry team from the 2nd
Panzer’s 2nd Grenadier Regiment obliterated the antitank gun and breached the defenses of
Clervaux.360
Lieutenant Maddox, severely wounded, was evacuated by the Germans to one of their
field hospitals, where he died of his wounds on Christmas Day. He was posthumously awarded
the Silver Star for his actions that day in Clervaux.361 Private First Class William Bull
remembered watching the tanks coming down the road along the narrow ravine that led into
Clervaux. “I was scared. I wanted to get out of there, but I knew we had to stay and fight. We
couldn’t let the Germans beat us, so we prayed.”362
At 6:00 p.m. German tanks and infantry had penetrated to within fifty yards of the
Regimental Command Post and were firing into the Hotel Claravallis which was being used as
the command post. At 7:30 p.m., the German infantry moved in and occupied the first floor of
359
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the hotel. The Regimental Headquarters personnel escaped through a second floor window and
re-grouped in Allerborn on the morning of December 18.363
At 9:00 a.m. the 2nd Battalion, 110th Infantry minus Company G was alerted for
movement. At 1:00 a.m. on December 17, they were ordered to assemble in an area just south of
Donnange. They received orders to secure a road junction a quarter of a mile north of Clervaux
and to attack and capture Marnach. At 7:30 a.m. the Battalion crossed its line of departure, the
Clervaux-Bastogne Road just north of Clervaux with Company F on the left and Company E on
the right. Almost immediately, both companies were heavily engaged by German infantry and
tanks. The Battalion plus supporting tanks and tank destroyers inflicted heavy losses on the
Germans and advanced, retaking Reuler. At 4:00 p.m. German infantry supported by an
estimated twenty tanks attacked, forcing both companies back approximately 500 yards, where
they dug in about 200 yards west of Reuler. 364
Ralph Johnson of the 110th Infantry recalled how his faith was tested during the Battle of
the Bulge. “The peaceful village of Clervaux, Luxembourg took a look of a nightmare.
Communications were impossible. The enemy quickly attacked our strongpoints and smashed its
way into our center. The men rolled with the punch, fighting, falling back, defending each
crossroad and strongpoint with everything they had. I had faith we would prevail though. We
were fighting for the right reasons and God was on our side.” 365
The German attack of tanks and infantry that destroyed Maddox’s gun position continued
its advance capturing the Regimental Command Post. At 11:59 p.m. Colonel Hurley E. Fuller,
the Regimental Commander, issued orders for the companies to break up into groups of squad
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size and withdraw west to Donnage, to assemble and await orders. There were a few men
remaining in Clervaux by the evening of the 17th. In the castle across town, which dates back to
the 12th century, the officers and men from the Regimental Headquarters Company and a
scattering of other units were still holding out. On the morning of December 18, the defending
force had run out of ammunition and parts of the castle were set ablaze by German artillery and
tank fire. The group decided to surrender at 1:00 p.m.
By 7:00 a.m. on December 18, approximately seven officers and sixty men had arrived at
the assembly area, in addition to the whole of Company G. Defensive positions were prepared in
the vicinity of Donnage. At 8:00 a.m. the German infantry attacked from the northeast. The
defending force was driven from their positions to near Hamiville. At 7:00 p.m. German tanks
and infantry attacked through Hamiville southwest on the main highway, isolating the regiment.
Another attack followed, overrunning the position. This was the last action of the 2nd Battalion
as an organized force. 366
In the 3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry sector, Company I observed movement in the woods
east of their position at 6:15 a.m. on December 16. They observed approximately 200 Germans
infantry troops approaching Weiler from the east. The German column was fired on and
dispersed. At 7:30 a.m. Company K reported that a few German infantry troops had infiltrated
into Hosingen but were killed. At 10:30 a.m. Company L observed a German force south of
Holzthum moving west to attack Consthum. Company L alerted Consthum and opened fire on
them. 367
After five attacks had been repulsed by using direct fire from 105mm howitzers from
Battery C, 109th Field Artillery Battalion, and multiple .50-caliber machine guns from an
366
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attached anti-aircraft unit, the Germans withdrew at 1:30 p.m. At 6:30 p.m. the Battalion
observation post and the 1st Platoon of Company I were overrun by German tanks and infantry at
Wahlhausen-strasse. In Weiler Company I had repulsed six attacks on the town, until the
Germans completely surrounded the town. Company I split into two groups and attempted to
fight their way north to Consthum, to join the 3rd Battalion. At 10:30 p.m. twenty men from
Company I made their way into Consthum.
On December 17 at 2:30 a.m. two German tanks accompanied by infantry attacked
Company L in Holzthum. Fighting continued in the town throughout the night and the German
tanks and infantry were driven out of the town. At 3:30 p.m. Company L was ordered to
withdraw from Holzthum and establish defensive positions around Consthum. German tanks
clanked into the village. The tanks roared down the village street, methodically blasting gaping
holes into houses, while supporting infantry sprayed the area with small arms fire. Company L’s
radio came on the air, “Town completely surrounded with enemy tanks and infantry. Running
low on ammunition. Waiting further orders. Over.” Major Harold F. Milton, Third Battalion
commander, who had been trying to reach the company ordered the company commander to
withdraw his men if possible. A reply came back on the radio, “We can’t get out, but the
Germans are going to pay if they try to get in.” Early in the morning a young lieutenant came on
the radio to report that his men were fighting from house-to-house with no ammunition except
grenades. He said, “We’ve blown everything there is to blow except the radio, it goes next.” And
then over the headset came the sound of a man sobbing. “I don’t mind dying. I don’t mind taking
a beating,” said the lieutenant. “But I’ll be damned if we’ll give up to these bastards.” The radio
clicked off, and shortly before 12:00 p.m. went dead.368
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At 1:00 a.m. Company K in Hosingen reported they were encircled and running low on
ammunition. The Battalion Commander ordered Company K to attempt to withdraw to
Consthum. Company K replied that it was impossible and that they would hold the position as
long as possible. The last contact with Company K was at 10:07 a.m. They were presumed lost.
At 5:00 a.m. on December 18 a heavy artillery barrage fell on Consthum, now defended
by the Battalion Headquarters Company, Company M (-), and Company L. Three German
infantry attacks were repulsed during the morning. Staff Sergeant Edger E. Ridenour, Company
L, volunteered to locate and destroy German tanks menacing his company’s position. While
repairing a damaged bazooka he had located in a nearby field, Sergeant Ridenour was
conspicuously outlined in the bright glow of flares fired by the Germans. During the brightness
of the flares, he noticed German tanks maneuvering into position on his right and a long column
of German troops advancing toward the town. Lacking protective cover and armed with only a
carbine rifle, he crawled back a few yards after the flares burned out and secured a 60mm mortar
from an abandoned reconnaissance car.369 Plainly in the view of the Germans, Sergeant Ridenour
held the mortar between his legs aiming only by the burst of his own weapons and fired at the
advancing German unit until his ammunition supply was exhausted. By his courageous stand
Sergeant Ridenour inflicted enormous casualties on the Germans and delayed the capture of
Consthum. He was awarded the Silver Star for his actions.370 At 1:00 p.m. German tanks and
infantry overran the defenses north and south of Consthum. At 1:30 p.m. the Battalion
Commander ordered a withdraw to Kauthenbach. The Battalion then withdrew to Nocher and
established a perimeter defense of the town. 371
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Before withdrawing, First Sergeant Sam J. Pizzo, Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion,
110th Infantry earned the Silver Star for his actions. When a strong German force led by Tiger
tanks surged toward the town, Sergeant Pizzo, without orders and acting on his own initiative,
maneuvered to the forward edge of town with a bazooka in an attempt to delay the Germans
armored advance. He was successful in halting the advancing tanks long enough for friendly
artillery to demolish one of the tanks and force the others to retreat. Later when the security of
the Battalion Headquarters became threatened by the Germans, Sergeant Pizzo bravely remained
to destroy all secret documents despite the fact orders were given to evacuate. He escaped to the
outer edge of town and while under fire erected a roadblock that delayed German vehicles
sufficiently for friendly troops to escape entrapment. 372
Even though the German assault was devastating, the American leaders did what they
could to protect their men. For example, on December 18, Captain Anthony J. Nastasi,
Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, when a concentrated German attack overran his forward
positions, he disregarded heavy German artillery fire and advancing German tanks, cleared his
men from houses and installations in the area and directed them to the far edge of Consthum. 373
In view of the wide area occupied, the resultant gaps between units, lack of depth to the
positions, and absence of reserves, the 110th Regiment was able to mount local independent
delaying actions against an overwhelmingly superior German force advancing through them.
Small, isolated units and detachments of clerical, communications, and service personnel
effected considerable disruption to the German plan of attack. In many instances the men held at
all costs, to the point that there were no survivors. In his request for the Presidential Unit Citation
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for the 110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division Commander Brigadier General Basil H.
Perry wrote:
The conspicuous gallantry, heroism, and determination of the 110th Infantry to
hold at all costs for nearly 96 hours without sleep, without food, without
reinforcements and under the most adverse climatic conditions, upset the
timetable of Rundstedt to reach Bastogne on the 16th of December as
substantiated by maps and orders captured and forwarded to the VIII U.S.
Corps, and contributed materially to the successful defense of Bastogne and
to the defeat of the enemy in the Ardennes; and reflect the highest traditions of
the Armed Forces.374
Stationed with the 28th Infantry was the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion with 3-inch towed guns.
Company A and the 1st Reconnaissance Platoon supported the 109th Infantry Regiment in the
area of Ermsdorf, Gilsdorf, Bettendorf, Reisdorf, Beaufort, and Sauelborn. Company B and the
2nd Reconnaissance Platoon supported the 110th Infantry Regiment along the HeinerscheidMarnach-Hosingen line. Company C had guns on both sides of the Our River supporting the
112th Infantry Regiment, its positions extending from Weiswampach to the vicinity of
Lutzkampen. As the German offensive began, the men of the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion
contributed greatly to delay the Germans long enough for reinforcements to be brought up on the
shoulders of the bulge. The 1st Reconnaissance Platoon in Marnach was encircled by the
Germans but continued to hold a vital road network until the Germans employed tanks and
infantry on the night of December 18. The battalion lost twenty-four of thirty-six towed guns, but
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destroyed twenty-eight German tanks, two 88mm guns, thirteen other vehicles and numerous
other equipment, as well as killing several hundred Germans. 375
Many of the 28th Infantry Division defenders recognized that they were surrounded and
that there was no relief or escape, save as prisoners. Yet despite this sober conclusion, they
continued to resist until there was simply no other means to resist. The stand of the men of the
28th Infantry Division had indeed been stubborn. In the first three days of fighting heavy
casualties had been inflicted on the German forces. The exact toll they extracted from the
Germans is difficult to determine. In 1979 the Army officially recognized that the 28th Infantry
Division cost the Germans over 12,000 casualties in the Ardennes campaign. 376
In a war, heroes and heroic actions are important and it is important to publicize them as
the epitome of American valor and thus strengthen both units and the war effort. Bastogne, is a
superb example of the American soldier, standing his ground and holding his position against all
odds and winning. Conversely, it is recognized that valorous stands do not always result in
holding one’s position and emerging intact from the fray. Sometimes valorous actions result in
the destruction of a command rather than its survival but the valorous act still produces an
advantage for their country. In such a case their valor is no less deserving of recognition and
study. Such was the case of the men of the 28th Infantry Division. They came to Europe to fight
for freedom and the American way of life and did the best they could.
The historical record clearly shows that for the first three days of the Battle of the Bulge
the men stood in their assigned positions denying the German Army clear access to the road
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networks that it so desperately needed. Without the desperate stand by the division, which had
been so recently mauled in the Hürtgen Forest, the Germans would have, in all likelihood, been
able to follow their schedule and would have achieved far more of their Ardennes offensive
objectives. In fact, without the determined resistance of the 28th Infantry Division, there may
never have been a defense of Bastogne by the 101st Airborne Division. As the months and years
passed many of the veterans reflected on why they fought so heroically against the Nazis.
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Chapter Eight
Motivating Factors in the Words of the Veterans
Many Americans viewed the issues at stake during World War II in terms of clearcut
right and wrong: democracy against fascism, defense against aggression, good against evil. The
country showed remarkable unity in support of a conflict that seemed good and just. Dissenters
were few and silent. Stephen Ambrose captured their feelings, “At the core, the American citizen
soldiers knew the difference between right and wrong, and they didn’t want to live in a world in
which wrong prevailed.”377
The press corps that was stationed in Europe did their best to keep the American
population informed of what their boys were doing overseas. Larry Newman, with the
International News Service, who covered Patton’s Third Army and was embedded with the
American troops in Belgium, wrote the article published in newspapers across America A Saga
of Gallant Men; How Heroic 28th Halted Nazis And Saved Our Armies, on January 6, 1945. Two
Pennsylvania war correspondents, Morley Cassidy with the Philadelphia Sunday Evening
Bulletin and Ivan H. (Cy) Peterman from the Philadelphia Inquirer, both who were embedded
with the 28th Division told heroic stories of the men of the division. 378 One such article written
by Morley Cassidy ended up in the Kansas City Star newspaper. In his dramatic style he wrote,”
They battled all day into the next. Then, late Sunday, encircled, their ammunition gone, they
radioed their battalion that the situation was critical. They were ordered to withdraw if possible.
Two company commanders radioed back. We can’t get out but will make them pay. They fought
to the last man…” 379 Cy Peterman wrote an article on November 16, 1944 about the 28th
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Division in the Hürtgen Forest, titled Great Unsung Battle of the 28th Division, “In the Hurtgen
Forest, that gloomy expanse below Aachen, where trees, terrain, and weather, even without
entrenched Germans, make formidable opposition, and mud-sluiced roads and clinging snow
penetrate like a plague in the bones, American troops fought a great but unsung battle for
freedom.”380
Stephen Ambrose hypothesized, “Cause and country were as critical to the GIs as to the
Civil War soldiers. The differences between them were not of feeling, but of expression. Civil
War soldiers were accustomed to using words like duty, honor, cause, and country. The GIs did
not like to talk about country or flag and were embarrassed by patriotic bombast. While they may
not have said that they were fighting for the American way of life, they were all proud
Americans and believed in their cause. They knew they were fighting for decency and
democracy and they were proud of it and motivated by it.”381
While few 28th Infantry Division veterans talked or wrote about the ideology of
America’s involvement in the war or their specific religious beliefs, some did keep a diary during
the war of their experiences. Others, participated in interviews and after action reports shortly
after their battle experience. Others reflected on the reasons for fighting in interviews conducted
by the U.S. Army European Theater Historical Section in September 1944 and January 1945.
Still other veterans participated in interviews conducted by the 28th Division Historical Section
in December 1988. Many soldiers commented about their reason for fighting in Wartime Logs,
journals, after action reports, and diaries kept during the war.
The men of the 28th Division were reminded of why they were fighting by the actions of
the German SS troops. Some German units, in particular the SS units, refused to take prisoners
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during the Battle of the Bulge.382 The most famous incident occurred near Malmédy, a Belgium
village just a few miles above Luxembourg and west of the German border. Early on the
afternoon of December 17 the Germans overran Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery
Observation Battalion, all of whom promptly surrendered. After briefly interrogating the men,
including medics wearing red crosses, they were lined up and gunned down with machine guns,
rifles and pistols. 383 Word of the massacre spread like wildfire in unit newsletters, 384 even to the
soldiers in the middle of their own fight, causing Americans to stiffen their defenses, eliminate
surrender if possible, and strengthen their determination to destroy Hitler’s army. 385
American chaplains in Europe after D-Day did more than stay with their units during
heavy combat. They worked alongside medics to care for the wounded and became litter bearers.
After the massacre at Malmédy many chaplains discovered they could not turn the other cheek.
Chaplain Leo Weigel told the men he was with that the SS was “a menace that should be
exterminated now because it will not be checked any other way.” 386 Jesuit historian Donald F.
Crosby discovered that the troops no longer viewed SS troops as well-trained elite fighting men.
They now saw the storm troopers as evil animals deserving extermination.
Faith was an important and significant factor for the soldiers during World War II. In a
2004 article for The Spokesman Review, Dallas Morning News, writer Katharine Goodloe
captured some reflections by war veterans on faith in God. These reflections were indicative of
most of the men of the 28th Division. “When you’re in combat, you pray for safety, you pray for
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deliverance, you pray to stay alive. It’s not always apparent how it’s going to happen. It’s a leap
of faith,”387 commented Norman Ford. Jonnie Henderson said, “When I wasn’t actually in
combat, I was thanking the Lord for getting me through the day or asking his help to get through
the next. When I stepped out of that foxhole and wasn’t killed, I knew that the Lord was right
there with me.”388 Robert Brooks said, “We all had faith and knew that everything would work
out. We had faith in our fellow man and in our military. We knew that we would overcome. And
we had faith in God. We knew he was on our side.” Henry Greenbaum recalled, “I always prayed
every day, quietly, to myself, for God to help me make it another day. I never gave up my
faith.”389
Robert E. Merriam was the chief of the Ardennes section of the U.S. Army Historical
Division, and had the opportunity to interview leaders, talk with German officers and to examine
battle records on both sides. He recalled that “to the highly disciplined Germans, American
normal unmilitary bearing, and apparent lack of discipline seemed completely contrary to their
conception of a good soldier. The Germans felt that the American soldier was inexperienced, not
completely interested in the war, and somewhat slipshod in his methods.”390 These same
Germans were unable to comprehend the sudden stiffening of the backbone, the complete change
of attitude which occurred when the 28th Division seemed trapped. When the first hours of the
Battle of the Bulge seemed like chaos, the German wrung their hands with glee and said, “Did
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we not tell you that the Americans were cowards; did we not say they would wilt if surprised and
overwhelmed?”391
The Germans failed to understand the psychology of the American soldier. As the initial
shock wore off, and terror and dismal uncertainty of those first hours diminished, a perceptible
change swept through the 28th Division ranks. The grim truth suddenly dawned on the dazed
troops and leaders. The war was far from over. Americans buckled down to the grim business of
killing Germans in large numbers. The soldiers forgot for the moment their desire to get home
and remembered why they were fighting.392 The following vignettes are examples of how
soldiers felt about why they were fighting. In each case, they reflect the concept of fighting for
the American way of life. Their comments answer the question of what forces beyond
camaraderie and cohesion influenced soldiers to resist the German offensive in the Battle of the
Bulge.
Russell Hark was like many young men at the outset of war. Standing on the corner of
Delevan and Main Streets in Buffalo, New York, on the afternoon of December 7, 1941. The gas
station attendant suddenly came running out shouting, “The Japanese have bombed Pearl Harbor
in Hawaii.”393 The news led Hark to situations that he never thought he would find himself in.
After the shock of the news went away, he became aware of the situation that the United States
was in. America had to fight to defend the way of life that Hark and others became accustomed
to. A few days later, Hark went to the draft board and asked when he would be called for active
duty. They told him that his draft number would not be called until the next August. He asked if
he could leave sooner, and a week later he received his notice. He was to report to the main post
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office in Buffalo for his physical. He was sworn into the Army after he passed the exam. He left
the next morning for basic training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 394
After eight weeks of training, he was sent to A.P. Hill Military Reservation, Virginia to
the 626 Tank Destroyer Battalion. After training, he was assigned to the 630th Tank Destroyer
Battalion. They set sail for Wales and after five weeks, landed on Omaha Beach in Normandy on
July 22, 1944. When the battalion arrived at an assembly area near Colombeires, France, they
were attached to the 28th Division. Hark traveled with the 110th Regiment across France,
supporting the regiment. 395 After the attacks and withdrawal from the Siegfried Line, the 630th
was moved to Elsenborn with the rest of the division. Soon he and his unit were in the Hürtgen
Forest. After the division was pulled out and sent to the Luxembourg to the tiny hamlet of
Enscherange. Hark stayed in a schoolhouse and did not bother to set up the guns since they were
told they were in a quiet sector. On December 16, they were awakened by artillery and the start
of the German onslaught.396
After firing at the Germans, they were eventually overcome and pulled back to Morhet,
about eight kilometers from Bastogne. They had five of their thirty-six guns left and were
attached to the 17th Airborne Division. It was very cold and all Hark had to wear was his leather
combat boots. One day he received rubber shoes with leather tops. When he removed his combat
boots, his feet were blue. The medics took him to an aid station. After his frozen feet healed, he
went to a replacement center and then returned to his unit and found out that he had enough
points to go home. In the replacement center General George Patton visited and gave the men a
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speech about the necessity of winning the war. Here is an excerpt from his speech as Hark
remembered it:
Men, all this stuff you hear about America not wanting to fight, wanting to stay
out of the war, is a lot of bullshit. Americans love to fight. All real Americans
love the sting and clash of battle. When you were kids, you all admired the
champion marble shooter, the fastest runner, the big-league ball players and the
toughest boxers. Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans
play to win all the time. That’s why Americans have never lost and will never lose
a war. The very thought of losing is hateful to Americans. 397
It appears that Patton repeated some of his ‘Blood and Guts’ speech that he delivered to his
troops in England. Hark said that the men who listened to it loved every word of it. Russell Hark
returned home, having done his duty and became a supervisor of heavy equipment for Niagara
Mohawk Power Company in Buffalo, New York. 398
Private First Class Louis Jurosek, Company A, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment,
kept a diary during the war. He wrote about being at an outpost just east of Heinerscheid, about a
mile from the German border. Having no real rank, he was an old timer looking after the new
replacements. At 5:30 a.m. the Germans opened up with a heavy artillery barrage from
Echternach in the south to Monschau in the north. Jurosek and his new replacements responded
as best as they could against the overwhelming German attack. Jurosek said he would constantly
have to remind his scared replacements of why they were fighting. When it became obvious that

397
398

Ibid.
Ibid.

162

their position was going to be overwhelmed, Jurosek gathered his group of replacements around
him and started a fighting retreat toward St. Vith. 399
They were constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Germans as they made their way
through the woods. During one of the skirmishes outside of St. Vith, Jurosek was wounded by
some shrapnel from a German 88mm round. The shrapnel penetrated his upper right leg. He
would not leave his replacements until they were safely in the hands of a sergeant at the mess
facility.400 After medical attention he returned to service and continued on with the 110th
Regiment. Except for recuperating for fourteen days from his leg wound, Louis Jurosek was in
action with the 110th Regiment from July 22, 1944 to May 9, 1945. He wrote in his diary that he
was determined to beat the Nazis; they could not win. He made it back home to Detroit,
Michigan on August 2, 1945. 401
Richard F. Leech was the company commander of Company D, 109th Infantry. He
started keeping a journal of sorts up until the end of the war. After many battles across France
and in the Siegfried Line, his unit became stymied for approximately two weeks. They were
pulled out of the line and after a brief rest they were sent northward to the Hürtgen Forest to
relieve the 9th Division who had been held up in the vicinity of Vossenack, Germeter, and
Schmidt. After several days of fighting and crawling in and out of the basements of houses in
Vossenack and Germeter, the 109th Regiment was ordered to launch an attack to the northeast to
the town of Hürtgen.402
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The attack was through heavy forest. Leech went along with Lieutenant Colonel Dan
Strickler, regiment commander and his headquarters group, which was following Company C,
commanded by Captain John Ritter, so that Leech could call a mortar fire ahead of the battalions
as it advanced. Leech had a radio operator and several runners with him. About a mile after they
left to go into the forest, they came across Captain Ritter who had just been shot through the
mouth. He was on his feet and gargling with Cognac and spitting blood and broken teeth, but still
leading his men and directing the company. Lieutenant Colonel Strickler ordered him to
immediately turn over his command of the company to someone else and go to the rear. Leech
found out later that Ritter did not go and kept on fighting. 403 Leech and the others knew why
they were there.
Leech’s group advanced another mile within sight of the town of Hürtgen. The remaining
Germans that they had not killed were flushed out of the forest and across the fields. Leech’s
group held up at the edge of the forest to regroup and reorganize. Many of the men were
completely lost and separated from their units and they flushed the Germans out through the
fallen trees. They were then hit with a heavy German artillery barrage. Leech hit the ground as
did everyone else until the barrage was over. 404
When the barrage lifted, Leech started to get up and found that his left elbow would not
work. He looked down and saw a hole in his jacket where a piece of shrapnel had pierced
through. Leech made his way back to the company command post and found his bed roll had
been riddled with a mortar burst right where he had slept the night before. He turned over
command of Company D and his driver drove him to the aid station. Richard Leech made in
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home to Colorado Springs, Colorado and became the president of the Colorado Association of
Real Estate Brokers. 405
The fighting men of the 28th Division were not the only ones there to defeat the
Germans. Ruth Puryear was a nurse with the 107th Evacuation Hospital that supported the 28th
Division. She kept a journal during the war and wrote about her experiences. In September 1944
they had a long drive through France, Belgium and Luxembourg. In October they opened their
hospital in Clervaux. Their staff consisted of forty doctors, forty nurses and 205 soldiers with
tents for four hundred beds. In October and November, they had terrible rain and mud and in
December there was snow. 406 On the night of December 15, Ruth and another nurse went to the
latrine tent in the forest. They thought they heard German voices. Her friend was so upset that
she let her flashlight fall into the latrine hole. A few weeks later a military policeman came into
the hospital and said he had passed through an area that must have been used by a special unit
because they had an illuminated latrine. 407
On December 16, the hospital staff were woken in the middle of the night and were
ordered to put warm clothes on as the Germans were attacking. They heard German tanks in the
distance. No one wanted to leave as they were there to support the troops. Finally, they decided
to leave, abandoning everything but their patients. It was very cold that night as they traveled to
an old castle in Libramont, Belgium. Other units helped them with supplies until they were able
to get re-supplied. The ballroom of the castle was used as a surgery room. In one room there
were all kinds of animal heads on the wall. It was in this room that the nurses attached the
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plasma bottles for the wounded to the antlers and heads of animals. They worked around the
clock conducting surgical operations. Ruth remembered that it was hard, but they had to do it.
Chief Warrant Officer Ralph Johnson, a staff officer with the 110th Infantry Regiment,
kept a diary of his experiences during the war. In 1976 he wrote his memoirs from the notes in
his diary. He was in the Pennsylvania National Guard 28th Infantry Division training in North
Carolina on December 7, 1941. He was asleep in a corn field near Halifax, Virginia, his blanket
covered with snow, when a loud, noisy radio was blasting in the early dawn. He remembered
cursing the radio operator as he tried to go back to sleep, but the blast persisted, so he uncovered
his head and tried to listen. He could hear that Pearl Harbor on Hawaii had been bombed. It was
a matter of hours before the shock took effect. All he had on his mind was visiting his family at
Christmas. “The true meaning of Pearl Harbor did not sink in for days afterwards. I don’t think
anyone ate breakfast that morning. Periods of hushed silence mingled with harsh accusing oaths
accompanied the remaining one hundred miles to our base at Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,” 408 wrote Johnson.
The 28th Division was originally scheduled to land at Omaha Beach on D-Day, June 6,
but instead landed on July 22, 1944. Johnson recalled seeing a sign on the beach placed by the
U.S. Army 1st Division that read ‘Welcome to Normandy-Courtesy of the First Division.’
Johnson and his fellow soldiers hung their heads as they safely walked ashore and bivouacked in
a Normandy apple orchard. Johnson read from the pocket Bible he had received before he left
the United States.409 The men were disappointed that they had not come ashore on June 6. It was
the topic of conversation for everyone as they awaited orders. They wanted to get a crack at the
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Nazis. They came to Europe to fight for freedom and they wanted to get at it. Soon Johnson and
his regiment would get their chance. After chasing the Germans across France and into Germany,
the 110th Infantry Regiment was in Luxembourg on December 16, 1944. 410
Johnson wrote in his diary, “I had faith we would prevail though. We were fighting for
the right reasons and God was on our side.” 411 Ralph Johnson thought, “the men who fought in
the Battle of the Bulge were like the Minutemen who stood at Concord Bridge in 1776. We were
in the business of destroying the enemy and returning home to a full and productive life.” Ralph
Johnson returned home on October 1, 1945 and stayed in the Army for another six months to
help with paperwork. 412
Charlie Waldrup, Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment, had his first combat experience
of the war in Percy, France. In his 1989 memoir, he recalled, “We were all green. It was
something different from what we’d ever experienced. Of course, we’d seen a lot of beat-up
troops back on the beach, Omaha Beach, and into St. Lo, but this was altogether different
because they were shooting at us.”413 They had taken Percy after a pretty fierce fight, lost some
troops but they were going out of Percy and one of his buddies said, “Look at that. There is a
dead German.” Waldrup replied, “Yes, and if you don’t mind, these Germans will kill you
too.” 414 About the same time, a German burp gun opened fire on them. After a few minutes, the
Germans left. Waldrup remembers thinking that the Germans had to be defeated or they would
kill everyone. They would come to America and kill everyone. After the Siegfried Line they
went into the Hürtgen Forest. To him, it was one of the roughest battles. The Germans were

410

Ibid.
Ibid, 12.
412
Ibid.
413
Charlie Waldrup, Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment. Unpublished Memoir, 1989. (Fort Indiantown Gap:
Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum).
414
Ibid.
411

167

killing Americans by the numbers. They had to dig a hole, put brush on it, and put dirt on top.
That was the only way they could survive the shrapnel from the artillery barrages. 415
The 3rd Platoon of Company K were captured east of Hosingen during the Battle of the
Bulge. Waldrup escaped capture. He commented, “People say the Bulge was the worst in
Europe. It was bad, all of it was bad. The ones who talk about the Bulge didn’t serve in the holes
in the Hürtgen Forest. There the weather was against us, the trees were against us, and the
Germans were against us. When you get three against you, I’ll tell you, you can’t win. But we
knew that we had to win. I prayed every night.” 416 Charlie Waldrup was thankful that God
showed him a way to get through it and he believed that God saved him for a purpose.
Harold M. Snedden, Service Company, 110th Infantry Regiment, was captured by the
Germans at Clervaux on December 18, 1944. In 1989 he wrote, “After interrogation, we were
marched back behind the lines. The question they asked was where was Patton’s tanks? We were
not about to tell the Germans anything. Patton’s tanks were going to beat them. They had to beat
them. Patton knew why we were fighting.” 417 After marching for several days and sleeping on
the hard frozen ground, they came to a railhead and about one hundred prisoners were herded
into boxcars that horses for their artillery had been moved in. No sanitary facilities were
available and water was scarce. Snedden and his fellow prisoners were taken to the Stalag 9B
prison camp at Bad Orb, Germany. 418
Their menu consisted of a cup of colored water, which was supposed to be coffee, for
breakfast. They might get some beans or bread or a piece of horse meat soup for lunch or dinner.
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There were no sanitary facilities. Their toilet was an open trench. They were housed in an old
dirty, wooden barracks. There were no blankets unless they had one when they were captured.
The men were soon infected with body lice. Snedden had a copy of the New Testament which
the Germans let him keep, along with pictures of his wife. He read the Bible often and prayed for
the Germans to be defeated. He remembered the prayer from Patton that he received before he
was captured. He remembered the Germans coming through the camp rounding up American
Jews. They were marched away from camp and never returned.419 On April 2, 1945, Easter
Monday, a tank column from Patton’s Third Army knocked down the main gate and they were
liberated. The lieutenant in the head tank was from Snedden’s hometown, Ogleby, Illinois.
Snedden said, I never gave up hope the entire time I was a prisoner. I knew that someday
General Patton would beat the Germans. He had to.”420
Private Eddie Pfannenstiel kept ‘A Wartime Log,’ which was provided to many prisoners
of war by the Y.M.C.A., of his experiences during war. Eddie’s experience as a driver and cook
took a back seat to the need for combat infantry riflemen. He was transferred to a replacement
battalion while still in the United States. As part of the 112th Infantry Regiment, he was among
replacements for the casualties they were suffering. With the 112th in the Hürtgen Forest, he
wrote about the tree bursts, shells that exploded above the trees to illuminate their positions. “We
felt like sitting ducks. When not fighting, we fought the cold and rain in our foxholes, and prayed
to God that he would save us.” 421 Eddie felt that the replacements during the battle were poorly
trained but enthusiastic about fighting the Germans. After some rest, Eddie found himself facing
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the German attack on December 16. He was part of the rear guard assigned to cover the
withdrawal of his unit. 422
On December 18, he was taken prisoner after spending eighteen hours with four other
men in the second story of a house in Ouren, Belgium, hoping their forces could return to rescue
them. They had taken refuge in the house because they had used up all their ammunition and
grenades fighting towards the rear. The Germans first searched the house and did not discover
them. Thinking they were in the clear they continued to hide while the Germans occupied the
main floor. Finally, a German came upstairs, lit a cigarette and found them. They had no choice
but to surrender. Their captors were German SS troops and guarded them on the way to their
prison camp. A German lieutenant learned that Eddie could speak German so he put him in
charge of the first small group of prisoners. They were taken to Stalag IXB in Bad Orb,
Germany.
Each nationality was kept in separate compounds. The Geneva Convention rules provided
that prisoners be allowed to select a representative among them. Since Eddie spoke German, he
was selected as ‘Chief Man of Confidence.’ In that position, he was responsible for keeping
detailed records of what was happening in the camp. He entered details of his stay in his
Wartime Log and hid many of the documents from the German guards. Regular Catholic and
Protestant services were held in the camp. Eddie recalled that everyone believed God would save
them from the ordeal. Church services were attended by most of the men. Eddie tried to attend
services no matter what was happening.
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The Germans segregated the known American Jews and transferred them from the camp.
Eddie never saw them again. In his position, he was able to write to the Red Cross and request
supplies for the prisoners. He was keenly aware that the religious needs of the prisoners included
supplies. He was successful in obtaining supplies for the Protestant Chaplains that included
Bibles, Testaments, Communion wine, and wafers and religious music. For the Catholic
Chaplains he obtained one thousand Sunday Missals, five hundred Rosaries, and twelve Kyrials
(a collection of Gregorian chant settings for the Mass). 423
Eddie was attending church on Easter Sunday when he was called out. A man had come
up from Bad Orb to report that shells had hit the town. Eddie was sent into Bad Ord to
accompany unarmed German officers to surrender the town. After liberation, Eddie received a
letter that he was to be flown to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. to turn over his records from
the prison camp. After five days in Washington, Eddie was given sixth days leave and scheduled
to report for officer training in Texas. He turned down the officer training and returned home to
Kansas. Schools and organizations asked him to give talks. He said that he hated to do it and did
not like talking about his time in the Europe. He just wanted to be left alone. He believed that in
his own way, he contributed to the war effort. 424
Private First Class Robert W. Pocklington, Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 110th
Infantry, recalled the week before December 16, 1944 during an interview in December 1988.
Pocklington had kept a journal during the war and referred to it during his interview. He
remembered the flood lights and music from the German side, not only in German but in
English. It was kind of a morale booster for the men on the front lines. The weather was cold,
overcast, foggy, and very damp. They had plenty to eat and were well-equipped with
423
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ammunition and hand grenades. It felt like the war would be over soon. They had beat the Nazis
and would soon go back to normal living at home. Originally in the 106th Infantry Division, he
was transferred to the 28th Division four days before leaving the harbor in Boston. 425
Pocklington said that when they came into the area in Luxembourg, they knew it was a
rest area. But their main objective was to protect the main roads that came from Germany. He
commented, “If they [the Germans] got by this point, and they got by that point, we were
surrounded and we would have had it. Bastogne would have been next. We couldn’t let that
happen. We could not let the Germans win and screw-up our way of life. No, we won’t let that
happen.”426
Pocklington’s job was in the Pioneer Platoon, specializing in demolition with the use of
TNT, explosives, booby traps, and land mines. He was set-up in one of the foxholes overlooking
Skyline Drive. It was cold, dark and he heard the sound of a tank coming down through a gully.
He did not know if it was and American or German tank. He thought it might be an American
tank from the 707th Tank Battalion or from the 9th Armored Division needing repairs. He was
just lying in his foxhole, having his last cigarette and loosening his boots when he heard the
clanking sound of tank treads coming close to his foxhole. The next thing Robert heard was the
sound of a .50 caliber machine gun firing at the tank. He got up from his foxhole and saw two
Germans getting off the tank and running down the hill. German infantry soon showed up and
the fighting started. 427
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Pocklington and the others who were in foxholes made their way up a stream and found
an American convoy. There were a lot of men in Pocklington’s unit that were not killed or
captured but gave their best in the fight. He commented, “Well you know in the military we are
always to fight and to hold. You are taught to shoot first and ask questions later, because that son
of a bitch ain’t going to testify against you. So, in war time that was the first thing I thought of.
We came here to fight for freedom and to keep these bastards from winning. That is why there
were so many heroes there.” 428
First Lieutenant Morris Katz was in the 108th Field Artillery Battalion as a forward
observer at an observation post in Hoesdorf. Katz kept a journal and wrote that on December 15
there had been some activity reported in the area around Vianden. He was ordered to go to the
Vianden Castle, observe what he could and fire some registration checkpoints, and get some
corrections so that they could bring fire on any portions of the terrain across the Our River. He
had no reason to believe that there was anything going on, anything other than a routine
registration mission. In fact, Lieutenant Katz had a date to go to a party that night in
Ettelbruck.429
He finished his job around 3:00 p.m. and started beck in his jeep with his radio operator
and driver, hoping to drop them off in Diekirch and to continue on to attend the party. Before
they got to Fouhren the party drew some machine gun fire and drove off the road. Another jeep
was behind them. The firing ceased and Katz told the driver of the other jeep to get back and
report what happened and give a note to Marion Conny, who was with the Red Cross in
Ettelbruck, his date for the party. With no more machine gun fire, Katz proceeded to the party.
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Little did he know that that would be the last party he would attend for a while. The 108th Field
Artillery fired in support of the 109th Infantry until they could no longer continue. When asked if
he thought his unit made a difference in the war, Katz responded, “I think they made a
tremendous difference. The preservation of peace and freedom was on the line. I keep thinking
that we did the best we could do. We delayed the Germans and they didn’t win.” 430
Captain Robert H. Henschen, 3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment kept a journal
during the war. A few years after the war, he started to write his experiences from his journal
notes. He recalled that his driver and he were feeling the freedom of the day as the slow tail end
of the divisional movement was on the road to the long promised rest period in Luxembourg.
Henschen had finished with his part of clearing the last 28th Division troops from the Hürtgen
Forest. 431 It was a typical early December day, gray overcast sky and patches of snow here and
there on the rolling hills. As open trucks filled with men moved along the chilling wind caused
the soldiers to huddle together under blankets for warmth. In spite of their discomfort the men
were beginning to relax from the tenseness of the previous week. 432
There were jokes passed around and a little horseplay was going on. Everyone had the
sense that the war was about over. They were still wearing the same uniforms, wearing the same
beards, and had most of the same dirt on them that went with them into the Hürtgen Forest many
weeks before. “The real grit, stamina, fearlessness, and dogged courage of the American boys
were still to be more severely tested and proven in a way they least expected. The men proved

430

Ibid.
Robert H. Henschen, 3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment. Unpublished Journal. (Fort Indiantown Gap:
Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum).
432
Ibid.
431

174

themselves once again. They knew in order to make it home that had to keep the Nazis from
winning, and they did,”433 recalled Henschen.
Staff Sergeant Frank Kusnir joined Company B, 110th Infantry Regiment in 1936 and
was with the same regiment across France, into Germany and to Luxembourg after the Hürtgen
Forest battle. On the night of December 15, Frank and another soldier were sent out to
reconnoiter the downtown of Clervaux. He was with the intelligence reconnaissance section and
suspected that there were some German sympathizers in town. He thought that by having a
conversation with some of the villagers, they might be able to find out if anything was going to
develop in the area. They no sooner got into the town when three German artillery shells dropped
in. Frank thought, “hey, our artillery goofed up again. They are shelling us again.” There was a
period of ten minutes or so with no shelling. The next thing he knew, two more shells dropped in
and he thought, “the damn fools made another mistake.”434 There was no more shelling that
night. Years later, Frank thought, “the Germans must have been registering their artillery and we
did not realize it.” 435
Early the next morning, there was an artillery barrage landing on the hill above town.
When the artillery firing stopped, he looked up at the hill and a whole line of German tanks were
parked on the hillside facing the Americans. The tanks were firing at the medieval castle that
Frank was stationed in. The walls were very thick so they were well protected.436 They could not
answer the fire from the German tanks as the men were only armed with carbines and rifles. The
German tanks and artillery kept firing at the castle for three days, but Frank and the men held
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their ground. They would occasionally shoot at any careless tank crewmen who ventured out of
their tanks. The Americans who occupied the castle had one order. They were to hold the castle
at all costs. 437
On the third day, the Germans sent infantry to capture the castle. Frank recalled, “They
came right up to the castle courtyard. They were foolhardy because they had no chance. We
killed quite a few of them. Then they would withdraw. Then they wanted to know if we would
surrender.” 438 The company commander said no. We would fight to the last man. The Germans
assaulted again and the Americans would kill more of their enemy and the Germans would
withdraw again. Finally on the afternoon of December 18, Frank’s group was out of ammunition
and the castle was on fire, so they made the decision to surrender.439
The Americans had captured three Germans earlier and walked out of the castle with
them in tow. A German Colonel told the Americans to stand against a wall. “He said line them
up and we’ll shoot them over there.” 440 The Colonel asked one of the Germans who had been
captured how they had been treated. He told the Colonel they had been treated well, fed well and
their wounded taken care of. Frank recalled the Colonel stated in perfect English, “You men are
lucky. My intention was to shoot all of you for my dead comrades laying strewn through the
courtyard. You are now prisoners of the German Army.” Frank and the other 110th Infantry men
were sent to the prison camp at Bottorf, Germany.441
During his interview, Frank was asked if he thought it was important that people
remember what happened during the Battle of the Bulge. Frank replied, “They should. There
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were a lot of people who did a lot of things. I believe every man who was there was a hero.
Sometimes when you felt like a guy was a laggard, you pepped him up a little, but there were no
cowards. I was scared, we were all scared, but it didn’t keep us from fighting for freedom. That
is why we were there.” 442
Sergeant John R. Chernitsky was with the 110th Regiment Anti-tank Company.
Chernitsky also kept a diary while he was with the division. He came from a small mining town
in Pennsylvania. In 1939, the Pennsylvania National Guard was recruiting by telling young men
that they could get a year in service before being called up for the draft. John joined the National
Guard shortly after graduating from high school. He attended weekend drills with his unit until
they were called up to federal service on February 17, 1941. His unit had just pulled into a
bivouac area at A.P. Hill Military Reservation, Virginia on the night of December 7, 1941.
Someone had a portable radio and heard that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
John recalled, “While making our trip through the south, we Yankees were treated not too
politely. The Southerners didn’t appreciate Yankee soldiers floating around the south, but on
December 8, all that changed.” 443
In the morning they got up early and all of the Catholics went to Mass. John’s faith was
important to him and he always tried to attend services even throughout Europe. If there was not
a Catholic Chaplain, then many of the Catholics would attend Protestant services. After Mass on
December 8 the men returned to the company area and prepared to convoy to Indiantown Gap in
Pennsylvania. One of the first things that John and the men noticed was that the attitude of the
Southerners had changed overnight. Men were dropped off at road junctions with signs to direct
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the convoy. The local people would come out and talk with them, wishing them the best. At
every stop, local people would bring them hot coffee, cakes, and doughnuts. John figured, “the
Southerners treated them better because they knew we soldiers would be protecting them from
the Nazis and the Japs.”444
After being sent to Luxembourg, John was with the 3rd Platoon in Hosingen. The
division headquarters in Wiltz started a non-commissioned officer refresher school. There had
been so many casualties and so many men were promoted to ranks of corporal and sergeants in
the field without having any understanding of what the duties of leadership were. Sergeant
Chernitsky was one of the sergeants picked as an instructor in the school. He got to Wiltz on
December 15 and was shown to his quarters in a portion of a leather warehouse and told he and
the other instructors could go to the theater where movies were being shown that night. They got
out of the movies, went back to the warehouse and were greeted by an officer who told them to
get their barracks bags together and they would be taken back to their units. On the way out of
Wiltz early the next morning they ran into German troops and came back to Wiltz and assigned
to a rifle platoon to defend Wiltz. Sergeant Chernitsky was with band members, clerical staff,
cooks, bakers and anyone who was caught between Wiltz and Clervaux trying to get back to
their units. 445
The men defended Wiltz as long as they could and eventually broke up into small groups
to make their way west toward Bastogne. While trying to go to Bastogne, Chernitsky was
captured and became a prisoner of war and sent to Stalag 2B at Hammerstein, Germany, and
moved to various prison camps. He eventually made it back to the United States on May 11,
1945 and back home to Uniontown, Pennsylvania. In his interview John said, “Although my wife
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had asked me repeatedly to write my army and war remembrances, I wouldn’t do it. Even though
I can’t remember what happened at each prison camp, there are some things I’ll never forget, like
how degrading it was being a prisoner of war. They stripped me of my freedom. I kept thinking
that they [the Germans] had to lose. They can’t be allowed to strip anyone else of their
freedom.”446
Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, Commander of the 109th Infantry Regiment, was
interviewed by the 3rd Information and Historical Services, Headquarters III U.S. Corps on
January 6, 1945 at Buzancy, France. Discussing the events of December 16 and after, he
commented that when the first reports started to come in on December 16, all the 109th Infantry
Regiment units were alerted and the division headquarters was notified. All of the battalions
reported that the company-strength attacks by German infantry did not include tanks. Rudder
said, “Everyone was holding and I saw no cause for alarm. We were in a good position and had a
distinct advantage of terrain. As the attack progressed, it became apparent that it was in great
strength. Still, we did not even consider giving up any ground and the division order was to hold
as long as the positions were tenable. After all, we were there to beat the Nazis. We were not
going to let them win.”447
During the night of December 17, the German attack continued in force, but the
American artillery was breaking up much of the German infantry and the attack was being
stopped in many places. The situation began to deteriorate on all fronts and the 109th Infantry
reserve battalion from Diekirch was committed. On December 18, the decision was made to
withdraw the regiment in the direction of Bastogne. That night the battalions were pulled back to
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the northwest of Ettelbruck to cover the 9th Armored Division. Lieutenant Colonel James E.
Rudder believed they did the best they could under the circumstances and commended his men
for their sacrifices. 448
John F. Marshall was with Company B, 707th Tank Battalion. His battalion had landed
with the 28th Division and supported the division across France, the Siegfried Line, the Hürtgen
Forest and to Luxembourg. John would write to his wife Daisy and tell her what he could about
his experiences. In a January 5, 1945 letter he wrote, “Daisy, you asked me several times who
stands out as a good soldier. They were all good. We were cooperative and fought with any unit
we were attached to and there were many. It probably sounds like an old cliché, but I am proud
of my conduct and performance in combat, nothing heroic, just did what had to be done to stop
the Germans and was blessed to live through it. For this guidance and intelligence, I thank
Almighty God.” 449
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Macsalka, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 112th
Infantry Regiment was interviewed by the 3rd Information and Historical Services, Headquarters
III U.S. Corps on January 22, 1945 in the mountains south of Kaysersberg, France. Lieutenant
Colonel Macsalka explained that on the morning of December 16, Companies E and F were
online with Company G at Weiswampach where it had been sent two days previously for
training. At 6:00 a.m. the battalion S-2 was informed by the regimental S-2 that strong German
patrol groups of fifty to sixty infantrymen were putting pressure on the 1st and 3rd Battalions. At
8:30 a.m. the Regimental S-2 informed the Battalion S-2 that the Germans were launching a full
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scale attack. Macsalka said that he was not worried at that point since five different plans had
been set up to engage the Germans. 450
At 11:30 a.m. the regiment called for Plan B to be put into effect. All of the plans
involved an attack against any enemy penetration into the 2nd Battalion main assembly area.
From this assembly area, Plan A called for the battalion to move through the right flank of the
3rd Battalion area, Plan B through the center of the 3rd Battalion and Plan C between the 1st
Battalion and 3rd Battalions, Plan D through the center of the 1st Battalion, and Plan E through
the left flank of the 1st Battalion. Plan B was called for because the Germans were known to be
near a footbridge that the Americans had built. 451
As the regiment was overrun, they fell back to Burtonsville and mined the road behind
them and eventually were re-assigned. Macsalka was confident that one of the plans that had
been formulated would have stopped the German advance. He commented, “We knew that we
had to beat these Germans. They were bringing no good to the people of Europe. If left
unchecked, they would bring no good to us too.” 452
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Allen, commander of the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry
Regiment was interviewed by the 3rd Information and Historical Services, Headquarters III U.S.
Corps on January 16, 1945 at Montfaucon, France. In the interview, he stated, “The principal
reason for the success of the enemy penetration of December 16-17, 1944 was that there just
wasn’t enough troops available at the time to offset the German attack in force.” Early in the
morning on December 16, Allen received a report from the regiment S-2 that approximately fifty
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German infantry soldiers were attacking the Company H mortar position which was set up within
the 3rd Battalion. A kitchen truck returning to the rear from Company A was ambushed by an
unknown number of Germans. Late in the afternoon, seven tanks approached Allen’s position.
Lieutenant Colonel Allen manned a .50 caliber machine gun and fired 150 rounds at the
advancing Germans. After the last burst, forty Germans surrendered. 453 “After enormous
pressure from the Germans we had to withdrew to fight another day,” commented Allen. “We
were not going to give up on beating the Nazis. That is what we traveled across Europe to do. To
beat them back and end their reign of terror.” 454
First Lieutenant, Jack Colbaugh, 108th Field Artillery Battalion, was the forward
observer who directed the first artillery shell fired into Germany during the Siegfried Line
Campaign. During a 1985 interview with Gus Hickock, 28th Division Association Historian,
Colbaugh recalled a story about the British Royal West Kent Regiment fighting in Burma who
were surrounded by a Japanese division. The regiment had killed over 4,000 Japanese before
they were finally relieved. Someone from the British regiment left behind an inscription from
World War I. It read, “When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow we gave
ours today.” 455 Colbaugh went on to say, “Well, that’s what our buddies did. We were men at
that moment and we held at all cost in the Bulge. The Luxembourgers will never forget. They
were in love with the men of the 28th Division.” 456
When asked why he thought the 28th Division was there, Colbaugh replied, “We went to
war to defeat a monstrous animal, a Nazi Dictator, enslaving the people of Europe, who had his
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eyes on enslaving us. Roosevelt sent us with a message for him. It was victory at all cost, those
were our orders.” 457 In Colbaugh’s judgement, the action of the 28th had become known as the
greatest single achievement in the history of the United States Army. The German attack failed
to crash through to the Meuse and Antwerp. “It may have been the crucial moment of the
war.” 458
The men of the 28th Division were proud of what they accomplished. They felt that they
were strong in the face of over-whelming odds and honored their dead. Perhaps a poem written
by Private First Class Russell G. Ogborn, Company E, 112th Infantry Regiment in August 1945
epitomizes the attitude of the soldiers of the division. They knew what they came to Europe to do
and were proud of what they had done. It was published in the division newsletter, distributed to
the troops, and reads:
They were formed in Pennsylvania,
Joined by men from every state,
With the keystone for their emblem
They were called the twenty-eight!
They hit the beach at Omaha,
Crossed the hedges row by row,
Where the Jerry learned to hate and fear
The keystone’s ruddy glow.
Fire and movement were their watchwords
As they climbed up Hill 210,
Wrote a bloody page for history
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In the woods of Compiegne.
A victory march in Paris,
Ever forward with the dawn,
Through Belgium, France and Luxembourg
The twenty-eighth “rolled on.”
The Siegfried line has seen them
All along its mighty wall,
From Aachen, south to Alsace,
Where they fought at Colmar’s fall.
There are towns they’ll long remember –
Vossenack, Schmidt and Kommerscheidt,
And the break-through in December
When they slowed the German tide.
With blood and sweet they carved a niche,
In history’s hall of fame.
With deeds of valor shining bright
And victory was their aim.
In Valhalla’s halls their heroes live,
Who fell along the way,
They’re resting now, awaiting call
To march on judgement day.
When my last recall is sounded
May I go there to dwell,
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And march again with the legions
Of the Gentlemen from Hell!459
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
This chapter will conclude this dissertation study by summarizing the key research
findings in relation to the research aims and questions and discuss the value and contribution
thereof. It will also review the limitations of the study and propose opportunities for future
research.
The purpose of this study was to determine what motivated the soldiers of the 28th
Infantry Division, in the face of overwhelming odds, to fight so stubbornly during the first few
days of the Battle of the Bulge to delay the German plan of attack. This study aimed to answer
three research questions:
1. What forces beyond camaraderie and cohesion influenced soldiers to resist the
German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge?
2. How did faith factor into the nexus of ideas that inspired the perseverance of the
soldiers?
3. How significant was the delaying action of the 28th Division to the Allied success in
the Battle of the Bulge?
As the last major German offensive of the war, and the United States largest land battle of World
War II, the Battle of the Bulge is frequently examined in literature. Despite this, historians
continue to focus primarily on physical aspects, unit cohesion and camaraderie and suggesting
that physical forces were the single influence on the final result. This research employed primary
and secondary sources to conduct the historical analysis and provide an interpretation of the
motivating factors that caused the soldiers of the U.S. Army 28th Infantry Division to delay the
Germans. By analyzing the various interpretations presented in the literature and personal
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accounts, this research produced a re-interpretation of the first days of the Battle of the Bulge
through the perspective of combat motivating factors.
The specific actions that were taken by the division soldiers to slow the German advance
was examined. This study has shown that the actions of the soldiers of the 28th Division delayed
the German plan to capture Antwerp, Belgium long enough for the Allies to re-enforce the
Bastogne, Belgium area and halt the German advance. While organized in strongpoints along the
Luxembourg-German border, the 28th Division troops were able to establish fields of fire at key
road intersections, avenues of approach to towns, and hilltops to interdict the German attacks. In
some cases, the men fought to the last man and in a few cases surrendered only when all
ammunition was expended and they no longer had the means to resist.
Despite intense German artillery, mortar, small arms, and tank fire and a scarcity of
ammunition the men continued to fight. Taking the brunt of the German assault were the three
regiments of the 28th Infantry Division – the 109th, 110th and 112th. Facing overwhelming
German forces, without any sleep, often without food, the soldiers of the division fought
nonstop, often until the last bullet and last man, to stop the German drive. Overall, the 28th
Division would identify elements of nine German divisions in its sector before the battle was
over.
How faith factored into the nexus of ideas that inspired the perseverance of the soldiers
was examined. The study found that the soldiers brought with them to Europe their religious
beliefs and continued to practice their faith even in adverse circumstances. Religion and faith
were tremendously important to American soldiers in World War II. Religious beliefs and
practices and ideas of freedom of religion are basic elements in American culture and this ethos
naturally extended to the U.S. military. Many soldiers attended religious services when they were
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available. Soldiers read from the Pocket Bibles chaplains handed out. Some men felt that God
protected them as they faced their enemy. The freedom to practice their religion was an integral
part of why they fought so bravely.
American soldiers found comfort and motivation through prayer on the front lines of
World War II. Despite witnessing horrific acts, most soldiers remained steadfast in their religious
beliefs. Some even performed heroic acts believing that God would not permit them to be killed.
General Patton’s prayer was distributed to every man prior to the German attack on December
16, as a reminder that prayer was not only important, but encouraged by their leadership. The
soldiers were constantly reminded that freedom of religion was part of the American way of life.
This study followed the Division from their training in the United States and England,
their landing on the beach in Normandy and their fight and pursuit of the Germans through the
hedgerow country at Percy, Hill 210, Gathemo and Hill 288, across France, as it faced the
pillboxes in the Siegfried Line in Germany and the nightmare of the Hürtgen Forest. All the way
the personal commitment of the soldiers of the need to fight for the American way of life never
wavered. The 28th Infantry Division went to rest in Luxembourg, thinking that the war would
soon be over. They had sustained some 6,184 casualties in 18 days of fighting in some of the
worst conditions imaginable in the Hürtgen Forest. They relaxed and thought about Christmas
and going home. When the Germans attacked on December 16, the thoughts of going home soon
evaporated and the men realized their fight for the American way of life was not over. They
summoned the strength and confronted the overwhelming German onslaught. Many asked God
to protect them as they frustrated the Germans by whatever means they had.
In the Ardennes positions the division was in the process of absorbing replacements for
their casualties and re-building the three infantry regiments which had been decimated. Tribute is
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due to the men who were together for only a couple of weeks, who had not trained together,
almost total strangers, and yet were soldiers all and fought for the American way of life until
killed, wounded or overrun.
Research identified stories about the men who had taken the brunt of the German
offensive in Luxembourg. They fought gallantly and desperately in hundreds of scattered battles.
There were days and nights of incredible heroism Stories of some who were awarded the Silver
Star, Bronze Star, and Distinguished Service Cross for their actions serve as a testament to the
commitment of the Americans. Some of them received the awards posthumously. These stories
offers us insight into sacrifice on the battlefield and demonstrates the honor and courage with
which they and so many other soldiers fought.
The principal reason the soldiers fought to delay the Germans advance was identified. A
review of the literature about the Battle of the Bulge yielded significant gaps in the
understanding of what motivated the 28th Infantry Division soldiers during the first few days of
the Battle of the Bulge. Some literature argues that soldiers fight because of unit cohesion or
fighting for one’s buddy while others suggest that ideology plays a role, albeit a secondary one.
The soldiers had read and seen films about life in Nazi Germany in theaters before going
to war and posters appeared that emphasized the need to defeat the Nazis. They had heard
speeches by political leaders and were constantly reminded of the reason they were fighting the
Germans. The government had a concerted effort to gain support for the war. Citizens were
encouraged to support the war effort and were encouraged enter the military to fight for the
American way of life. Along with instilling teamwork, and learning the basics of survival, drill
sergeants stressed the importance of winning to preserve the American way of life. The Why We
Fight films along with other orientation films and materials were shown to American soldiers
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during basic training, and chaplains not only tended to the soldiers religious needs, but they also
continued to underscore why it was necessary to defeat the Germans.
William Henderson argues that cohesion in the primary motivational factor that must be
considered in any study of combat motivation. He equates cohesion with terms such as spirit de
corps, group morale, and elan. While Henderson’s conclusions are plausible when groups of
soldiers train together and fight together over time, due to the losses the division encountered
during its fighting across Europe, the division units were filled with replacement soldiers. Many
companies experienced dips in effective strength of fifty percent or greater even as they
attempted to assimilate new replacements. For example, the men of the 28th Division were only
in Luxembourg after their Hürtgen Forest experience for three weeks before the Germans
attacked, it is unlikely that the men could have developed a sense of unit cohesion. As a result of
the significant turn-over of personnel, the bonds that had been developed between the veterans
who had been with the division since its initial training did not exist. In many cases leaders did
not know the names of their replacements and the veterans found it difficult to bond with the
new replacements.
Unit cohesion and camaraderie undoubtedly were strong motivators when soldiers are
together and have a chance to get to know each other and how they can count of each other. As
the 28th Division confronted the Germans from one battle to the next, the number of casualties
grew. The men who left the training in Wales were not the ones who fought the next major
battle. The attrition of war since the division landed in Normandy steadily thinned out the ranks.
Lone replacements found themselves among groups of strangers with little chance to get
acquainted before being flung into battle, so there had to be other factors that motivated the men
to fight as they did. Challenging the conventional ideas about why soldiers fight and the
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contribution of the 28th Infantry Division during the Battle of the Bulge, this study concluded
overwhelmingly that the soldiers of the 28th Division believed they were fighting to preserve the
American way of life, which included freedom to worship, freedom from oppression, and
freedom of movement.
Despite the near destruction of its infantry regiments, the Division retained significant
resilient structure with an experienced headquarters that continued to function proficiently,
supporting elements survived generally intact, and most companies retained small veteran cores.
The core of veterans continued to support the idea of fighting for the American way of life with
the new replacements. It is clear from interviews and personal accounts that the overriding
reason why the men of the 28th Infantry Division fought so fiercely do delay the Germans during
the first days of the Battle of the Bulge was to insure the American way of life. Personal
narratives, interviews, unit historical summaries, journals, and after action reports constituted a
substantial portion of this study. The comments made by veterans were substantiated by
comparing their statements with after action reports, unit reports and interviews conducted
shortly after the battles.
Throughout the soldiers’ personal interviews, and writings, we see the soldiers return to
the idea that the Nazis had to be defeated so that freedoms in America would not be affected.
This sense of duty and willingness to fight is reflected in letters the soldiers wrote home and in
diaries and journals they kept during the war.
This study adds to the historiography of the Battle of the Bulge by discovering previously
unpublished details about the specific actions taken by the three regiments of the 28th Infantry
Division and placing them in the larger context of the Battle. Historians and writers have
virtually skipped over the heroic efforts of the 28th Division units who had been badly battered
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by their engagements attempting to breach the German Siegfried Line and in the fierce battles in
the Hürtgen Forest. Future researchers can now have a more thorough understanding of why the
Germans were not able to execute their plans, and what caused the soldiers on the front line to
fight so determinedly.
Many veterans of World War II were reluctant to talk about their experiences, their
religious beliefs, and what motivated them to fight. Most say, they did their duty and came home.
Interviews of veterans many years after the war may be skewed with sentimental memories and
jaded with time. In future studies the circumstances described by veterans in these interviews
should be corroborated with reports and interviews conducted as close to the events as possible.
The availability of interviews and reports shortly after the Battle of the Bulge was a limitation
during research for this study, however, there was overwhelming evidence corroborated with
after action reports, chaplain reports, and unit summaries to support the conclusions.
While this study only examined the motivations of the soldiers of the 28th Infantry
Division, it lays the groundwork for future research on the role that such motivations have on the
soldiers willingness to fight and the role leaders and government efforts play in motivating
soldiers. Future researches must weigh the validity of the statements of veterans years after their
experiences with primary source evidence from documents produced during or shortly after the
events.
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